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“We feel that fundamentally Wall Street is sound, and that for people who
can afford to pay for them outright, good stocks are cheap at these prices.”
– Goodbody and Company market-letter quoted in The New
York Times (Friday, October 25, 1929)
“Life’s biggest tragedy is that we get old too soon and wise too late.”
– Benjamin Franklin

1 Introduction
The U.S. housing bubble, with house prices peaking in 2006, was primarily initiated by
lax mortgage lending standards of U.S. banks. As interest rates increased, however, fewer
and fewer debtors were able to service their outstanding loans, which contributed to a
sudden rise of the default rates of U.S. subprime mortgages in mid 2007. The following
credit crunch, forcing banks to write down several hundred billion dollars in bad loans, has
caused the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression (Brunnermeier, 2009).
However, the unprecedented International Financial Crisis of 2007 to 2009 would not have
reached such a global and disastrous scale without the bankruptcy of the investment bank
Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
Before then, large and interconnected financial institutions were generally considered
as ”too-big-too-fail”, ”too-interconnected-too-fail” or just ”systemically important” be-
cause their default would easily trigger banking system turmoil with contagious effects
spreading from one bank to the other. Therefore, bondholders and managers of those
banks perceived their investments to be backed by implicit government bailout guaranties
in the case of failure. This strategy worked for investors of Bear Stearns and Northern
Rock. Both banks were rescued by their governments after experiencing significant losses
in the aftermath of the U.S. credit crunch. In the case of Lehman Brothers, though,
the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank were not willing to
provide rescue funds guaranteed by the taxpayers to offset its liquidity shortage resulting
from heavy subprime mortgage losses in early 2008 (Brunnermeier, 2009).
One explanation for this proceeding was the strategy to break the vicious cycle be-
tween large banks’ ”too-big-too-fail” status and their corresponding government bailout
guarantees. Nonetheless, the decision resulted in a loss of confidence of financial mar-
ket participants and a disruption of the interbank lending market, which led to a severe
liquidity crisis that globally prompted governments and central banks to intervene and
bailout financial institutions. Thus, the Lehman bankruptcy can be best described as the
trigger of a systemic event that significantly aggravated the U.S. credit crunch. Generally,
such an event can be regarded as the materialization of the banking system’s underlying
level of systemic risk, whereas systemic risk is tantamount to the risk of the occurrence of
a severe banking crisis with spillover effects to the real economy (FSB, IMF, BIS, 2009).
As a response to the International Financial Crisis and the ripple effects of the default
of the investment bank Lehman Brothers, the Group of Twenty agreed on the implemen-
tation of a whole bunch of new regulatory rules commonly summarized as Basel III with
the purpose of, besides improving microprudential supervision, fostering the resilience
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of the banking system by introducing macroprudential measures such as counter-cyclical
capital buffers and capital surcharges for systemically important banks. The adequate
application of such macroprudential measures, however, necessitates the precise measure-
ment of a banking system’s level of systemic risk and a comprehensive understanding of
the particularities of systemically important banks.
Notwithstanding the ongoing efforts of politicians, regulators, and supervisors to im-
prove the stability of the global banking system and hence the reduction of systemic risk,
European banks, especially those in the euro area, are still suffering from the long-term
consequences of the International Financial Crisis and the subsequent European Sovereign
Debt Crisis. Today, however, the insufficient profitability patterns of a lot of banks and
the unsustainable business models of some of the largest European banks are in the spot-
light and a growing concern for aggregate banking system stability (see, e.g., European
Central Bank, May 2014, Financial Stability Review).
Unfortunately, especially the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB)
targeted at stimulating economic growth in the euro area with interest rates at or close
to zero has become a growing drag on banks’ profitability patterns. It is more and more
difficult for banks to achieve profits from maturity transformation because the yield curve
flattened over the last couple of years. Moreover, at current market rates, banks are unable
to profitably invest the excess supply of deposits into liquid and more or less risk-free
financial assets. The fact that financial institutions are facing ever increasing costs from
regulation and an enhanced competition from Fintechs is not particularly helpful either.
Given the European economic environment, one recurring expert suggestion to boost
banks’ business model profitability and sustainability is the increased diversification into
non-interest income generating activities such as fees and commissions. The question
that remains, however, is whether the diversification into non-interest income is a gener-
ally valid option for the average bank.
This thesis consists out of three essays on systemic risk, systemic importance, and bank
profitability. To be more precise, the essays address the following three main questions.
How should we evaluate the viability of systemic risk measures? Do systemically im-
portant banks (SIBs) exhibit default risk and return characteristics that are distinctively
different from non-SIBs? How can banks adjust their business models in order to achieve
sufficiently high but sustainable risk-adjusted profitability patterns in the post-crisis area?
The first essay (Do¨ring et al., 2016, Systemic risk measures and their viability for bank-
ing supervision) contributes to the literature by proposing a criteria-based framework to
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assess the viability of systemic risk measures as a monitoring tool for banking supervision
and investigates the bank characteristics that determine the banking system’s overall level
of systemic risk. We empirically evaluate and compare the Marginal Expected Shortfall
(MES) (Acharya et al., 2010), the SRISK measure (Acharya et al., 2012; Brownlees and
Engle, 2015), and the Conditional Value at Risk (CoVaR) (Adrian and Brunnermeier,
2016) on the basis of a representative sample of listed European institutions covering the
period from July 2005 to June 2013. The three measures have had the highest impact on
research and regulation over the past years and are applied by the U.S. Department of
the Treasury and the European Systemic Risk Board.
We assess the monitoring qualities of the former systemic risk measures (SRMs) by
focusing on their forecasting capabilities for a set of major aggregated bank-specific and
macroeconomic state variables. We find that all of them are informative for the prediction
of the future state of the banking system; however, the measures vary significantly in their
predictive power for the state of the real economy. In fact, only the MES and the SRISK
measure are able to significantly explain future variations in the macroeconomic state
variables. Furthermore, we find that the system-wide market-to-book and loan-to-deposit
ratios act as fundamental drivers of systemic risk.
The results have paramount implications. First, the market-to-book ratio itself may
be used as a simple and efficient proxy for the systemic tension in the banking system.
Second, the systemic relevance of the loan-to-deposit ratio underlines the critical role of
funding liquidity and supports recently proposed regulatory initiatives that curb aggre-
gate liquidity risks, i.e., the Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Net Stable Funding
Ratio. Third, the inclusion of balance sheet data is beneficial for systemic risk measure-
ment, which becomes obvious in a comparison between SRMs based on both balance sheet
data and stock market information and SRMs based solely on stock market information.
The second essay (Do¨ring et al., 2016a, Systemic importance, default risk, and prof-
itability in the European banking system) examines the relation between banks’ systemic
importance and their default risk and return characteristics on a broad sample of listed
European banks. To be more specific, we analyze whether systemically important banks
(SIBs) exhibit default risk and return patterns that are distinctively different from those
of non-systemically important banks (non-SIBs). We apply the SRISK (Acharya et al.,
2012; Brownlees and Engle, 2015) as the measure of systemic importance.
By grouping banks into quintiles according to their systemic importance we show
that SIBs’ default risk and return characteristics feature above average pro-cyclicality
with respect to economic conditions. We do not find evidence that non-SIBs exhibit
1 Introduction 4
such patterns. These insights are particularly important for the design of macropruden-
tial stress-testing procedures because supervisors need to separately account for SIBs’
and non-SIBs’ sensitivities to macroeconomic shocks. Our finding on the increased pro-
cyclicality of SIBs’ financial stability patterns also indicates the usefulness of the Basel III
leverage ratio for the regulation of SIBs since the former measure acts much more counter-
cyclical than current regulations on risk-weighted assets (Brei and Gambacorta, 2015).
Furthermore, systemic importance coincides with significantly weaker return patterns.
That is, SIBs feature annual returns that are around 5% lower than those of non-SIBs.
In contrast, the 20% least systemically important banks exhibit returns that are approxi-
mately 2% higher when compared to more systemically important banks. Institutions’ sys-
temic nature, however, cannot be associated with higher levels of default risk, challenging
the notion that systemically important banks take excessive risks as a result of perceived
bailout guarantees. In fact, SIBs exhibit levels of ameliorating default risk over time.
The third essay (Do¨ring, 2016, Risk-adjusted bank performance and income diversifi-
cation) contributes to the academic literature by analyzing the effects of income diversifi-
cation on banks’ profitability patterns for a broad sample of listed and unlisted euro area
banks covering the period from 2007 to 2014. We measure bank profitability employing
the ratio return on risk-weighted assets (RoRWA) and proxy a bank’s income diversifi-
cation by calculating the shares of non-interest income, fee income, trading income, and
other non-interest income in total operating income.
We apply the two-step system GMM (generalized method of moments) regression
technique for estimation purposes developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell
and Bond (1998) in order to account for the possibility of reverse causalities between
banks’ risk-adjusted profitability patterns and their non-interest income shares. The
system GMM estimator is further capable of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
across our sample banks by first differencing the employed regression variables.
Our empirical analysis shows that the diversification into non-interest income activi-
ties such as fees, commissions, and trading substantially increases a bank’s profitability,
supporting the existence of economies of scope. However, we also find that a diversifica-
tion into other non-interest revenue streams is disadvantageous for the average bank. Yet,
the significance of the relations between the fee and trading income shares and bank per-
formance depends to a large extent on bank type and bank size. That is to say, especially
investment banks and banks with a stock exchange listing profit from the economies of
scope resulting from fee generating activities, whereas smaller banks are the only ones that
are able to significantly increase their RoRWAs by diversifying into trading activities.
2 Systemic risk measures and their
viability for banking supervision
2.1 Introduction
How should we monitor systemic risk? In the aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy that
triggered an unprecedented international financial crisis this question has become of vital
interest to regulators and researchers. Over the last years, a large number of approaches
to measure both – systemic importance (at the institutional level) and systemic risk (at
the banking system level) – have been proposed.
The Bank for International Settlements (2013), for example, identifies systemically
important financial institutions (SIFIs) by various balance and off-balance sheet charac-
teristics such as size, interconnectedness, and substitutability. Moreover, academia has
recommended a whole bunch of approaches with a strand of literature based on asset
prices applying standard risk measures such as the Conditional Value at Risk (Adrian
and Brunnermeier, 2016) and the Marginal Expected Shortfall (Acharya et al., 2010), ex-
treme value theory (De Jonghe, 2010; Zhou, 2010), principal components analysis (Billio
et al., 2012; Kritzman et al., 2011), and credit default models and default probabilities
(Suh, 2012; Gray and Jobst, 2010; Huang et al., 2009; Segoviano and Goodhart, 2009;
Lehar, 2005). Another strand of literature applies network analysis to investigate systemic
risk arising from interbank relationships (e.g., Halaj and Kok Sorensen, 2013; Drehmann
and Tarashev, 2013; Allen et al., 2010). Furthermore, supervisors and academia suggest
the use of simple market indicators such as Libor-OIS and credit default swap spreads
for the monitoring of systemic risk. For an extensive survey on the literature on systemic
risk measurement we refer to Bisias et al. (2012).
Despite the multitude of approaches, research on the measures’ capability to effec-
tively capture and predict the dynamics of systemic risk and its potential consequences
is scarce. For macroprudential policymaking and supervision, however, the assessment
of the measures’ adequacy as a monitoring tool is crucial. But how can we determine
whether systemic risk measures (SRMs) are viable as a monitoring tool or not?
While it is difficult to assess SRMs at the institutional level because an individual
bank’s rank with respect to its systemic importance is predominantly determined by
the applied measure, evaluating SRMs at the banking system level is more expedient.
According to the definition of the International Monetary Fund, aggregate systemic risk
is the risk of excessive losses within all or parts of the financial system with imminent
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negative spillover effects to the real economy (FSB, IMF, BIS, 2009). Recent research
supports this definition. E.g., Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) show that systemic financial
crises often have substantial adverse effects on the overall state of the economy, such as
drops in asset prices, output, and employment levels. Therefore, expedient SRMs should
be capable of pre-identifying banking system distress as well as downturns in the real
economy in order to gauge the overall level of systemic risk.
This paper contributes to the literature on the analysis of SRMs and underlying aggre-
gate systemic risk by proposing a criteria-based framework that can be applied to assess
the viability of SRMs as a monitoring tool for banking supervision. We make use of
our assessment framework and empirically evaluate and compare the Marginal Expected
Shortfall (MES), the related SRISK measure (Acharya et al., 2012; Brownlees and Engle,
2015), and the Conditional Value at Risk (CoVaR). Over the past years, these measures
have had the highest impact on research and regulations. They are applied by the U.S.
Treasury Department and the European Systemic Risk Board.
To be more specific, we compute time series of cross-sectional averages for the bank-
level series of MES, SRISK, and CoVaR in order to evaluate the measures’ capability
of capturing the level of systemic risk by focusing on their predictive power for a set of
major aggregated bank-specific and macroeconomic state variables. We investigate the
directionalities and dependencies between the SRMs and the latter variables employing
vector autoregressions. This approach allows us to simultaneously examine the aggregate
bank characteristics that determine the banking system’s overall level of systemic risk,
which is vital in order to achieve macroeconomic stability (Arnold et al., 2012). We
apply the measures to a broad sample of European publicly listed banks analyzing the
level of systemic risk in the European banking system in the period between July 2005
and June 2013. The latter provides a unique setting for the evaluation of SRMs, as
European institutions were affected by both the Subprime Crisis including the subsequent
International Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis.
Our main results are as follows. We find that all three SRMs generally possess substan-
tial predictive power for bank-specific state variables, including those that directly proxy
for the banking system’s capital strength and crisis resilience. For instance, an increase
in the value of the measures coincides with an increase in the future level of system-wide
leverage and a decrease of aggregate equity values. The forecasting capabilities of MES
and SRISK for macroeconomic state variables, particularly for aggregate production and
employment, are superior to those of CoVaR, however. In fact, CoVaR’s capability of
capturing the future state of the real economy is rather poor. Thus, given the depen-
dencies between the SRMs and bank-specific and macroeconomic state variables, only the
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dynamics of MES and SRISK are informative for the identification of true systemic events.
A sharp increase of the latter coincides with a deterioration of the state of the banking
system and a decrease in macroeconomic activity. A sharp increase in CoVaR, on the
contrary, does not precisely distinguish between banking system turmoil with no macroe-
conomic effects and systemic banking crises that cause downturns in the real economy.
Our analysis additionally reveals that the ratio of market valued equity to book val-
ued equity (MTB) and the ratio of total loans to total customer deposits (LTD), both
calculated as the aggregate of institutions within the predefined banking system, act as
fundamental drivers of systemic risk. Both ratios significantly determine the future dy-
namics of MES, SRISK, and CoVaR at the banking system level. I.e., lower levels of the
MTB ratio (higher levels of the LTD ratio) are associated with higher levels of future
systemic risk.
The results have paramount implications. First, the MTB ratio, capturing the mar-
ket’s view about banks’ aggregate risk of financial distress by itself, may be used as a
simple early warning indicator for the banking system’s systemic tension. The latter in-
dicated a significant deterioration in the value of European banks as early as in 2007,
pointing at the risk of a systemic banking crisis. Moreover, since it is well-documented
in literature that lower MTB values of equity can be mainly attributed to lower earnings
expectations, higher earnings uncertainty, and elevated debt burdens (Chen and Zhang,
1998; Fama and French, 1995), our findings indicate that banks’ earnings volatility con-
tributes to systemic risk. Thus, supervisors might incentivize institutions to establish
more sustainable business models with higher earnings certainty such as to reduce their
vulnerability in times of crises, thereby reducing institutions’ aggregate systemic footprint.
Second, the significance of the aggregate LTD ratio demonstrates that an effective
regulation of funding liquidity risk is vital to lower the overall level of systemic risk.
Therefore, our empirical findings stress the importance of the new Basel III guidelines
concerning limits on institutions’ liquidity mismatch and the strengthening of the institu-
tions’ ability to survive periods of stress without market funding, namely the Net Stable
Funding Ratio and the Liquidity Coverage Ratio.
Finally, our results reveal that the inclusion of balance sheet data is beneficial for sys-
temic risk measurement. This becomes particularly visible in a comparison between SRMs
based on both balance sheet and stock market information and SRMs based exclusively
on stock market information.
Our paper is most closely related to the work of Rodriguez-Moreno and Pen˜a (2013),
who evaluate the performance of SRMs at the banking system level based on their cor-
relation with an index of systemic events and policy actions. In contrast, we establish a
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criteria-based approach that explicitly considers the consequences of changes in the SRMs’
level of systemic risk for a set of aggregated bank-specific and macroeconomic state vari-
ables. Our approach does not require the identification of systemic events that may be
prone to selection biases. Moreover, we are – to the best of our knowledge – the first to
identify aggregate bank characteristics that drive the overall level of systemic risk.
We contribute to a growing body of literature on the MES, SRISK, and CoVaR mea-
sures, which can be systemized as follows. The first strand implements MES, SRISK
(e.g., Engle et al., 2014; Idier et al., 2014; Acharya and Steffen, 2013) or CoVaR (e.g.,
Weiß et al., 2014; Brunnermeier et al., 2012; Lo´pez-Espinosa et al., 2012) and identifies
determinants of systemic importance at the institutional level. These studies find, among
others, that balance sheet characteristics such as banks’ non-interest income, short-term
wholesale funding or regulatory standards substantially drive an institution’s systemic
importance.
Another strand of literature compares or extends these measures. Jiang (2012) an-
alyzes the tail dependence structure of MES and CoVaR. Benoit et al. (2013) rank US
financial institutions according to MES, SRISK, and CoVaR and find that the risk mea-
sures can be proxied by market risk and liabilities. Lo¨ﬄer and Raupach (2013) estimate
the robustness of MES and CoVaR. Girardi and Ergu¨n (2013) propose the use of bivariate
GARCH estimates to measure CoVaR and Cao (2013) extends the CoVaR measure from
one bank being in financial distress to a set of one or more banks being in distress.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the sample
selection and Section 2.3 defines the SRMs. In Section 2.4 we introduce our assessment
framework as well as the employed aggregated bank-specific and macroeconomic variables.
Section 2.5 presents and discusses our results and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Sample selection
Our empirical analysis focuses on the European banking system. We concentrate on the
member states of the European Union to ensure sufficient homogeneous banking regula-
tion across our sample excluding countries from Eastern Europe. However, we additionally
include Switzerland due to its comparable regulatory standards and the country’s indi-
vidual banking sector’s importance within the European banking system.1 Our sample
covers the period from July 2005 to June 2013 including the International Financial Crisis
1 All member states of the European Union and Switzerland implemented the Basel II Directives
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC and are introducing the new Basel III criteria.
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from 2007 to 2009 and the subsequent European Sovereign Debt Crisis.
Beyond location, we select banks according to the following two main criteria: free
float market capitalization and total assets. By restricting our sample to free float publicly
listed institutions, we ensure that all sample banks are actively traded and that institu-
tions’ share prices adequately reflect their financial state and health. Thus, as a starting
point we identify all banks that are included in the STOXX Europe TMI Banks Index in
at least one quarter within the sample period and select those that fit our geographical
restrictions.2 This procedure ensures that our sample of banks adequately reflects the
aggregate of traded stocks of banks in Western Europe leaving us with 126 banks.3
In the next step, all preselected banks are ranked with respect to their size in total
assets. Based on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) approved by the European
Commission, the European Central Bank started supervising euro area based banks with
total assets exceeding e30bn in November 2014 (Council Regulation 1024/2013/EU). Re-
stricting our sample to institutions that fulfill the latter criterion for at least one quarter
within the sample period, we ensure that our sample only includes institutions with rele-
vant systemic exposure to the European banking system. Furthermore, we apply a penny
stock sanction excluding banks in case their stock is traded at a price of lower than e1
for 22 consecutive trading days. To ensure that our sample does not suffer from any
survivorship biases, we do not exclude banks that are delisted from the STOXX Europe
TMI Banks Index.
The resulting sample contains 84 banks from 15 countries including Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. As a result of bankruptcies, merg-
ers and acquisitions, and new listings the number of sample banks varies over time with
a maximum of 78 and a minimum of 51 banks per sample quarter.
For our predefined selection of banks, we obtain all stock price information and quar-
terly balance sheet data from Datastream. Table 2.1 displays the names and different
characteristics of the banks in our sample and Table 2.2 provides a summary of the lat-
ter. The institutions’ mean total assets over the sample period range from e13.8bn to
2 The individual banks are admitted into the index based on their free float market capitalization
and cover roughly 95% of the free float market capitalization of all banks headquartered in Western
Europe. The index composition is updated on a quarterly basis (STOXX Limited, 2013, STOXX
Index Methodology Guide, http://www.stoxx.com/indices/rulebooks.html).
3 To our preselection of banks we furthermore add the ING Groep. STOXX classifies the ING Groep
as an insurance company. However, a substantial part of ING’s revenue comes from banking related
activities. In addition, the bank is classified as a global systemically important bank by the Financial
Stability Board.
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Institution Country ISIN Total assets Rank Leverage Rank Market-to-book Rank Profitability Rank
ABN AMRO Holding N.V. Netherlands NL0000301109 794,905 15 14.25 67 3.39 83 0.5712 27
Ageas N.V. Belgium BE0974264930 420,419 23 23.48 45 1.36 52 -3.2078 84
Agricultural Bank of Greece S.A. Greece GRS414003004 25,216 80 30.99 34 14.39 84 -1.2763 81
Alliance & Leicester PLC United Kingdom GB0000386143 90,321 48 52.37 18 1.27 45 0.3100 46
Allied Irish Banks PLC Ireland IE0000197834 148,411 38 71.99 12 1.51 60 -0.9409 80
Alpha Bank A.E. Greece GRS015013006 56,845 60 34.71 29 1.18 38 -0.0445 71
Banca Antonveneta S.p.A. Italy IT0003270102 44,553 67 6.19 83 2.59 81 0.2621 48
Banca Carige S.p.A. Italy IT0003211601 33,588 71 13.62 68 1.09 29 0.4959 31
Banca Civica S.A. Spain ES0148873005 74,048 55 87.40 8 0.30 5 0.1397 62
Banca Lombarda Italy IT0000062197 40,222 68 7.52 81 2.04 79 0.7362 15
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A. Italy IT0001334587 196,445 33 37.52 28 0.82 17 -0.0375 70
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro S.p.A. Italy IT0001254884 88,283 49 10.59 75 1.75 74 0.5646 29
Banca Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna Italy IT0000066123 52,307 61 21.96 50 0.89 21 0.4140 39
Banca Popolare di Milano Italy IT0000064482 45,742 66 25.63 40 0.72 12 0.1460 61
Banca Popolare di Sondrio Italy IT0000784196 21,916 82 11.42 72 1.42 57 0.5391 30
Banca Popolare Italiana S.C.A.R.L. Italy IT0000064300 46,138 64 7.86 80 1.79 76 -0.1701 72
Banche Popolari Unite S.C.A.R.L. Italy IT0003487029 109,530 43 22.88 47 0.73 13 0.2368 52
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. Spain ES0113211835 507,807 19 13.08 69 1.64 68 0.8504 9
Banco Comercial Portugues S.A. Portugal PTBCP0AM0007 87,428 52 30.47 35 1.30 47 0.2058 56
Banco de Sabadell S.A. Spain ES0113860A34 88,060 50 16.79 63 1.26 43 0.6536 20
Banco Espanol de Credito S.A. Spain ES0113440038 104,562 45 22.78 48 1.38 53 0.4690 33
Banco Espirito Santo S.A. Portugal PTBES0AM0007 70,588 56 18.94 54 0.98 25 0.4895 32
Banco Pastor S.A. Spain ES0113790085 26,549 77 19.90 53 1.32 49 0.4449 36
Banco Popolare Societa CooperativaAz. Italy IT0004231566 108,159 44 32.35 33 0.68 10 0.1641 59
Banco Popular Espanol S.A. Spain ES0113790226 114,220 41 17.00 61 1.44 58 0.6177 23
Banco Portugues de Investimento S.A. Portugal PTBPI0AM0004 39,802 70 28.11 36 1.70 71 0.4643 34
Banco Santander S.A. Spain ES0113900J37 1,025,916 10 15.78 65 1.17 37 0.6863 18
Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG Austria AT0000995006 206,010 32 11.21 74 1.46 59 0.9729 4
Bank of Greece Greece GRS004013009 84,172 54 194.01 6 0.50 6 0.2962 47
Bank of Ireland Ireland IE0030606259 169,136 37 60.52 15 1.08 28 0.1949 58
Bankia S.A. Spain ES0113307021 287,902 27 210.26 4 -0.44 1 -2.0169 83
Bankinter Spain ES0113679I37 50,617 62 18.55 55 1.56 65 0.4312 37
Banque Cantonale Vaudoise Switzerland CH0015251710 25,552 78 10.16 77 1.74 72 1.0558 3
Banque Nationale de Belgique S.A. Belgium BE0003008019 100,203 46 80.73 9 0.15 3 0.7001 17
Barclays PLC United Kingdom GB0031348658 1,633,656 5 46.37 23 1.11 31 0.3259 45
Basler Kantonalbank Switzerland CH0009236461 22,432 81 44.05 25 0.28 4 0.7228 16
Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG Germany DE0008022005 457,780 21 17.43 59 1.42 56 0.1281 63
BNP Paribas S.A. France FR0000131104 1,743,205 1 33.25 32 0.95 24 0.3738 41
Bradford & Bingley PLC United Kingdom GB0002228152 64,273 58 120.48 7 0.88 20 0.1270 64
Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel de Paris France FR0000045528 29,870 74 50.64 21 0.58 7 0.9527 5
Caixabank S.A. Spain ES0140609019 111,228 42 11.86 71 0.79 16 2.5606 2
Capitalia S.p.A. Italy IT0003121495 138,590 39 9.03 79 1.74 73 0.7673 12
Table 2.1 – Bank characteristics and descriptives (continued on the next page)
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Institution Country ISIN Total assets Rank Leverage Rank Market-to-book Rank Profitability Rank
Commercial Bank of Greece Greece GRS006013007 25,549 79 20.63 52 2.72 82 -1.7566 82
Commerzbank AG Germany DE000CBK1001 663,395 16 75.76 10 0.65 8 0.0746 67
Cre´dit Agricole S.A. France FR0000045072 1,465,511 6 66.49 13 0.75 14 0.1258 65
Credit Suisse Group AG Switzerland CH0012138530 805,461 13 23.01 46 1.54 64 0.3263 44
Credito Emiliano S.p.A. CredemAz. Italy IT0003121677 27,395 76 17.17 60 1.22 40 0.5992 25
Credito Valtellinese S.C.A.R.L. Az. Italy IT0000064516 21,571 83 27.99 37 0.66 9 0.2063 55
Danske Bank Denmark DK0010274414 415,945 24 33.83 30 1.04 27 0.2476 50
Depfa Bank Germany IE0072559994 223,521 30 44.54 24 1.86 77 0.2268 53
Deutsche Bank AG Germany DE0005140008 1,722,101 2 53.30 17 0.94 23 0.2040 57
Deutsche Postbank AG Germany DE0008001009 196,433 34 33.52 31 1.24 41 0.1484 60
Dexia S.A. Belgium BE0003796134 523,914 18 506.42 1 0.93 22 -0.2472 73
Erste Group Bank AG Austria AT0000652011 194,229 35 20.65 51 1.34 50 0.3545 42
Eurobank Ergasias S.A. Greece GRS323003004 67,235 57 64.02 14 1.24 42 -0.4100 75
GAM Holding AG Switzerland CH0102659627 13,786 84 3.12 84 1.68 70 13.8219 1
HBOS PLC United Kingdom GB0030587504 805,950 12 51.84 19 1.76 75 -0.3134 74
HSBC Holdings United Kingdom GB0005405286 1,644,162 4 13.06 70 1.42 55 0.6277 21
IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG Germany DE0008063306 40,094 69 73.66 11 0.86 18 -0.5720 77
ING Groep N.V. Netherlands NL0000303600 1,220,294 7 40.27 26 1.15 33 0.3428 43
Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. Italy IT0000072626 542,920 17 301.56 3 0.87 19 0.4532 35
Investec PLCShs United Kingdom GB00B17BBQ50 45,940 65 18.47 57 1.59 66 0.8766 8
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd Ireland IE00B06H8J93 87,850 51 329.59 2 1.19 39 0.8093 11
Julius Ba¨r Switzerland CH0102484968 32,597 72 7.02 82 1.65 69 0.7451 13
Jyske Bank Denmark DK0010307958 28,094 75 15.85 64 1.40 54 0.6222 22
KBC Groep N.V. Belgium BE0003565737 318,055 25 26.93 39 1.11 30 0.2164 54
Lloyds Banking Group United Kingdom GB0008706128 798,099 14 24.21 42 1.53 63 0.3948 40
Mediobanca - Banca di Credito Finanziario S.p.A. Italy IT0000062957 64,004 59 10.51 76 1.26 44 0.9519 6
National Bank of Greece S.A. Greece GRS003003019 93,762 47 24.01 44 1.17 36 -0.7827 79
Natixis Banques Populaires France FR0000120685 425,956 22 50.14 22 0.69 11 0.0777 66
Nordea Bank AB Sweden SE0000427361 485,820 20 18.53 56 1.35 51 0.5956 26
Northern Rock PLC United Kingdom GB0001452795 123,666 40 195.77 5 0.11 2 -0.5364 76
Piraeus Bank S.A. Greece GRS014003008 46,352 63 51.79 20 1.16 34 -0.7509 78
Pohjola Bank PLC Finland FI0009003222 32,148 73 16.83 62 1.16 35 0.6632 19
Raiffeisen Bank International AG Austria AT0000606306 86,980 53 15.23 66 1.52 62 0.9156 7
Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC United Kingdom GB00B7T77214 1,689,769 3 56.99 16 1.15 32 0.0660 69
Sanpaolo IMI S.p.A. Az. Italy IT0001269361 279,409 28 11.26 73 2.17 80 0.7428 14
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB Sweden SE0000148884 236,951 29 22.75 49 1.29 46 0.4223 38
Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale S.A. France FR0000130809 1,054,032 9 38.11 27 1.04 26 0.2606 49
Standard Chartered PLC United Kingdom GB0004082847 299,863 26 9.52 78 1.59 67 0.8342 10
Svenska Handelsbanken AB Sweden SE0000193120 220,029 31 17.59 58 1.51 61 0.6166 24
Swedbank AB Sweden SE0000242455 175,054 36 24.05 43 1.31 48 0.5677 28
UBS AG Switzerland CH0024899483 1,212,246 8 24.99 41 1.99 78 0.0746 68
UniCredit S.p.A. Italy IT0004781412 850,254 11 27.05 38 0.79 15 0.2388 51
Table 2.1 – Bank characteristics and descriptives
The table exhibits figures averaged across the entire time series of quarterly bank characteristics for each of the 84 sample banks. The time series
of observations cover the period from July 2005 to June 2013. Total assets is the book value of total assets expressed in EUR m. Leverage is the
ratio of market valued total assets (book valued total debt + market valued equity) divided by market valued equity and market-to-book is the ratio
of market valued equity divided by book valued equity. Profitability is defined as the ratio of net income over total assets expressed in percentage
terms. All data are obtained from Datastream.
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Statistics Total assets Leverage Market-to-book Profitability
mean 343,964 49.07 1.40 0.41
std dev 466,554 76.42 1.54 1.65
min 13,786 3.12 -0.44 -3.21
q = 0.25 46,298 16.55 0.92 0.13
q = 0.50 110,379 24.13 1.25 0.35
q = 0.75 433,912 50.27 1.53 0.62
max 1,743,205 506.42 14.39 13.82
Table 2.2 – Summary of bank characteristics and descriptives
The table provides a summary of Table 2.1. Total assets is the book value of total assets expressed in
EUR m. The time series of observations cover the period from July 2005 to June 2013. Leverage is the
ratio of market valued total assets (book valued total debt + market valued equity) divided by market
valued equity and market-to-book is the ratio of market valued equity divided by book valued equity.
Profitability is defined as the ratio of net income over total assets expressed in percentage terms. All data
are obtained from Datastream.
e1,743bn. The median-sized bank has around e110bn in total assets. Our sample banks
are leveraged (market leverage) between 3.12 and 506.42 with a median leverage of 24.13
across the sample period. The banks’ mean market-to-book ratio of equity ranges from
-0.44 to 14.39 across the sample period with a sample median of 1.25.4 The institutions’
mean profitability (return on assets) over the sample period ranges from 13.82% to -3.21%
with a sample median of 0.35%.
2.3 Systemic risk measures
This section briefly defines the systemic risk measures (SRMs) implemented in this paper
and elaborates on their econometric implementation.
2.3.1 Marginal Expected Shortfall
The Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) proposed by Acharya et al. (2010) measures the
expected return (loss) of bank i’s stock given that the banking system’s overall return is
in its tail. More intuitively, the MES can be interpreted as the ”participation rate” of
bank i within a financial crisis. Following Acharya et al. (2010), Brownlees and Engle
(2015) introduce a time-dependent dynamic extension of the MES that is defined as bank
4 After its IPO in July 2011, Bankia S.A. requested a bailout of e19bn in May 2012 and was partially
nationalized by the Spanish government. As a consequence, the bank reported on average a negative
balance for its book value of equity over the sample period.
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i’s expected cumulative h-day stock return – i.e., over time interval [t, t+ h] – with the
condition that the banking system’s cumulative h-day return is falling below a predefined
threshold C, indicating distress in the banking system:
MESi,ht (C) = −E
[
Ri;[t,t+h]
∣∣Rsys;[t,t+h] ≤ C ] , (2.1)
with Ri;[t,t+h] denoting bank i’s cumulative stock return over h days:
Ri;[t,t+h] = exp
(
h∑
τ=1
ri,t+τ
)
− 1. (2.2)
ri,t represents the one-day returns of bank i’s stock. The h-day banking system return
Rsys;[t,t+h] is defined analogously. Note that for the ease of interpretation, we switch the
sign for the risk measure. Thus, an increase in the measure indicates an increase in the
level of systemic risk.
2.3.2 SRISK
Based on the MES, Acharya et al. (2012) directly model a bank’s expected undercapital-
ization during a financial crisis. The proposed systemic risk measure, SRISK, therefore
incorporates financial market data as well as balance sheet data. A bank’s capital shortfall
or its undercapitalization, respectively, is defined as the amount of capital that a bank
would have to raise during a financial crisis in order to prevent bankruptcy. Hence, a
bank’s expected time-varying capital shortfall over the time interval [t, t+ h] given the
event of a financial crisis or severe distress in the banking system is calculated as follows:
SRISKi,ht (C, k) = E
[
capital shortfalli;[t,t+h]
∣∣ crisis] . (2.3a)
Applying the going concern loss absorbing capacity concept, Equation (2.3a) can be re-
arranged:
SRISKi,ht (C, k) = E
[
{k × (debt + equity)− equity}i;[t,t+h]
∣∣∣ crisis] , (2.3b)
In order to prevent bankruptcy, institution i’s equity cushion needs to be larger than a
fraction k of the (market valued) total assets. Within the Basel III framework, parameter
k can be considered to represent the absolute Tier I capital ratio of 3%, which is consistent
with the Basel III maximum Leverage Ratio of 33.3 that must be satisfied even during a
crisis. In that case, k can be interpreted as a Basel Capital Adequacy Ratio equivalent on
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market valued total assets instead of risk-weighted assets. The market value of total assets
is determined using current debt balance sheet data – assuming that the levels of debt
remain relatively constant over the observed time interval [t, t+ h] – and the market value
of equity. The market value of equity within a future financial crisis can be expressed as
a function of MES:
SRISKi,ht (C, k) = k × debti,t − (1− k)
(
1−MESi,ht (C)
)
× equityi,t. (2.3c)
The higher a bank’s SRISK, the higher its capital shortfall during a crisis period. A
negative SRISK indicates that a bank’s equity cushion is sufficiently large in order to
avoid bankruptcy.
2.3.3 Conditional Value at Risk
The bottom-up measure Conditional Value at Risk (CoVaR) proposed by Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2016) explicitly allows the calculation of a bank’s contribution to systemic
risk in the banking system measuring the value at risk return of the banking system
conditional on institution i being in severe financial distress. In analogy to the MES and
SRISK measures we define a multi-period CoVaR measure that is in line with the CoVaR
extension of Girardi and Ergu¨n (2013). The ”distress CoVaR” CoVaR
sys|i≤VaR,h
t is defined
as the banking system’s h-day value at risk return, conditional on bank i’s h-day stock
return being at or below bank i’s h-day value at risk:
P
(
Rsys;[t,t+h] ≤ CoVaRsys|i≤VaR,ht (q)
∣∣∣Ri;[t,t+h] ≤ VaRi,ht,q) = q, (2.4a)
with VaRi,ht,q denoting bank i’s h-day value at risk return. Parameter q indicates the
confidence level.5 The median state CoVaR is given by conditioning on the one standard
deviation band around institution i’s median h-day return:
P
(
Rsys;[t,t+h] ≤ CoVaRsys|i=median,ht (q)
∣∣∣ ∣∣Ri;[t,t+h] − νhi,t∣∣ ≤ σhi,t) = q, (2.4b)
5 Whereas Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) estimate CoVaR using a quantile regression approach, we
employ a bivariate conditionally heteroskedastic model to account for the time-varying dependence
structure between banks and the banking system, which enables the measure to better capture the
tail events of distress (Girardi and Ergu¨n, 2013). Furthermore, we are able to evaluate all three SRMs
within a common statistical setup that improves the comparability and interpretability of our key
results.
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where σhi,t and ν
h
i,t indicate the standard deviation and the median return of institution i’s
h-day cumulative stock return. Thus, institution i’s marginal systemic risk contribution
to overall systemic risk in the banking system is defined as the difference between the
system’s CoVaR conditional on bank i being in financial distress and the system’s CoVaR
conditional on bank i being in its median state:
∆CoVaRi,ht (q) = −
[
CoVaR
sys|i≤VaR,h
t (q)− CoVaRsys|i=median,ht (q)
]
. (2.4c)
Note that again we switch the sign of ∆CoVaR in order to facilitate the comparison of
the three different risk measures MES, SRISK, and ∆CoVaR.
2.3.4 Implementation
We follow Brownlees and Engle (2015) and calculate weekly series of SRMs for each
of the 84 sample banks by modeling the bivariate return dynamics of bank i and the
banking system employing a conditionally heteroskedastic model and estimate the return
distributions of Ri;[t,t+h] and Rsys;[t,t+h] by applying Monte Carlo simulation techniques.
We set the crisis regime threshold C = −25%, the leverage ratio parameter k = 3%, the
VaR confidence level q = 5%, and the length of the SRMs’ forward looking period h = 60
days (a quarter of a year).6 For a detailed exposition of the implementation methodology
we refer to Appendix 2.A.
Finally, we compute time series of cross-sectional averages for the bank-level series of
MES, SRISK, and ∆CoVaR in order to evaluate the measures’ ability to gauge the overall
systemic tension in the banking system and to examine the determinants of the banking
system’s aggregate level of systemic risk. We call these averaged measures avgMES,
avgSRISK, and avg∆CoVaR.
2.4 Evaluation methodology
Evaluating the viability of SRMs as a tool for macroprudential supervision necessitates
the development of a framework that can be readily applied to assess the SRMs’ ability
of capturing the overall level of systemic risk in a banking system. In the following, we
6 To calibrate the threshold level C, we observed the performance of the STOXX Europe TMI Banks
Index during the most severe periods of the International Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign
Debt Crisis. In both periods the index dropped on average by around 25% within a three month time
window.
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motivate our assessment criteria and provide an outline of the empirical data (i.e., the
choice of variables) that our empirical analysis requires.
2.4.1 Assessment criteria
By definition SRMs are designed to measure the systemic importance of individual banks
and/or the level of systemic risk in a predefined system. Since we are solely interested
in the SRMs’ macro perspective, the evaluation of the latter, in particular, requires a
concept of what systemic risk is. Generally, systemic risk can be regarded as the risk or
danger of the occurrence of a systemic event, whereas the systemic event is tantamount
to the materialization of systemic risk. In recent years, policy-making institutions have
defined the term systemic risk in numerous ways. However, most of the definitions feature
adverse effects of systemic events on the banking system and the macroeconomy. The
International Monetary Fund (FSB, IMF, BIS, 2009) provides a useful working definition
of systemic risk:
Systemic risk is the risk of excessive losses within all or parts of the financial
system with imminent negative spillover effects to the real economy.
The above definition is twofold and features the two main preconditions that we will use
as foundations for our assessment criteria that we derive in the following.
According to the IMF, systemic risk first materializes as banking system turmoil. The
materialization of systemic risk in return implies that an indicator of systemic risk (or an
SRM, respectively) should sharply increase before the onset of such an event. Moreover,
an SRM should – to some extent – be capable of predicting the consequences of systemic
risk materialization. Thus, we can formulate the following assessment criterion:
Criterion 1 SRMs should possess predictive power for the state of the banking system.
In addition to the distress that systemic events cause to the banking system, the IMF
definition features imminent spillover effects to the real economy that could potentially
result in an economic recession. Such spillovers from the banking system to the real
economy typically manifest themselves in substantial drops in output and employment
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Hence, increases in systemic risk (as indicated by SRMs)
should have predictive power for such spillover effects:
Criterion 2 SRMs should possess predictive power for macroeconomic state variables.
The latter assessment criteria are crucial, because forward looking measures that possess
predictive power for the state of the banking system and the real economy are able to
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capture current systemic risk exposures. Consequentially, such measures may act as early
warning indicators at the banking system level.
Measures fulfilling both criteria have to be negatively correlated with the general state
of the banking system as well as the state of the real economy. Thus, a sharp increase
in systemic risk (as indicated by the SRMs) would indicate a deterioration of the future
state of the banking system and a decrease in macroeconomic activity. In contrast, SRMs
that are uncorrelated with the state of the banking system and/or the real economy are
incapable of effectively distinguishing between financial turmoil in the banking system
with no macroeconomic effects, macroeconomic cycles with little effect on the banking
system, and true systemic events.
However, our empirical evaluation of the SRMs’ ability to measure systemic risk ac-
cording to the above definition and criteria requires a comprehensive measurement of the
state of the banking system, especially the banking system’s level of financial distress,
and it’s corresponding macroeconomic activity.
2.4.2 Selection of state variables
We assess the SRMs’ predictive power employing a set of aggregated bank-specific and
macroeconomic variables, which we discuss briefly in the following.
Bank-specific variables
We measure the banking system’s aggregate default risk applying the variables leverage
and Z-score. We define leverage as the ratio of market valued total assets over market
valued equity. Market valued total assets is calculated as the sum of total book valued debt
and market valued equity. The system-wide ratio of leverage therefore reflects institutions’
aggregate capital strength and crisis resilience. The Z-score gives the number of standard
deviations that an institution’s return on assets needs to decline in order to trigger its
bankruptcy, given its current capital asset ratio (Hannan and Hanweck, 1988; Boyd and
Runkle, 1993). A lower Z-score at the banking system level therefore implies a higher
propensity to systemic default. We calculate the measure as (roat + cart)/σ (roa), where
roa denotes the return on assets, car the capital asset ratio, and σ (roa) the return on
assets’ standard deviation over the sample period.
Furthermore, we capture the market’s view about institutions’ aggregate risk of finan-
cial distress employing the variable market-to-book (MTB). MTB is defined as market
valued equity divided by book valued equity. The ratio is primarily driven by future
earnings expectations, earnings uncertainty, and current debt burdens (Chen and Zhang,
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1998; Fama and French, 1995). A low MTB ratio at the banking system level should thus
coincide with high levels of systemic risk.
To additionally account for the banking system’s underlying profitability, credit risk,
and liquidity risk, we include the following bank-specific control variables. Profitability is
the ratio of net income over total assets. The variable proxies the financial institutions’
ability to generate profits efficiently throughout the business cycle. We employ the ratio
of nonperforming loans (NPL) over total gross loans to control for the quality of the
financial institutions’ on-balance-sheet credit exposures. A rise in NPL not only reduces
current profits, but might also impede future credit lending due to an increase in risk
aversion and binding regulatory capital constraints.
Lastly, we define loan-to-deposit (LTD) as total loans over total customer deposits
and apply the latter to proxy for liquidity risk. A ratio of greater than one indicates that
institutions are relying on (short-term) wholesale funding in addition to customer deposits
in order to refinance loans. The resulting liquidity mismatch increases an institution’s
dependence on capital-market-based funding. At the banking system level, a high LTD
ratio may easily lead to an acute shortage of funding liquidity in times of crises.
For each of the previously outlined bank-specific variables we compute quarterly ag-
gregate time series at the banking system level by consolidating the balance sheet data
and market data (market valued equity) across all 84 sample banks.7
Macroeconomic variables
To be consistent with macroeconomic forecasting literature, we measure the state of the
European Union’s real economy and its economic activity employing the variables pro-
duction and real GDP.
Production represents the total industrial production excluding the construction sec-
tor. By predominantly measuring current output levels, the macroeconomic variable thus
serves as an ideal measure for economic activity. As a classic indicator of the economy’s
overall state, real GDP is defined as nominal GDP deflated by the GDP deflator. In
contrast to production, a country’s gross domestic product not only captures the market
value of final goods but also the value of services produced within the economy. Thus, due
to its definition that is much broader than production, we expect real GDP adjustments
to be sluggish.
7 We collect aggregate harmonized time series data for NPL and the LTD ratio referring to the EU27
from the Worldbank and the EBF/EBA, respectively. Given the ratios’ sensitivity to accounting
standards, this approach minimizes the effects of differences in accounting definitions and thus allows
meaningful comparisons across time and countries.
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Label Description
Sampling
Data source
frequency
Bank-specific variables
Leverage*
market valued total assets / market valued equity, where
quarterly Datastream
market valued total assets = book valued total debt + market valued equity
Z-score*
roat + cart/sd (roa), where sd = standard deviation of the sample period, quarterly Datastream
car = capital asset ratio, and roa = return on equity
Market-to-book* market valued equity / book valued equity quarterly Datastream
Profitability* net income / book valued total assets (in %) quarterly Datastream
Nonperforming loans nonperforming loans / total gross loans (EU27, in %) annual Worldbank
Loan-to-deposit total loans / total customer deposit (EU27, in %) quarterly/annual EBA/EBF
Macroeconomic variables
Production EU Industrial Production Index excluding construction (EU27) monthly Datastream
Real GDP real quarterly gross domestic product (EU27, in EUR bn) quarterly Datastream
Inflation Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) (EU27, in %) monthly Datastream
Unemployment unemployment rate (EU28, in %) monthly Datastream
House prices EU House Price Index (EU evolving) quarterly Datastream
Credit private domestic credit to private sector (EU27, in % of GDP) annual Worldbank
Table 2.3 – Description of bank-specific and macroeconomic variables
The table shows the label, description, sampling frequency, and data source of the bank-specific and macroeconomic variables used in the regression
analysis. The time series of observations cover the period from July 2005 to June 2013. * The bank-specific variables leverage, Z-score, market-to-
book, and profitability represent quarterly time series for the aggregate of all 84 sample banks. We compute quarterly time series at the banking
system level for the latter by consolidating the balance sheet data and market data (market valued equity) across all sample banks.
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We furthermore include a set of macroeconomic control variables. Inflation measures
the steady increase in the general price level over time and acts as a proxy for a stable
economy. Generally, a moderate inflation target is regarded as positive (Mundell, 1963;
Tobin, 1965). Higher inflation rates typically coincide with economic boosts and may dis-
play signs of overheating. Contrary to that, low economic activity typically results in low
inflation rates. Unemployment reflects the structural health of the economy. Lower levels
of economic activity are associated with higher levels of unemployment, which became
visible in the recent financial crises. In addition, unemployment rates are indicative for
the propensity of future consumption spending.
Moreover, we use house prices to proxy for the state of the economy in two ways. First,
the index simply measures the households’ wealth. Second, real estate is an important
source of collateral that serves as a cushion for the losses from distressed debt. Finally,
measured as a proportion of GDP, credit private is the total amount of domestic credit
held by the private sector. We employ credit private to control for economic sustainability.
Table 2.3 provides a summary of all aggregated bank-specific and macroeconomic
variables used in our subsequent analysis including their description, sampling frequency,
and data source.
2.5 Empirical evidence
This section divides into three subsections. We commence with the investigation of the
SRMs’ predictive power for the state of the banking system and the real economy in
Section 2.5.1. Section 2.5.2 then investigates the determinants of the banking system’s
overall level of systemic risk and Section 2.5.3 closes with critical remarks on SRMs.
2.5.1 SRMs’ predictive power
To be viable for the identification of systemic events and to be used as a tool for macro-
prudential supervision, SRMs should possess predictive power for the state of the banking
system and the real economy. Based on prominent working definitions of systemic risk,
we formulated these prerequisites as assessment criteria.
First of all, however, in order to develop an understanding about our explanatory
variables’ dynamics during the International Financial Crisis and European Sovereign
Debt Crisis, Figures 2.1 and 2.2 display the time series of the bank-specific and the
macroeconomic state variables that we apply in our regression analysis within the period
from July 2005 to June 2013.
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Figure 2.1 – Time evolution of bank-specific variables
The figure presents quarterly time series for the aggregate of all 84 sample banks, except for nonperforming
loans and the loan-to-deposit ratio, which refer to the European Union (EU27). The time series of
observations cover the period from July 2005 to June 2013. For a detailed description of the bank-
specific variables we refer to Table 2.3. Data on nonperforming loans is obtained from the Worldbank’s
database and data on the loan-to-deposit ratio is obtained from the European Banking Authority and
the European Banking Federation. All remaining data is from Datastream.
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Figure 2.2 – Time evolution of macroeconomic variables
The figure presents quarterly time series of macroeconomic data from the European Union. The time
series of observations cover the period from July 2005 to June 2013. For a detailed description of the
macroeconomic variables we refer to Table 2.3. Data on domestic credit to private sector is obtained
from the Worldbank’s database, and all remaining data is from Datastream.
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Most importantly, the early increase in banking system leverage and the notable de-
creases in aggregate Z-score and market-to-book values of equity at the onset of the
International Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis in 2008 and 2011
reveal that the former variables are expedient for the analysis and characterization of the
banking system’s level of financial turmoil. Likewise, the adverse macroeconomic spillover
effects in the aftermath of both systemic crises are well captured by the variables pro-
duction and real GDP. As indicated by the aggregated bank-specific and macroeconomic
control variables, the crises are furthermore reflected in a sharp decline in system-wide
profitability and loan quality. Furthermore, delayed in time, the economic downturns are
subsequently reflected in increasing unemployment rates as well as in a decline of inflation
and house prices. The variable credit private vividly reflects the evolving credit crunch.
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Figure 2.3 – Time evolution of systemic risk measures
The figure presents averages across the time series of weekly systemic risk measures of all 84 sample
banks. The time series of observations cover the period from July 2005 to June 2013. The systemic risk
measures are defined in detail in Section 2.3. All stock price and balance sheet data are obtained from
Datastream.
Figure 2.3 exhibits the weekly time series of the SRMs that we calculate as outlined
in Section 2.3.4. In particular, these are a banking system’s avgMES, avgSRISK, and
avg∆CoVaR. At the first glance, the figure reveals that the three banking-system-level
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time series are generally able to gauge the overall level of systemic risk in the banking
system since all of them exhibit peaks during the International Financial Crisis and the
European Sovereign Debt Crisis. Nevertheless, avg∆CoVaR has much more swings in
value over time than the other measures. As a result, avgMES and avgSRISK seem to
be superior in the selective identification und prediction of true systemic events. In the
following, we want to confirm that the previous conjectures remain valid by empirically
evaluating our assessment criteria framework.
We apply a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to measure the directionalities and de-
pendencies between the SRMs and the selected bank-specific and macroeconomic state
variables. In particular, the VAR approach allows for the simultaneous analysis of the
two-sided relationship between the SRMs’ predictive power and their banking-system-
specific determinants. Running the regressions requires that we harmonize data with
respect to their sampling frequency. We perform the SRMs’ regressions on the aggregated
bank-specific and macroeconomic variables on a quarterly frequency. For time series with
a higher frequency (SRMs, inflation, production, and unemployment), we calculate quar-
terly averages. Data on an annual frequency (nonperforming loans and credit private)
are interpolated applying cubic splines. Table 2.4 exhibits the correlations between all
quarterly time series. We use log-differences if time series are non-stationary to ensure
that we do not violate the stationarity requirements.8
According to the Schwarz criterion, the data suggests a one lag structure. We thus employ
a VAR system of the following type:
yt = a+Byt−1 + ǫt (2.5)
with yt ≡ (SRMsyst , xtT )′, where SRMsyst represents any of the three systemic risk measures
avgMES, avgSRISK or avg∆CoVaR and xt is either the vector of the aggregated bank-
specific or macroeconomic variables. Parameter vector a denotes the intercepts, B is the
coefficient matrix of the lagged regression variables yt−1, and ǫt is a vector of standard
Gaussian error terms.9 We organize each of our result tables such that Panel A contains
8 We perform several time series diagnostics. We test the quarterly time series for stationarity, het-
eroskedasticity, auto-correlation, and non-normality. According to Appendix-Table 2.7 we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the time series are stationary (Panel A) for all series except nonper-
forming loans and for most series we cannot reject the homoscedasticity and normality null hypotheses
(Panel B and Panel D). All series exhibit strong auto-correlation (Panel C).
9 Since all employed time series exhibit strong auto-correlation we again test the residuals of the es-
timated VAR systems for auto-correlation. However, we find no evidence that the residuals exhibit
significant auto-correlation over time.
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avgMES 1.000 *** 0.894 *** 0.725 *** 0.808 *** 0.096 -0.818 *** -0.733 *** 0.672 *** -0.615 *** -0.597 *** 0.326 * 0.623 *** 0.535 ** 0.384 * -0.575 ***
avgSRISK 1.000 *** 0.697 *** 0.902 *** 0.073 -0.960 *** -0.892 *** 0.767 *** -0.782 *** -0.742 *** 0.244 0.630 *** 0.625 *** 0.451 * -0.708 ***
avg∆CoVaR 1.000 *** 0.651 *** -0.285 -0.578 *** -0.509 ** 0.573 *** -0.267 -0.357 * 0.414 * 0.280 -0.016 0.622 *** -0.613 ***
Leverage 1.000 *** -0.097 -0.908 *** -0.896 *** 0.799 *** -0.706 *** -0.756 *** 0.192 0.535 ** 0.574 *** 0.380 * -0.556 **
Z-score 1.000 *** -0.238 0.063 -0.324 * -0.445 * 0.213 0.332 * 0.586 *** 0.479 ** 0.125 -0.051
Market-to-book 1.000 *** 0.895 *** -0.718 *** 0.885 *** 0.699 *** -0.304 * -0.721 *** -0.707 *** -0.475 ** 0.668 ***
Profitability 1.000 *** -0.911 *** 0.798 *** 0.886 *** -0.007 -0.513 ** -0.708 *** -0.252 0.523 **
Nonperforming loans 1.000 *** -0.595 *** -0.855 *** -0.048 0.330 * 0.482 ** 0.261 -0.394 *
Loan-to-deposit 1.000 *** 0.678 *** -0.122 -0.703 *** -0.858 *** -0.305 * 0.403 *
Production 1.000 *** 0.383 * -0.171 -0.674 *** 0.069 0.246
Real GDP 1.000 *** 0.692 *** -0.175 0.857 *** -0.471 **
Inflation 1.000 *** 0.556 *** 0.594 *** -0.554 **
Unemployment 1.000 *** -0.160 -0.222
House prices 1.000 *** -0.524 **
Credit private 1.000 ***
Table 2.4 – Correlation coefficients
The table exhibits correlations between systemic risk measures (SRMs), bank-specific variables, and macroeconomic variables at the banking system
level. I.e., avgMES, avgSRISK, and avg∆CoVaR represent time series of cross-sectional averages for the bank-level series of SRMs of all 84 sample
banks. Likewise, the time series of the bank-specific variables refer to the aggregate of our sample banks, except for nonperforming loans and the
loan-to-deposit ratio, which refer to the European Union (EU27). All time series are on a quarterly basis and cover the period from July 2005
to June 2013. The systemic risk measures are defined in detail in Section 2.3. For a detailed description of the bank-specific and macroeconomic
variables we refer to Table 2.3. Correlation coefficients are assigned asterisks if they are statistically significant (*** = 0.1% confidence level; ** =
1% confidence level; * = 10% confidence level).
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the results for avgMES, Panel B the results for avgSRISK, and Panel C the results for
the avg∆CoVaR regressions. We express avgSRISK in EUR billion and avgMES and
avg∆CoVaR are expressed in percentage terms. Each column represents an estimated
regression equation with the lagged explanatory variables given in the rows. Thus, the
header exhibits the dependent variables and the rows feature the corresponding lagged
explanatory variables.
Table 2.5 presents the results of the VAR regressions of the analyzed SRMs on bank-
specific state variables. We find that SRMs generally possess substantial predictive power
for the future state of the banking system. Most notably, however, all three SRMs are
highly significantly related to the levels of aggregate leverage and market-to-book, which
are well-established indicators of financial distress. More precisely, a sharp increase in the
level of avgMES, avgSRISK, and avg∆CoVaR coincides with a future increase in aggre-
gate leverage which in turn increases the probability to experience a systemic crisis due
to a deterioration of the banking system’s capital structure and hence its loss-absorbing
capacity. Likewise, increases in the SRMs coincide with a lower aggregate market-to-book
value in the following period indicating that spikes in systemic risk, as measured by the
latter, are linked to distressed and uncertain market environments in the future.
Increases in avgMES and avgSRISK are additionally reflected in a statistically signif-
icant decrease of the system-wide Z-score, which is tantamount with an expected future
increase in aggregate default risk. Both measures’ regression coefficients are significant at
the 1% confidence level. Also avg∆CoVaR’s level of systemic risk is negatively correlated
with the aggregate level of the Z-score, the relationship is insignificant.
Differences in the SRMs’ predictive power become more evident when shifting the
focus to the bank-specific control variables proxying for system-wide profitability, credit
risk, and liquidity risk. On the one hand, only the avgMES and the related avgSRISK
predict a statistically significant decline of profitability in the case of an increase in the
SRMs’ systemic risk level. The directionality is furthermore in line with expectations.
Systemic events that increase the banking system’s fragility should eventually result in
an underperforming banking sector. AvgMES is also able to significantly capture and
forecast the ratio of nonperforming loans. On the other hand, although all three measures
are negatively related to the system-wide loan-to-deposit ratio, only avg∆CoVaR adds
explanatory power to the latter, indicating that banks, on average, reduce their LTD
ratios in order to improve their funding liquidity during periods of financial turmoil.
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Panel A – avgMES (in %)
avgMES 0.288 2.093 *** -0.417 *** -0.040 ** -0.041 *** 0.031 ** -0.091
Leverage -0.233 -0.124 0.020 0.031 ** 0.003 -0.004 0.094
Z-score -0.495 -0.369 0.454 0.056 0.021 -0.065 0.431
Market-to-book -9.182 ** -11.152 * 0.634 1.445 *** 0.255 ** -0.325 * 1.804
Profitability 4.670 2.530 0.158 -0.437 0.362 * -0.037 -0.147
Nonperforming loans 0.456 -0.445 0.463 * -0.015 0.009 1.175 *** -0.372
Loan-to-deposit 0.444 * 0.272 -0.134 -0.005 -0.005 0.082 *** 0.765 ***
adjusted R2 0.647 0.896 0.870 0.951 0.966 0.999 0.978
p-value (F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B – avgSRISK (in EUR bn)
avgSRISK 0.674 *** 2.455 *** -0.353 *** -0.058 *** -0.033 *** 0.010 -0.096
Leverage -0.477 *** 0.440 ** 0.007 0.016 * -0.004 0.015 ** 0.032
Z-score -0.500 0.952 0.775 *** 0.003 0.019 0.047 ** 0.151
Market-to-book -14.267 *** 13.863 ** -0.927 0.778 ** 0.052 0.102 0.832
Profitability 3.967 -0.452 -4.158 -0.261 0.076 -0.157 -1.342
Nonperforming loans 0.806 -6.430 -0.320 0.078 -0.115 0.959 *** -2.307 **
Loan-to-deposit 0.551 ** 0.329 -0.159 -0.005 -0.006 0.035 *** 0.813 ***
adjusted R2 0.954 0.926 0.827 0.965 0.949 0.945 0.982
p-value (F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel C – avg∆CoVaR (in %)
avg∆CoVaR 0.376 * 0.934 *** -0.109 -0.029 *** -0.005 -0.008 -0.087 **
Leverage -0.720 *** 0.305 0.035 0.017 0.001 0.011 * 0.022
Z-score -1.045 1.214 0.766 *** -0.010 0.028 0.027 0.048
Market-to-book -21.195 *** -1.829 1.802 1.029 *** 0.422 ** -0.210 0.396
Profitability 10.204 -11.880 -2.638 0.020 0.112 0.022 0.102
Nonperforming loans 4.042 -5.104 -0.541 0.047 -0.168 1.035 *** -2.042 **
Loan-to-deposit 0.961 ** 0.327 -0.190 0.004 -0.013 0.044 *** 0.847 ***
adjusted R2 0.635 0.832 0.777 0.958 0.924 0.951 0.985
p-value (F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 2.5 – VAR results bank-specific variables
All figures are estimated from quarterly time series of systemic risk measures at the banking system level
(i.e., time series of cross-sectional averages for the bank-level series of SRMs of all 84 sample banks) and
quarterly time series of bank-specific variables for the aggregate of our sample banks covering the period
from July 2005 to June 2013. We estimate the VAR system yt = a+Byt−1+ǫt with yt ≡ (SRMsyst , xtT )′,
where SRMsyst represents any of the three systemic risk measures avgMES, avgSRISK, or avg∆CoVaR
and xt is the vector of aggregated bank-specific variables. Parameter vector a denotes the intercepts,
B is the coefficient matrix of the lagged regression variables yt−1, and ǫt is a vector of standard Gaussian
error terms. The table is organized as follows. Panel A presents the results for the VAR systems with
SRM = avgMES, Panel B the results for SRM = avgSRISK, and Panel C the results for SRM =
avg∆CoVaR. The names of the lagged explanatory variables, to which the regression coefficients refer,
are given in the respective rows and the dependent variables’ names are given in the respective column
headers. The systemic risk measures are defined in detail in Section 2.3. For a detailed description of the
bank-specific variables we refer to Table 2.3. For the ease of exposition, we suppress the intercepts’ values.
The regression coefficients are assigned asterisks if they are statistically significant (*** = 1%-confidence
level (cl); ** = 5%-cl; * = 10%-cl).
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We check the robustness of our results performing several modifications. First, we drop
Z-score to ensure that only leverage accounts for the feedback effect of systemic risk on
institutions’ aggregate default risk. Not surprisingly, our results remain valid. Especially
the directionality and the significance of our two coefficients of interest leverage and
market-to-book remain unchanged. Second, we test the stability of the main variables’
coefficient estimates by excluding all control variables. The economic relevance of the
SRMs for changes in leverage, Z-score, and market-to-book does not change substantially.
All SRMs now determine the latter at the 1% confidence level. Altogether, we are able
to confirm that all three SRMs possess significant predictive power for the state variables
used to measure the banking system’s level of financial distress. The dynamics of avgMES,
avgSRISK, and avg∆CoVaR are thus in line with Criterion 1.
Table 2.6 presents the results of our analysis of interdependencies between the SRMs
and macroeconomic state variables. According to Criterion 2, SRMs should have predic-
tive power for macroeconomic state variables in order to be capable of identifying true
systemic events or crises that cause negative spillover effects to the real economy, such as
drops in output levels or aggregate economic wealth.
Our results demonstrate that avgMES and avgSRISK indeed provide significant pre-
dictive power for the state of the real economy. Most importantly, a sharp increase
in the level of avgMES and avgSRISK is reflected in a subsequent decline in the Eu-
ropean Union’s aggregate level of industrial production. In contrast, the dynamics of
avg∆CoVaR are not significantly related to future output levels. Surprisingly, though,
none of the measures load significantly on real GDP. Yet, for avgSRISK and avg∆CoVaR,
the relationship is actually positive and thus contradicts economic expectations. This fact
may be attributed to various reasons. First of all, real GDP incorporates the economic
value created within the financial sector itself. Moreover, the adjustments of GDP growth
are driven to some extent by a country’s service sector which is likely to be more sluggish
than production because services usually involve a lot of contractual rigidities.
The superior predictive power of MES-based measures for the identification of the fu-
ture state of the real economy becomes even more evident when focusing on the macroe-
conomic control variables. Only avgMES and avgSRISK load significantly positive on
unemployment at the 1% and 5% confidence level, respectively. Thus, spikes in systemic
risk, as measured by avgMES and avgSRISK, lead to lower production levels that coin-
cide with lower levels of employment. Additionally, avgMES loads significantly negative
on inflation, revealing that an increase in the level of the latter indicates a subsequent
decrease in inflation rates. For instance, low inflation usually reflects low consumption
growth, which in turn is negatively related to aggregate economic activity.
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Panel A – avgMES (in %)
avgMES 0.089 -0.730 *** -0.255 -0.110 ** 0.043 *** -0.141 0.122
Production -0.452 *** 1.078 *** 7.373 *** 0.129 *** -0.050 *** 0.178 ** -0.813 ***
Real GDP 0.013 0.003 0.315 *** -0.005 0.003 ** -0.003 -0.028
Inflation 2.433 *** -1.733 ** -5.944 0.347 ** 0.081 * -0.609 * 5.100 ***
Unemployment -0.127 1.356 *** 19.591 *** 0.379 *** 0.852 *** 0.334 ** -1.760 ***
House prices 0.061 0.009 6.320 *** 0.078 * -0.019 * 0.960 *** -0.379
Credit private 0.040 -0.003 0.136 -0.030 *** -0.004 * 0.025 0.996 ***
adjusted R2 0.800 0.951 0.985 0.880 0.997 0.982 0.956
p-value (F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B – avgSRISK (in EUR bn)
avgSRISK 0.436 * -0.764 ** 0.505 -0.026 0.045 ** -0.039 0.683 *
Production -0.406 0.761 ** 8.002 *** 0.163 ** -0.032 * 0.212 -0.214
Real GDP 0.000 -0.007 0.285 *** -0.009 ** 0.003 *** -0.008 -0.046 *
Inflation 2.110 ** -0.660 -7.207 0.333 0.020 -0.602 3.697 ***
Unemployment 0.076 1.889 *** 19.290 *** 0.415 *** 0.822 *** 0.398 ** -2.243 ***
House prices 0.336 ** 0.358 * 6.158 *** 0.117 ** -0.037 *** 1.032 *** -0.707 ***
Credit private -0.040 -0.035 0.092 -0.031 ** -0.001 0.031 0.952 ***
adjusted R2 0.957 0.940 0.982 0.853 0.996 0.975 0.973
p-value (F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel C – avg∆CoVaR (in %)
avg∆CoVaR 0.113 -0.196 0.066 -0.034 0.013 * -0.033 0.103
Production -0.578 ** 1.307 *** 7.558 *** 0.161 *** -0.063 *** 0.226 *** -0.797 ***
Real GDP 0.007 -0.027 0.302 *** -0.009 ** 0.004 *** -0.009 -0.024
Inflation 2.446 * -1.819 ** -6.212 0.341 * 0.085 * -0.634 * 4.990 ***
Unemployment -1.791 ** 1.168 ** 19.765 *** 0.343 *** 0.864 *** 0.305 * -1.604 **
House prices 0.279 0.275 6.390 *** 0.119 *** -0.035 *** 1.011 *** -0.436
Credit private -0.030 -0.014 0.139 -0.032 *** -0.004 0.023 1.001 ***
adjusted R2 0.676 0.933 0.985 0.863 0.996 0.981 0.956
p-value (F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 2.6 – VAR results macroeconomic variables
All figures are estimated from quarterly time series of systemic risk measures at the banking system level
(i.e., time series of cross-sectional averages for the bank-level series of SRMs of all 84 sample banks) and
quarterly time series of macroeconomic variables covering the period from July 2005 to June 2013. We
estimate the VAR system yt = a + Byt−1 + ǫt with yt ≡ (SRMsyst , xtT )′, where SRMsyst represents
any of the three systemic risk measures avgMES, avgSRISK, or avg∆CoVaR and xt is the vector of
macroeconomic variables. Parameter vector a denotes the intercepts, B is the coefficient matrix of the
lagged regression variables yt−1, and ǫt is a vector of standard Gaussian error terms. The table is
organized as follows. Panel A presents the results for the VAR systems with SRM = avgMES, Panel B
the results for SRM = avgSRISK, and Panel C the results for SRM = avg∆CoVaR. The names of
the lagged explanatory variables, to which the regression coefficients refer, are given in the respective
rows and the dependent variables’ names are given in the respective column headers. The systemic risk
measures are defined in detail in Section 2.3. For a detailed description of the macroeconomic variables
we refer to Table 2.3. For the ease of exposition, we suppress the intercepts’ values. The regression
coefficients are assigned asterisks if they are statistically significant (*** = 1%-confidence level; ** =
5%-confidence level; * = 10%-confidence level).
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No significant reactions are measurable for house prices. Though not significant, an
increase in the measures predict future decreases in the value of real estate. This relation
might be mainly attributed to the specific house price dynamics during the Subprime
Crisis where housing prices acted as a main driver of systemic risk (Longstaff, 2010).
Furthermore, none of the SRMs possesses substantial predictive power for the control
variable credit private. Economic theory would suggest a negative response of the latter
to the occurrence of systemic events, however, our empirical results cannot confirm such
a relationship.
The results are furthermore robust to modifications in the VAR setup. We apply
additional control variables such as the ratio of government debt to GDP and the German
12-month Bund rate to test for robustness. However, this does not influence the SRMs’
predictive power for our baseline results. We further exclude real GDP from the regression
equation in order to solely account for the measures’ ability to predict future levels of
production. Again, all previously mentioned results remain unchanged. Avg∆CoVaR is
still insignificantly related to the dynamics of the aggregate level of industrial production.
Our evaluation methodology demonstrates that avgMES and avgSRISK possess sig-
nificant explanatory power for the future state of the real economy. Avg∆CoVaR, on the
other hand, is not in line with Criterion 2. Consequently, only the dynamics of avgMES
and avgSRISK are informative for the identification of true systemic events. A sharp
increase of the latter indicates a deterioration of the state of the banking system and
a decrease in macroeconomic activity (as measured by aggregate production). A sharp
increase in avg∆CoVaR, on the contrary, does not precisely distinguish between banking
system turmoil with no macroeconomic effects and systemic banking crises that eventu-
ally trigger downturns in the real economy. Nevertheless, avg∆CoVaR is still informative
about the general state of the banking system.
2.5.2 Drivers of systemic risk
In the following we investigate the bank characteristics that drive the banking system’s
overall level of systemic risk. Identifying the determinants of systemic risk not only allows
supervisors to improve their monitoring of the banking system’s vulnerabilities, but also
to implement adequate regulatory measures geared at limiting the probability of systemic
spillovers to the real economy. Although the predictive power for systemic events varies
among the evaluated measures, we only refer to the bank-specific state variables from
Section 2.4.2 as fundamental drivers of systemic risk if they significantly explain future
variations in avgMES, avgSRISK, and avg∆CoVaR. This approach, in particular, allows
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for a robust and generally valid verification of the identified factors of influence.10
We expect a positive relation between leverage, nonperforming loans, and loan-to-
deposit and future levels of systemic risk. Moreover, we expect future levels of systemic
risk to be negatively related to changes in Z-score and market-to-book. The relationship
between profitability and future levels of systemic risk, however, is not that clear cut.
On the one hand, higher profitability could reduce the risk of future systemic events as a
result of an enhanced propensity of setting up capital buffers. On the other hand, high
profitability may simply reflect aggressive risk taking that eventually results in an increase
of systemic risk.
For the discussion of our empirical findings we return to the results of our VAR regres-
sions between bank-specific state variables and SRMs that we presented in Table 2.5. In-
deed, the measures do not exploit all balance sheet information determining the dynamics
of systemic risk. The variables market-to-book and loan-to-deposit possess significant pre-
dictive power for all three SRMs. A one-standard-deviation decline of the MTB ratio (in-
crease of the LTD ratio) indicates a future increase in avgSRISK by e7.42bn (e2.17bn).11
AvgMES and avg∆CoVaR are influenced as follows. A one-standard-deviation decline
of the MTB ratio (increase of the LTD ratio) increases avgMES and avg∆CoVaR by
absolute numbers by 4.77% (1.75%) and by 11.02% (3.79%), respectively.
The implications for financial supervision are twofold. First, the MTB ratio, capturing
the market view about banks’ aggregate risk of financial distress, itself may be used as a
simple and efficient early warning indicator to monitor systemic risk. The MTB dynamics
before the onset of the International Financial Crisis underline the latter. Figure 2.1 shows
that the MTB ratio’s decline started as early as in late 2006. Throughout 2007, the MTB
dynamics indicate a significant deterioration in the European banking sector’s asset values
and hence the emerging risk of a systemic banking crisis.
The MTB ratio also sheds light on the fragility of the European banking system in the
years following the peak of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. In mid-2013, the ratio still
fluctuated around mid-crisis levels, indicating high levels of systemic risk. Thus, another
micro- or macroeconomic shock could have easily triggered another systemic event. To
avoid the latter, the European Banking Authority (EBA) is establishing guidelines for
10 It is worth mentioning that according to the market efficiency hypothesis, we may only identify such
drivers if SRMs fail to capture all contemporaneous available information determining future levels of
systemic risk. Was all contemporaneous information to be captured by the measures, accounting-based
bank characteristics would not be able to predict future variations of market-based SRMs.
11 In order to evaluate the economic significance of the variables MTB and LTD on future systemic
risk we multiply the variables’ regression coefficients by their quarterly standard deviations (σMTB =
0.520%;σLTD = 3.946%). Thus, −14.267×−0.520 ≈ 7.42 and 0.551× 3.946 ≈ 2.17, respectively.
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more sustainable financial institutions on behalf of the European Parliament and Council
(Directive 2013/36/EU, Article 107(3)). Given the fact that lower MTB values of equity
can be mainly attributed to lower earnings expectations, higher earnings uncertainty, and
elevated debt burdens (Chen and Zhang, 1998; Fama and French, 1995), our findings
additionally indicate that banks’ earnings volatility contributes to systemic risk. Thus,
the EBA’s guidelines should incentivize institutions to establish less volatile business
models with higher earnings certainty such as to reduce their vulnerability in times of
crises, thereby reducing institutions’ aggregate systemic footprint.
Second, the significant impact of the aggregate loan-to-deposit ratio underlines the
critical role of deposit funding and liquidity at the banking system level and highlights
the importance of an expedient regulation of the latter. Notably, the LTD ratio of Eu-
ropean banks ranks top in a global comparison. In early 2013, the average LTD ratio of
European banks amounted to approximately 116%, whereas for US banks it amounted
to approximately 82% (Buehler et al., 2013). A decline of aggregate LTD is likely to
substantially lower systemic risk in the European banking system. As of June 2013, a
ceteris paribus reduction of the LTD ratio to 100% would reduce the average bank’s cap-
ital shortfall by roughly e8.82bn, reverting avgSRISK to pre-crisis levels.12 The effects
on avgMES and avg∆CoVaR are of similar magnitude.
Supervisors are able to lower systemic risk by implementing prudent liquidity stan-
dards that contribute to a more resilient banking system. Therefore, our empirical findings
support the new Basel III guidelines concerning limits on institutions’ liquidity mismatch
(Net Stable Funding Ratio) and the strengthening of the institutions’ ability to survive
periods of stress without market funding (Liquidity Coverage Ratio). A binding im-
plementation of both regulatory ratios reduces the system-wide LTD ratio by definition
and increases the banking system’s propensity to survive periods of financial turmoil and
distress.13
The bank-specific state variables Z-score, profitability, and nonperforming loans do
not provide predictive power for future changes in systemic risk. Leverage possesses sig-
nificant explanatory power for future levels of avgSRISK and avg∆CoVaR. The direction
of influence, however, is negative, which is counterintuitive at first glance because the
measures themselves load significantly positive on leverage. The fact that higher levels of
12 In order to estimate the ceteris paribus effect of a decline of LTD on aggregate systemic risk measured
by avgSRISK, we multiply the regression coefficient of LTD by the assumed ratio change of 16%
(116%−100%). That is: 0.551×−16 ≈ −8.82.
13 Both the NSFR and the LCR were endorsed by European law in 2013 by the adoption of the Capital
Requirements Regulation (Regulation 2013/575/EU.) that will be fully binding from 2019.
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leverage coincide with lower future levels of avgSRISK and avg∆CoVaR may be explained
as follows. Both avgSRISK and avg∆CoVaR are capable of capturing banking system
turmoil before it is reflected by leverage. Materializing financial distress causes leverage
to increase in the subsequent periods. However, contemporaneous internal and external
actions undertaken to stabilize distressed institutions eventually result in a decline of the
SRMs even though market valued leverage still increases.
Our results are furthermore robust to modifications in the VAR setup, that we elab-
orate on in Section 2.5.1. I.e., the performed variable modifications do not change the
relevance of the identified drivers of systemic risk. In fact, the economic significance of
the market-to-book and the loan-to-deposit ratio increases on average.
2.5.3 Some critical remarks on SRMs
To serve as a viable tool for banking supervision, SRMs should be in line with the definition
of systemic risk and, as a consequence, possess significant predictive power for the state of
the banking system and the real economy. Our assessment framework demonstrates the
adequate predictive power of MES-based measures, whereas the dynamics of avg∆CoVaR
are not significantly related to the future trend of macroeconomic state variables.
The measures’ expedience to identify episodes of future systemic events as early as
possible is another desirable attribute. Figure 2.3 shows that MES-based risk measures
reflected the first signs of a sharp increase of systemic risk in early 2008 (avgSRISK)
and late 2008 (avgMES). The measures were thus able to identify significant increases
of systemic risk prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers. However, both SRMs are –
to a great extent – determined by the dynamics of the aggregate market-to-book ratio
that itself indicated a significant deterioration in the valuation of the European banking
sector’s assets as early as in 2007. An additional advantage of the MTB ratio as a proxy
for the overall level of systemic risk in contrast to the SRMs analyzed in this paper is its
independence of any statistical assumptions and simulation techniques.
Lastly, the measures differ with respect to their degree of persistence. This becomes
most visible considering the measures’ post-crisis dynamics. Even though government
and central bank interventions had a calming effect on the financial markets (e.g., due to
bank bailouts or government bond purchase programs), the European banking system’s
balance sheet and valuation fundamentals remained fragile. This risk persistence is very
well captured by the dynamics of avgSRISK and MTB. The dynamics of avgMES and
avg∆CoVaR, in contrast, exhibit a mean reversion tendency with sharply declining levels
of systemic risk coinciding with lower volatility in the financial markets. That is to say, the
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avgMES (avg∆CoVaR) and the VSTOXX index, measuring the option implied volatility
of the Euro Stoxx 50, have a correlation of 75.2% (89.4%).
The superior monitoring qualities of avgSRISK and aggregate MTB clearly indicate
that systemic risk measurement and systemic risk measures should focus on and include
stock market information and balance sheet data.
2.6 Conclusion
We propose a criteria-based framework to assess the systemic risk measures’ (SRMs’)
viability as a monitoring tool for banking supervision comparing the MES, the SRISK,
and the CoVaR measures at the banking system level. In particular, we investigate the
measures’ capability of capturing the level of systemic risk by focusing on their predictive
power for the state of the banking system and the real economy. The measures are
evaluated on the basis of a representative sample of European institutions covering the
period from July 2005 to June 2013, which includes both the International Financial Crisis
and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. Moreover, we analyze the drivers of the banking
system’s overall level of systemic risk.
Our main findings reveal that all three SRMs generally possess substantial predictive
power for the state of the banking system. Measures relating to the MES are furthermore
able to significantly explain future variations in macroeconomic activity. The CoVaR’s
capability of capturing the future state of the real economy is rather poor, however. Con-
sequentially, only the dynamics of MES and SRISK are informative for the identification
of true systemic events. That is, a sharp increase of the latter coincides with a deterio-
ration of the state of the banking system and a decrease in macroeconomic activity. A
sharp increase in CoVaR, on the contrary, does not precisely distinguish between banking
system turmoil with no macroeconomic effects and systemic banking crises that cause
downturns in the real economy.
In addition, we are able to identify two fundamental drivers of systemic risk at the
banking system level – the market-to-book (MTB) and the loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio.
The results have paramount implications. First, the aggregate MTB ratio itself may be
used as a simple and efficient early warning indicator to monitor systemic risk. The latter
indicated a significant deterioration of the European banking system as early as in 2007
pointing at the risk of a systemic banking crisis. Furthermore, the information content
of the MTB dynamics also emphasizes the importance of incentivizing institutions to
establish less volatile business models such as to strengthen their resilience to shocks in
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times of crises, thereby reducing the overall level of systemic risk. Second, the significance
of the aggregate LTD ratio demonstrates that an effective regulation of funding liquidity
risk is vital in order to contribute to a more resilient banking system and strongly confirms
the necessity of the new Basel III guidelines geared to curb an institution’s liquidity risk.
Finally, our findings highlight that including balance sheet data is beneficial for sys-
temic risk measurement. This becomes particularly visible in a comparison between SRMs
based on both balance sheet and stock market information and SRMs based exclusively
on stock market information.
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2.A Econometric approach
We model the bivariate return dynamics of institution i {ri}t and the banking system
{rsys}t applying a bivariate conditionally heteroskedastic process as in Brownlees and
Engle (2015):
rsys,t = σsys,tǫsys,t (2.6a)
ri,t = σi,t
(
ρi,sys,tǫsys,t +
√
1− ρ2i,sys,tǫi,t
)
, (2.6b)
where σj,t, j ∈ {sys, i} denotes the time-varying (conditional) volatilities and ρj,t the
time-varying (conditional) correlations; rj,t = ln (Pj,t/Pj,t−1) − µj denotes the detrended
logarithmic returns, where Pj,t represents either bank i’s stock price or the banking system
stock price index at time t and µj simply stands for the mean return over the full length
of our sample period.
The banking system stock price index reflects the stock price movements within our
sample and is calculated as the average total asset weighted stock price of our sample of
banks.14 The residuals ǫi and ǫsys are distributed according to the bivariate distribution
Fi capturing the tail dependence of the return series and are assumed to be uncorrelated
but not independent. Over time, however, the residuals are assumed to be independent
and identically distributed with zero mean and unit variance.
The time-varying volatilities of institution i (σi,t) and the banking system (σsys,t) are
estimated individually for every institution i applying a univariate GARCH(1,1) process
as proposed by Bollerslev (1986):
σ2j,t = α0,j + α1,jr
2
j,t−1 + β1,jσ
2
j,t−1 (2.7a)
with ξj,t =
rj,t
σj,t
; j ∈ {i, sys} , (2.7b)
where the ξj,t denote the (correlated) standardized residuals derived from the univariate
GARCH(1,1) processes which we use to model the time-varying correlation coefficient
ρi,sys,t. As suggested by Brownlees and Engle (2015), we apply the Dynamic Conditional
Correlation (DCC) GARCH model of Engle (2002) for the estimation of correlations.
Rather than directly modeling the correlation between institution i’s return and the
banking system return, the DCC GARCH approach models the time-varying correlation
of the standardized residuals ξj,t, whereas their covariance matrix serves as a proxy for
14 Our total-asset-weighted banking system price index has a correlation of 97.9% with the STOXX
Europe 600 Banks and the TMI Banks Index.
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the correlation matrix of returns ri,t and rsys,t. The validity for this equivalence follows
directly from the bivariate return process of Equation (2.6). For a detailed discussion of
the DCC GARCH framework we refer to Appendix 2.B.
The h-day MES and CoVaR measures, nevertheless, cannot be expressed in closed-
form solution as a function of volatility, correlation, and tail dependence and therefore
have to be determined via simulation. Thus, for each institution i we simulate bivariate
return series carrying out the following five steps:
(i) To model the volatility and correlation dynamics of {rsys, ri}t, we first estimate the
parameter vectors of the univariate GARCH(1,1) and the DCC GARCH processes
(α0,j, α1,j, β1,j) and (α, β), respectively.
15 All GARCH(1,1) and DCC GARCH pa-
rameters are estimated maximizing the corresponding log likelihood functions under
the assumption that the residuals be Gaussian.16
(ii) Furthermore, the dynamics of {rsys, ri}t are assumed to be driven by the distribution
Fi that we model using a t-copula and standard Gaussian marginal distributions.
The bivariate t-copula is fitted to the series of residuals {ǫsys, ǫi}t from the entire
sample period.17
(iii) In a third step, we simulate S = 500, 000 paths of residuals with h = 60 days (a
quarter of a year) length each. For every single path s, h independent pairs of
residuals are drawn from the parameterized distribution Fˆi:
{
ǫssys,t+τ
ǫsi,t+τ
}h
τ=1
∼ Fˆi for s = 1, . . . , S. (2.8)
(iv) In a fourth step, we employ the drawn residuals to calculate the daily bivari-
ate returns for the simulated time interval [t, t+ h] by updating the volatilities
{σsys,t+τ+1, σi,t+τ+1}h−1τ=1 and correlations {ρi,sys,t+τ+1}h−1τ=1 on a daily basis (the de-
15 We apply various time series diagnostic tests to the individual banks’ series of daily log returns. I.e., we
test for stationarity, heteroskedasticity, auto-correlation, and non-normality. According to Appendix-
Table 2.8, we cannot reject the null hypotheses that the time series are stationary for all series. Most
series, however, exhibit heteroskedasticity, strong auto-correlation, and non-normality.
16 Note that this does not imply that the estimated return series are normally distributed over time.
In fact, in literature it is well documented that the unconditional return distribution of a GARCH
process is heavy-tailed and exhibits excess kurtosis.
17 Recall that we use Gaussian error terms to estimate the GARCH and DCC GARCH parameters. To
be consistent with our previous assumptions, we model the univariate residuals as standard Gaussian
noise.
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tailed procedure of how the daily correlations are updated is presented in Ap-
pendix 2.B). This yields the following return series:
{
rssys,t+τ
rsi,t+τ
}h
τ=1
for s = 1, . . . , S. (2.9)
(v) In the last step, we determine the h-day cumulative returns of simulations s = 1, . . . , S
at day t for institution i and the banking system (according to Equation (2.2)). Sub-
sequently, the MES and ∆CoVaR measures are directly inferred from the simulated
return series. We calculate weekly series of SRISK employing the weekly MES es-
timates and the corresponding daily market and quarterly balance sheet values as
described in Section 2.3.2.
We perform the simulation procedure outlined in Steps 3–5 including the calculation of the
systemic risk measures for each Wednesday within our sample period moving ahead one
week in each step. We estimate the h-day MES and CoVaR measures from the simulated
bivariate cumulative h-day returns as follows:
Marginal Expected Shortfall
The h-day MES is calculated using the average of institution i’s cumulative h-day returns
resulting from paths s = 1, . . . , S for which the cumulative return of the banking system
is below threshold C:
MESi,ht (C) = −
∑S
s=1R
s
i;[t,t+h]✶
{
Rssys;[t,t+h] ≤ C
}
∑S
s=1 ✶
{
Rssys;[t,t+h] ≤ C
} . (2.10)
✶ denotes an indicator variable that takes the value one if the market return is below
threshold level C and zero otherwise.
Conditional Value at Risk
∆CoVaR is calculated as the residual between bank i’s ”distress CoVaR” given by
CoVaR
sys|i≤VaR,h
t (q) = VaRt,q
(
Rssys;[t,t+h]
)
with
{
Rssys;[t,t+h] : R
s
i;[t,t+h] ≤ VaRt,q
(
Rsi;[t,t+h]
)} (2.11a)
2 Systemic risk measures and their viability for banking supervision 39
and bank i’s ”median state CoVaR” given by
CoVaR
sys|i=median,h
t (q) = VaRt,q
(
Rssys;[t,t+h]
)
with
{
Rssys;[t,t+h] : ν
s,h
i,t − σs,hi,t ≤ Rsi;[t,t+h] ≤ νs,hi,t + σs,hi,t
}
,
(2.11b)
where νs,hi,t is the simulated median h-day return of institution i and σ
s,h
i,t the simulated
standard deviation of institution i’s h-day return.
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2.B DCC GARCH
Recalling the bivariate return process from Equation (2.6) and the setup of the univariate
GARCH(1,1) models from Equations (2.7a) and (2.7b), the following relationship holds:
ξsys,t = ǫsys,t (2.12a)
ξi,t = ρi,sys,tǫsys,t +
√
1− ρ2i,sys,tǫi,t. (2.12b)
It is obvious that within the bivariate process the correlation variable ρsys,i,t entirely
captures the correlation between institution i and the banking system. Therefore, the
residuals ǫi,t and ǫsys,t are uncorrelated by definition. However, this is not the case for the
(correlated) residuals ξi,t and ξsys,t from the univariate GARCH(1,1) processes. This fact
is used by Engle (2002) to estimate time-varying return correlations.
Using matrix notation the return vector of the market and institution i is given by:
Rt = Σ
1
2
t ǫt, (2.13)
where
Σt =
[
σ2sys,t ρi,sys,tσi,tσsys,t
ρi,sys,tσi,tσsys,t σ
2
i,t
]
(2.14)
is the covariance matrix of the return vector Rt = (rsys,t, ri,t)
′ and Σ
1/2
t is the corresponding
Cholesky transformation of Σt. The covariance matrix can be further decomposed to the
following form:
Σt = DtPtDt (2.15a)
=
[
σsys,t 0
0 σi,t
][
1 ρi,sys,t
ρi,sys,t 1
][
σsys,t 0
0 σi,t
]
, (2.15b)
with Pt representing the correlation matrix of the return vector Rt. Since the residuals ξi,t
and ξsys,t have zero mean and unit variance, the correlation matrix of the return vector
and the covariance matrix of the residuals are equivalents and can be used to calculate
the time-varying correlation variable ρi,sys,t. Following Engle (2009), the bivariate DDC
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GARCH model at time t is fully specified by:
ρi,sys,t =
qi,sys,t√
qi,i,tqsys,sys,t
(2.16a)
qi,sys,t = (1− α− β) qi,sys + αξi,t−1ξsys,t−1 + βqi,sys,t−1 (2.16b)
qsys,sys,t = (1− α− β) qsys,sys + αξsys,t−1ξsys,t−1 + βqsys,sys,t−1 (2.16c)
qi,i,t = (1− α− β) qi,i + αξi,t−1ξi,t−1 + βqi,i,t−1 (2.16d)
qi,sys =
1
n
n∑
t=1
ξi,tξsys,t. (2.16e)
q is the average correlation within the sample period and the q values are the quasi-
correlations extracted from residuals ξi,t and ξsys,t. The decomposition of ρt into quasi-
correlations ensures that the correlation matrix is positive definite. In analogy to the
volatility GARCH models, the time-varying correlation of the DCC GARCH is het-
eroskedastic and depends on the lagged quasi-correlation values as well as on the lagged
values of the GARCH(1,1) residuals (ξsys,t, ξi,t). Parameters α and β are estimated using
the maximum likelihood method.
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2.C Time series diagnostics
We conduct several diagnostic checks for the time series employed in our empirical anal-
ysis. Table 2.7 contains test results for the quarterly series of SRMs, bank-specific, and
macroeconomic variables at the banking system level. Table 2.8 displays the test results
for the individual banks’ series of daily log returns.
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Panel A – Unit roots & stationarity: Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test
p-value 0.737 0.445 0.282 0.551 0.490 0.195 0.766 0.010 0.990 0.671 0.756 0.900 0.953 0.990 0.990
statistic -2.805 -2.047 -1.622 -2.323 -2.163 -1.395 -2.882 0.457 -4.546 -2.635 -2.857 -3.232 -3.632 -4.545 -4.475
Panel B – Heteroskedasticity: Breusch-Pagan test
p-value 0.883 0.573 0.942 0.945 0.933 0.705 0.734 0.961 0.588 0.372 0.007 0.832 0.001 0.001 0.004
statistic 0.022 0.317 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.144 0.115 0.002 0.293 0.798 7.243 0.045 10.788 11.259 8.254
Panel C – Auto-correlation: Durbin-Watson test
p-value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
statistic 0.934 0.290 0.611 0.689 0.476 0.360 0.348 0.125 0.223 0.239 0.191 0.392 0.130 0.114 0.240
Panel D – Non-normality: Jarque-Bera test
p-value 0.441 0.186 0.452 0.514 0.165 0.148 0.347 0.210 0.167 0.662 0.419 0.757 0.372 0.006 0.091
statistic 1.636 3.362 1.587 1.330 3.600 3.818 2.117 3.122 3.575 0.825 1.739 0.556 1.978 10.208 4.791
Table 2.7 – Time series diagnostics (levels): p-values and test statistics
The above table exhibits p-values of various statistical diagnostic tests on the quarterly time series used in our regressions in Section 2.5.1 and
Section 2.5.2. All time series of observations range from 2005 to 2013. The table is organized as follows: Panel A exhibits the results of the
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test with the null hypothesis that the time series are stationary, i.e., there is no unit root. Panel B presents the
results of the Breusch-Pagan test with the null hypothesis that the time series are homoscedastic, i.e., there is no heteroskedasticity. Panel C gives
the results of the Durbin-Watson test with the null hypothesis that the time series exhibit no auto-correlation. Panel D presents the results of the
Jarque-Bera test with the null hypothesis that the time series follow the Gaussian distribution.
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Statistic #series mean min q = 0.25 q = 0.50 q = 0.75 max
#p : p < 0.1 #p : p < 0.05 #p : p < 0.01
(in %) (in %) (in %)
KPSS 84 0.9900 0.9900 0.9900 0.9900 0.9900 0.9900 0.00 0.00 0.00
Breusch-Pagan 84 0.1628 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.1672 0.9883 71.43 63.10 55.95
Durbin-Watson 84 0.1656 0.0000 0.0003 0.0456 0.1923 0.9510 66.67 53.57 35.71
Jarque-Bera 84 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table 2.8 – Diagnostics of sample bank’s daily log return series: p-values and test statistics
The above table exhibits p-values of various statistical diagnostic tests on the daily log return series for all 84 sample banks. All stock price data
are obtained from Datastream and the analyzed time series range from 2005 to 2013. We perform the following tests: the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin statistic tests the null hypothesis that the time series are stationary, i.e., there is no unit root; the Breusch-Pagan statistic tests the
null hypothesis that the time series are homoscedastic, i.e., there is no heteroskedasticity. The Durbin-Watson statistic tests the null hypothesis
that the time series exhibit no auto-correlation and the Jarque-Bera statistic tests the null hypothesis that the time series follow the Gaussian
distribution. Column one specifies the respective test statistics. Column two gives the number of series tested and thus the number of test results.
Column three gives the mean p-value of the test results, columns four to eight the quantiles, and columns nine to eleven provide the percentage of
test results significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels.
3 Systemic importance, default risk,
and profitability in the European
banking system
3.1 Introduction
The recent International Financial Crisis has prompted the G20 to agree on the imple-
mentation of a set of new regulatory rules commonly known as Basel III with the purpose
of improving micro- and macroprudential supervision and fostering the resilience of the
banking system. In order to effectively achieve the former, the financial stability of sys-
temically important banks (SIBs) is of great importance, as SIB failures are likely to
trigger turmoil in the banking system with substantial spillover effects to the real econ-
omy. While the adverse consequences of SIBs’ failures are more or less commonly known,
it remains unclear whether SIBs are more vulnerable to banking system distress and eco-
nomic downturns than non-SIBs. However, especially the identification of SIB-specific
business cycle sensitivities is crucial for the development and execution of macropruden-
tial stress-testing procedures as well as for the evaluation of policies relevant to SIBs, such
as systemic importance surcharges or risk insensitive leverage ratio constraints.
Yet, current literature investigating public costs and benefits associated with SIBs
primarily focuses on efficiency issues of the largest banks as well as on market distortions
arising from implicit too-big-to-fail guarantees. Large banks’ benefits can be mainly at-
tributed to portfolio diversification effects and economies of scale and scope. For instance,
Wheelock and Wilson (2012) document that large U.S. banks obtain significant and in-
creasing returns to scale. De Haan and Poghosyan (2012) show that non-investment banks’
quarterly earnings volatility decreases with bank size. In addition, Demsetz and Strahan
(1997) find that portfolio diversification of large U.S. bank holding companies positively
affects their default risk. The risk reduction benefit from diversification, though, is offset
by above average leverage ratios and riskier lending activities.
Public costs can arise from market-implied too-big-to-fail guarantees. Analyzing
banks’ safety net subsidies from bank mergers and acquisitions, Molyneux et al. (2014)
find that large banks are more likely to be rescued. Gandhi and Lustig (2015) provide
evidence that large banks feature significantly lower risk-adjusted stock returns and simi-
larly, Vo¨lz and Wedow (2011) find that CDS premia are distorted by bank size. Contrary
to the previous findings, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (2013) find that banks’ market-to-
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book ratios are negatively related to bank size indicating that beyond a certain threshold
banks become too-big-to-save, which is priced by stock markets accordingly.
To the best of our knowledge, only Bertay et al. (2013) and Tabak et al. (2013) directly
examine the financial stability of SIBs. Both studies find that systemic importance is not
associated with higher levels of default risk, but larger banks are found to outperform
smaller ones in terms of profitability. Bertay et al. (2013) additionally find that banks’
systemic size, defined as a bank’s size relative to the national economy, coincides with
substantially weaker return patterns. However, the studies share the weakness of focusing
on banks’ balance sheet size as the principal indicator for systemic importance, albeit
this identification method is coming short of a key feature of systemic importance which
is an institution’s exposure to systemwide failure (Acharya et al., 2012). Thus, Bertay
et al. (2013) and Tabak et al. (2013) primarily analyze the risk and return efficiency of
large banks, instead of capturing the underlying effects of systemic importance on banks’
financial stability. Furthermore, existing literature does not investigate the particularities
of SIBs’ and non-SIBs’ sensitivity to macroeconomic conditions.
The purpose of this paper is to explicitly analyze the relation between banks’ systemic
importance and their financial stability over the business cycle. In particular, we analyze
in three steps whether SIBs exhibit default risk and return patterns that are distinctively
different from non-SIBs. In a first step, we conduct a general examination of the deter-
minants of bank profitability and default risk, which also includes a sensitivity analysis
of the latter with respect to macroeconomic conditions. Second, we explore how systemic
importance affects banks’ financial stability and their sensitivity to economic expansions
and contractions by grouping banks into quintiles according to their systemic relevance.
In a last step, we investigate the time persistence of SIBs’ particularities in their default
risk and return patterns.
We conduct our analysis for the European banking system covering the period from
July 2005 to June 2013 allowing for an investigation of SIBs’ and non-SIBs’ vulnerabilities
during the International Financial Crisis and the subsequent European Sovereign Debt
Crisis. As a measure of systemic importance we apply the SRISK concept (Acharya
et al., 2012; Brownlees and Engle, 2015). SRISK is considered to be a measure for the
externalities of bank distress and represents the measure of systemic importance that is
most widely accepted in literature (Laeven et al., 2014).
Our main findings are as follows. First, SIBs’ contemporaneous and future default risk
and return characteristics feature above average pro-cyclicality with respect to macroe-
conomic conditions. A 1% increase of the GDP growth rate results in an improvement
of SIBs’ return on equity that is around 1.4% higher than that of non-SIBs. In the same
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way, SIBs’ and non-SIBs’ probabilities of default significantly differ in their sensitivity to
economic expansions and contractions. We do not find evidence that non-SIBs exhibit
cyclicality patterns that are distinctively different from average. Economic recessions
therefore disproportionately impede the financial stability of SIBs.
Second, we find that systemic importance coincides with substantially weaker return
patterns. In particular, SIBs’ annual returns on equity are 4.7% lower than those of non-
SIBs. SIBs’ underperformance is furthermore persistent for three subsequent quarters. In
contrast, the 20% least systemically important institutions feature annual returns that are
2.3% higher compared to systemically more important banks. However, we cannot observe
that the systemic importance attribute of SIBs is reflected in higher levels of default risk,
challenging the popular notion that SIBs’ systemic nature significantly affects their risk-
taking behavior as a result of perceived government bailout guarantees.
Contrary to this, SIBs exhibit levels of ameliorating default risk over time, possibly
reflecting that this group of institutions engages in particularly strong recapitalization ef-
forts in anticipation of higher capital requirements and reduced risk-taking as a response
to the recent crises. The fact that SIBs eventually exhibit higher levels of default risk
compared to non-SIBs can be primarily attributed to their equity ratios. Our results
concerning the marginal effects of size on banks’ default risk and return characteristics
mainly confirm the findings of previous literature. We find that size is significantly neg-
atively related to an institution’s default risk. The effect of size on bank performance is
positive though insignificant.
The results have paramount implications. The distinction between SIBs and non-SIBs
is of particular importance for the development and execution of macroprudential stress-
testing procedures as their different sensitivities with respect to economic shocks need
to be accounted for in an adequate manner. Moreover, the results indicate that banks’
balance sheet size should not be a primary concern for supervisors. Empirical evidence
supports the existence of economies of scale and scope for large institutions. In addition,
the divesture of large banks as a measure to increase banking stability may deteriorate
risk management capacities and reduce market liquidity (IMF, 2014).
However, our results emphasize the usefulness of implementing binding leverage ratio
constraints for SIBs for two reasons. First, the leverage ratio is much more counter-
cyclical than the current regulation on risk-weighted assets (Brei and Gambacorta, 2015)
and therefore an ideal candidate to effectively dampen the increased pro-cyclicality of
SIBs’ financial stability. Second, moderate balance sheet leverage ratio constraints of up
to 5% substantially reduce SIBs’ default probability by raising their substandard cushions
of equity without affecting the median bank. The measure further limits banks’ SRISK
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and hence public transfers from taxpayers in case of bank failures or restructurings.1, 2
Finally, the result that systemic importance is reflected in lower levels of profitability
suggests that implicit government bailout guarantees for SIBs are costly to shareholders,
too. In particular, our finding contradicts the view that such guarantees can be regarded
as a free of charge long-term put option on shareholders’ future income streams.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the mea-
surement method that we apply for the assessment of systemic importance, Section 3.3
elaborates on the sample selection and variables employed in our analysis, Section 3.4
presents and discusses our empirical results, and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Measuring systemic importance
We measure institutions’ systemic importance employing the SRISK proposed by Acharya
et al. (2012). SRISK is a bank’s time-varying expected undercapitalization conditional
on a severe banking crisis and thus quantifies the amount of equity an institution has to
raise in order to prevent bankruptcy. Institution i’s SRISK at time t over time interval
[t, t+ h] is defined as follows:
SRISKi,ht (C, k) = E
[
capital shortfalli;[t,t+h]
∣∣ crisis] . (3.1a)
A positive SRISK indicates an institution’s propensity to be substantially adversely af-
fected in the event of a distressed banking system and thus highlights the need of recap-
italization. On the contrary, a negative SRISK suggests that a bank’s cushion of capital
is sufficiently large in order to withstand a banking system crisis. Applying the going
concern loss absorbing capacity concept to better define a bank’s undercapitalization,
Equation (3.1a) can be rearranged into:
SRISKi,ht (C, k) = E
[
{k × (debt + equity)− equity}i;[t,t+h]
∣∣∣ crisis] , (3.1b)
where debt represents the book value of debt and equity the market value of equity. Con-
sequently, institution i becomes insolvent during a severe banking crisis in case its equity
1 It is important to note that enhanced risk-based capital requirements for SIBs (systemic importance
surcharges) are also adequate in order to reduce their above average probability of default but are less
appropriate to effectively tackle the increased pro-cyclical nature of the former.
2 The reader should additionally note that, when the leverage ratio becomes a binding regulatory
measure, it might lose its economic expediency and thus becomes an unreliable indicator in the
spirit of Charles Goodhart (Goodhart’s law), as banks reallocate their assets to optimize regulatory
constraints and may find ways for regulatory arbitrage.
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cushion decreases below fraction k of market valued total assets. Allowing parameter k to
be the inverse of the Basel III maximum Leverage Ratio of 33.3; k can be interpreted as a
Tier I Capital Adequacy Ratio of 3% on total marked valued assets instead of the Basel
Capital Adequacy Ratio of 8% on risk-weighted assets. Eventually, SRISK can be calcu-
lated as a function of bank i’s future stock market return conditional on a banking crisis:
SRISKi,ht (C, k) = k × debti,t − (1− k)
(
1−MESi,ht (C)
)
× equityi,t. (3.1c)
MES denotes bank i’s h-day Marginal Expected Shortfall and is defined as bank i’s ex-
pected h-day stock return, given that the banking system’s h-day return falls below a
predefined threshold C, indicating a severe crisis in the banking system:
MESi,ht (C) = −E
[
Ri;[t,t+h]
∣∣Rsys;[t,t+h] ≤ C ] , (3.2)
with Ri;[t,t+h] representing bank i’s h-day stock return:
Ri;[t,t+h] = exp
(
h∑
τ=1
ri,t+τ
)
− 1. (3.3)
The h-day return Rsys;[t,t+h] is defined analogously and represents the asset-weighted re-
turn of the respective banking system.
The measure’s incorporated conditionality is of fundamental importance because we
are particularly interested in institutions’ responses to a distressed banking system. In
a well-functioning banking system, the consequences of a bank failure do not need to be
severe because competitors can acquire the bankrupt institution as a whole or in parts
without impeding the functioning of the banking system. In times of crises, however,
failing institutions may not be acquired due to competitors’ (cash) constraints, resulting
in a severe disruption of the financial system (Acharya et al., 2010). As a consequence,
institutions exhibiting high levels of SRISK substantially contribute to the intensification
of the crisis and thus pose a high risk to the banking system. We calculate weekly SRISK
figures as presented in Section 2.3.4.
3.3 Data
This section briefly introduces our sample of banks, discusses bank characteristics and
macroeconomic variables employed in the regression analysis, and provides descriptive
summary statistics.
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3.3.1 Sample selection
Our study investigates the dependence structure between systemic importance, default
risk, and return characteristics of European banks. The selection of our sample is based
on Do¨ring et al. (2016) and covers the period from July 2005 to June 2013. The particular
focus on the European banking system allows us to analyze the abovementioned depen-
dencies in the context of two severe financial crises – the International Financial Crisis
and the subsequent European Sovereign Debt Crisis.
The sample contains 84 banks from 15 European countries including Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Due to bankruptcies, mergers
and acquisitions, and new listings the number of sample banks changes over time with a
maximum of 78 and a minimum of 51 banks per sample quarter. For a detailed exposition
of our sample selection, we refer to Section 2.2.
3.3.2 Bank characteristics
Systemic importance
We measure systemic importance employing the SRISK concept as outlined in Section 3.2.
Figure 3.1 exhibits the weekly SRISK time series for all sample banks covering the pe-
riod from July 2005 to June 2013. Institutions’ SRISK strongly increases at the onset of
the International Financial Crisis in 2007, peaking after the default of Lehman Brothers
on September 15, 2008. Despite a decrease after 2009, levels of SRISK remain signifi-
cantly higher than prior to 2008 and exhibit another increase as a result of the European
Sovereign Debt Crisis. Although prevailing high levels of SRISK stress the market’s aware-
ness of remaining threats in the European banking system, Figure 3.1 reveals substantial
cross-sectional variation with SRISK values ranging from e-100,000m to e70,000m.
For the subsequent empirical analysis we compute quarterly SRISK series for each
sample bank by averaging across the weekly SRISK values that refer to the respective
quarter and express quarterly SRISK in em. Consequently, institutions’ SRISK quantifies
the average amount of money the government or the taxpayer needs to raise in times of
crises in order to prevent the latter from bankruptcy and can be considered to be a
measure for the externalities of bank distress.
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Figure 3.1 – Evolution of systemic importance
The figure presents time series of weekly SRISK for all sample banks covering the period from July 2005
to June 2013. SRISK is a bank’s expected undercapitalization conditional on a future financial crisis
expressed in EUR m. All stock price and balance sheet data are obtained from Datastream.
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Figure 3.2 – Distribution of systemic importance
The figure presents the unconditional distribution of quarterly SRISK for the aggregate of all sample
banks covering the period from July 2005 to June 2013. SRISK is a bank’s expected undercapitalization
conditional on a future financial crisis expressed in EUR m. All stock price and balance sheet data are
obtained from Datastream.
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Figure 3.2 represents the histogram of quarterly SRISK for our sample of banks. The
distribution of SRISK is heavy-tailed as a result of the size effect, with a substantial
share of values in the left and right tails representing the largest banks within the sample.
This fact emphasizes the notion that large banks do not have to be systemically risky by
definition, i.e., SRISK separates large systemic from large non-systemic banks.
Risk and return
We capture the effect of systemic importance on banks’ financial stability measuring the
SRISK’s influence on banks’ default risk and return characteristics. We proxy default risk
by using the Z-score. Z-score is defined as
Z-scorei,t =
roai,t + cari,t
σi(roa)
,
where roa represents the return on assets, car the capital asset ratio, and σ the return
on assets’ standard deviation over the sample period; t indicates the quarter and i the
respective institution. The Z-score states the number of standard deviations an institu-
tion’s return on assets needs to fall below its expected return in order for the bank to
default (Roy, 1952; Boyd and Runkle, 1993). Hence, the measure is inversely related to
bank default risk, with a high Z-score indicating a reduced probability of default. As
a measure of an institution’s return we employ return on equity which is defined as the
annualized ratio of net income over book equity and expressed in percentage terms.
Control variables
Our analysis accounts for a number of bank-specific control variables that are likely to
affect banks’ default risk and return characteristics. In particular, we employ assets,
defined as the natural logarithm of an institution’s total assets (measured in ek), and
asset growth, defined as the quarterly logarithmic change in total assets. Assets captures
bank size. In literature it is often proposed that larger banks might be less risky and more
profitable than their smaller peers as a result of sophisticated portfolio diversification
techniques and returns of scale and scope (e.g. Diamond, 1984; Demsetz and Strahan,
1997; Feng and Serletis, 2010; Wheelock and Wilson, 2012). Accounting for a bank’s
asset growth rate is crucial because abnormal asset growth rates are likely to be reflected
in banks’ default risk and return characteristics.
Moreover, we employ the equity ratio, defined as the ratio of book equity over total
assets. The latter proxies for a bank’s balance sheet strength in periods of crises and
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thus, higher values indicate a lower risk of default. Lastly, we include the net profit
margin which is defined as net income divided by gross sales and other operating revenue.
The net profit margin captures the operating efficiency of a bank’s return generating
activities and should be positively related to bank performance. We express asset growth,
equity ratio, and net profit margin in percentage terms. All daily stock price information
and quarterly balance sheet data are collected from Datastream.
3.3.3 Macroeconomic variables
The bank-specific controls are complemented by a set of macroeconomic control variables
including the variables GDP growth, inflation, and slope-yield-curve. GDP growth is the
inflation-adjusted annualized growth rate of the European Union’s gross domestic product.
We include the GDP growth rate in order to analyze the economic cyclicality of banks’
default risk and return patterns. We expect institutions to generally be positively affected
by GDP growth. Inflation is the inflation rate computed from the Harmonised Index of
Consumer Prices for the European Union. Slope-yield-curve reflects the ”slope” of the Eu-
ropean economy’s yield curve. It is proxied by the differential between the 10- and 1-year
German government bond yields. Moderate levels of inflation may positively affect bank
performance. However, low yield curve slopes reduce banks’ return on maturity transfor-
mation and could result in lower performance. All macroeconomic variables are collected
from Datastream, sampled on a quarterly frequency, and expressed in percentage terms.
Figure 3.3 depicts time series of all employed macroeconomic control variables. As a
result of the International Financial Crisis the GDP growth rate significantly dropped with
the European economy sliding into a deep recession in late 2008. In 2010 the European
Union experienced a short period of economic recovery, which was however nipped in the
bud by the European Sovereign Debt Crisis starting in 2011. In analogy to GDP growth,
inflation reached its highest levels shortly prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers and
was at its minimum in 2009 when distress in the banking system finally spilled over to the
real sectors. Again, the economic recovery in 2010 led to an increase in inflation, which
was reversed at the onset of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis in 2011.
The yield curve slope dynamics were primarily affected by a sharp decline of the short-
term rate in early 2008. As a consequence, the spread between long- and short-term inter-
est rates increased by roughly 200 basis points from 2008 to 2009 and thereafter remained
on levels that were substantially higher than pre-crisis levels. Beyond the ECB’s sharp
reduction of its main refinancing rate, the yield curve dynamics can further be explained
by an increased investors’ demand for short-term riskless assets during the crises.
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Figure 3.3 – Evolution of macroeconomic variables
The figure presents time series of quarterly macroeconomic data from the European Union covering the
period from July 2005 to June 2013. GDP growth is the inflation-adjusted annualized growth rate of the
EU’s gross domestic product. Inflation is the inflation rate based on the Harmonised Index of Consumer
Prices. German Bund yield is the German government bond yield and slope-yield-curve is the differential
between the 10- and 1-year German government bond yields. All macroeconomic data are expressed in
percentage terms and are obtained from Datastream.
3.3.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics of all variables used in the main study. We only
collect data for a particular sample bank and quarter if all its bank characteristics are
available for that quarter, leaving us with 2,030 quarterly bank observations.
Institutions’ levels of SRISK are slightly skewed to the left with a median value
of e-771.07m. That is to say, even in crisis periods the majority of sample banks is
adequately capitalized. The median sample bank is furthermore characterized by total
assets of approximately e130bn3, a return on equity of 10.09%, and a Z-score of 15.64.
3 This corresponds to the natural logarithm of total assets, exp(18.69) ≈ e130,000,000k.
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Statistics Quantiles
# obs mean std dev min q = 0.25 q = 0.50 q = 0.75 max
Bank characteristics
SRISK 2,030 -398.04 13,584.22 -91,691.39 -3,930.28 -771.07 1,103.53 67,788.30
Z-score 2,030 20.57 20.15 -2.29 9.07 15.64 24.64 113.49
Return on equity 2,030 5.47 68.48 -2,086.72 4.77 10.09 15.82 138.85
Assets 2,030 18.85 1.45 14.40 17.63 18.69 20.12 21.68
Asset growth 2,030 2.28 13.27 -92.98 -0.90 0.93 4.06 423.07
Equity ratio 2,030 6.06 7.58 0.08 3.41 5.13 6.67 87.75
Net profit margin 2,030 13.06 137.69 -235.74 4.50 9.11 14.86 4,348.07
Macroeconomic variables
GDP growth 32 0.86 2.60 -5.50 -0.35 1.65 2.73 3.60
Inflation 32 2.39 0.82 0.40 2.00 2.40 2.90 4.30
Slope-yield-curve 32 1.36 0.92 0.02 0.48 1.58 1.92 2.82
Table 3.1 – Summary statistics on bank characteristics and macroeconomic variables
The table presents summary statistics on quarterly sample bank characteristics and quarterly macroe-
conomic data from the European Union covering the period from July 2005 to June 2013. SRISK is
a bank’s expected undercapitalization conditional on a future financial crisis expressed in EUR m. A
bank’s Z-score is a measure of bank solvency and is defined as (roat + cart)/σroa, where roa is the return
on assets, car the capital asset ratio, and σ denotes the standard deviation; t refers to the respective
quarter. Return on equity is defined as the annualized ratio of net income over book equity expressed in
percentage terms. Assets is the natural logarithm of an institution’s total assets (in EUR k) and asset
growth is the quarterly growth rate of total assets. Equity ratio is the ratio of book equity over total
assets. The net profit margin is defined as net income divided by gross sales and other operating revenue.
GDP growth is the inflation-adjusted annualized growth rate of the EU’s gross domestic product. Infla-
tion is the inflation rate based on the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices and slope-yield-curve is the
differential between the 10- and 1-year German government bond yields. Asset growth, equity ratio, net
profit margin, and all macroeconomic variables are expressed in percentage terms. All data are obtained
from Datastream.
Furthermore, institutions exhibit quarterly median asset growth rates of approximately
one percent.
Sample banks substantially vary in terms of their balance sheet strength, which can
be inferred from their equity ratio. Despite the median bank featuring an equity ratio
of 5.13%, the 25%-quantile (75%-quantile) exhibits equity ratios of 3.41% (6.67%). The
median net profit margin is at 9.11%. In order to control for outliers, we winsorize the
upper and lower 1% quantiles of return on equity, asset growth, equity ratio, and net
profit margin in our subsequent regression analysis.
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# obs SRISK Z-score
Return on
Assets
Asset Equity Net profit
equity growth ratio margin
Austria 73 -3,503.05 15.87 13.73 18.87 1.46 5.58 9.78
Belgium 118 1,089.28 4.83 8.16 19.58 0.00 5.16 4.63
Denmark 64 -350.08 15.50 5.11 18.50 1.40 4.39 6.89
Finland 32 -671.42 26.22 10.02 17.34 2.76 6.14 7.00
France 157 7,129.25 16.98 7.64 20.79 0.00 3.25 6.76
Germany 133 3,000.95 12.05 7.74 20.01 0.04 2.69 5.45
Greece 180 -712.97 3.68 9.27 17.80 1.73 5.06 9.65
Ireland 54 -3,138.73 7.70 23.27 18.96 0.00 4.14 14.27
Italy 352 -759.64 19.73 6.04 17.84 1.31 7.12 7.69
Netherlands 44 1,739.27 11.17 19.44 20.92 0.00 2.87 8.23
Portugal 61 -1,630.54 22.09 12.94 17.88 1.76 4.65 10.20
Spain 249 -1,886.19 19.23 11.54 18.47 1.29 5.57 11.09
Sweden 128 -2,944.76 27.10 13.32 19.27 1.89 4.15 15.53
Switzerland 175 -1,820.19 10.59 9.90 17.29 0.52 7.08 15.16
United Kingdom 210 -1,258.23 19.17 14.04 19.99 0.32 3.95 9.65
Table 3.2 – Summary statistics on bank characteristics by country
The table exhibits median statistics of quarterly sample bank characteristics by country covering the
period from July 2005 to June 2013. SRISK is a bank’s expected undercapitalization conditional on
a future financial crisis expressed in EUR m. A bank’s Z-score is a measure of bank solvency and is
defined as (roat + cart)/σroa, where roa is the return on assets, car the capital asset ratio, and σ denotes
the standard deviation; t refers to the respective quarter. Return on equity is defined as the annualized
ratio of net income over book equity expressed in percentage terms. Assets is the natural logarithm of
an institution’s total assets (in EUR k) and asset growth is the quarterly growth rate of total assets.
Equity ratio is the ratio of book equity over total assets. The net profit margin is defined as net income
divided by gross sales and other operating revenue. Asset growth, equity ratio, and net profit margin are
expressed in percentage terms. All data are obtained from Datastream.
To develop an understanding of regional particularities we present median statistics
of bank characteristics by country in Table 3.2. Italian banks account for the largest
share of quarterly bank observations, followed by Spain and the United Kingdom. Most
notably, however, the measure of systemic importance varies from country to country at
large. Banks from France, Germany, and the Netherlands appear to be the systemically
most important. Greek institutions exhibit the highest probability of default. Danish and
Italian banks, in contrast, are the least profitable.
Table 3.3 reports the correlation coefficients of all quarterly bank characteristics de-
scribed above. The figures reveal a considerable negative relation between banks’ systemic
importance and their return on equity. To a lesser extent the same can be observed for sys-
temic importance and Z-score. SRISK and return on equity are correlated with -0.29 and
SRISK and Z-score are correlated with -0.16. Correlations between systemic importance,
default risk, and return characteristics are all significant at the 0.1% level.
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SRISK 1.00
Z-score -0.16 *** 1.00
Return on equity -0.29 *** 0.15 *** 1.00
Assets 0.16 *** -0.17 *** 0.01 1.00
Asset growth -0.14 *** 0.04 0.18 *** -0.06 ** 1.00
Equity ratio -0.16 *** 0.18 *** 0.03 -0.50 *** 0.00 1.00
Net profit margin -0.33 *** 0.27 *** 0.77 *** -0.16 *** 0.18 *** 0.29 *** 1.00
Table 3.3 – Correlation coefficients of bank characteristics
The table exhibits the correlation coefficients of all bank characteristics covering the period from July
2005 to June 2013. SRISK is a bank’s expected undercapitalization conditional on a future financial crisis
expressed in EURm. A bank’s Z-score is a measure of bank solvency and is defined as (roat + cart)/σroa,
where roa is the return on assets, car the capital asset ratio, and σ denotes the standard deviation; t
refers to the respective quarter. Return on equity is defined as the annualized ratio of net income over
book equity expressed in percentage terms. Assets is the natural logarithm of an institution’s total assets
(in EUR k) and asset growth is the quarterly growth rate of total assets. Equity ratio is the ratio of book
equity over total assets. The net profit margin is defined as net income divided by gross sales and other
operating revenue. Asset growth, equity ratio, and net profit margin are expressed in percentage terms.
All data are obtained from Datastream. The correlation coefficients are assigned asterisks if they are
statistically significant (***, **, and * denotes significance at the 0.1%-, 1%-, and 10%-confidence levels).
3.4 Empirical evidence
In the following, we explore the dependence structure between institutions’ systemic im-
portance and their default risk and return characteristics. We do so by first analyzing the
general determinants of risk and return in Section 3.4.1. Section 3.4.2 then focuses on
subsamples categorized according to banks’ systemic nature in order to explicitly capture
the effects of systemic importance on their financial stability and sensitivity to economic
expansions and contractions. Section 3.4.3 exhibits the time persistence of systemically
important banks’ particularities and Section 3.4.4 tests the robustness of our main results.
3.4.1 Determinants of institutions’ default risk and return
A number of explanatory bank-specific and macroeconomic variables can generally be ex-
pected to determine institutions’ default risk and return characteristics regardless of their
systemic importance. More importantly, though, these variables may already capture the
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effect of systemic importance on the cross-sectional variation of institutions’ default risk
and return characteristics. We measure institutions’ default risk and return characteris-
tics employing institutions’ Z-score and return on equity (roe). As a baseline regression
we estimate the following models:
roe i,t = α + β
′ BankControls i,t + γ
′ MacroControls t + φ
′ BFi + θ
′ TFt + ǫi,t
Z-score i,t = α + β
′ BankControls i,t + γ
′ MacroControls t + φ
′ BFi + θ
′ TFt + ǫi,t,
(3.4)
where BankControls represents a vector containing the bank-specific control variables
assets, asset growth, equity ratio, and net profit margin and MacroControls denotes a
vector of macroeconomic control variables consisting of GDP growth, inflation, and slope-
yield-curve. In our regression analysis we further employ bank fixed (BF) as well as time
fixed (TF) effects; α, β, γ, φ, and θ represent the regression coefficients and ǫ is Gaussian
White Noise. All regressions are estimated applying standard error clustering at the
bank level allowing for a fully general structure w.r.t. heteroskedasticity and serial cross-
sectional correlation. We present the estimation results of Equation (3.4) in Table 3.4
which is organized as follows: Regressions (1), (2), and (3) feature the Z-score, whereas
Regressions (4), (5), and (6) feature the return on equity as the dependent variable.
Our results demonstrate that banks’ probability of default is primarily driven by bank-
specific variables. In line with theory, the effect of size on Z-score is positive. Thus, large
institutions are less likely to go bankrupt. Excessive growth of banks’ balance sheets,
on the contrary, is reflected in significantly higher levels of default risk confirming the
notion that fast-growing banks take excess risk on their balance sheets and are thus more
vulnerable. The equity ratio constitutes the major driver of bank default risk, however.
Its influence is economically large and highly significant; a 1% increase of the equity ratio
is reflected in a strong increase of the Z-score by 1.4. Finally, the net profit margin has a
significantly negative impact on default risk by indirectly strengthening an institution’s
capital base. The explanatory power of macroeconomic variables is rather limited. The
relation between the latter and a bank’s Z-score is insignificant indicating that, in general,
economic conditions do not substantially drive the average bank’s probability of default.
Regarding the analysis of bank profitability we observe that increases of banks’ net
profit margin result in significantly higher return on equity levels. High equity ratios,
however, are reflected in lower levels of profitability, though the influence is only slightly
significant. Given the heated debates between bankers and regulators in light of the
increased Basel III capital requirements, this result is not very surprising, as high returns
on equity usually coincide with high leverage ratios that also imply a higher default risk.
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The effect of size on return on equity is positive though insignificant.
In contrast to banks’ default risk, we find evidence that macroeconomic conditions
significantly drive an institution’s profitability. Inflation generally possesses a positive
impact on banks’ return on equity. The explanatory power of the GDP growth rate,
though, seems to be controversial at first glance. On the one hand, without controlling
for the influence of bank-specific variables, the effect of GDP growth is economically
significant. An increase in GDP by 1% results in an increase in the return on equity by
3.1%. On the other hand, GDP growth turns out to be statistically insignificant when
including bank-specific control variables. In particular, the explanatory power of the
net profit margin is likely to implicitly capture the effect of economic growth since both
return on equity and net profit margin are directly affected by an institution’s net income.
Table 3.5 confirms this assumption. The net profit margin is significantly determined by
the bank-specific variables assets, asset growth, and equity ratio. As a consequence, larger
banks achieve higher return margins and higher capital ratios indicate a bank’s ability to
generate profits more efficiently. In addition, the economic cycle, as measured by GDP
growth, substantially drives a bank’s net profit margin. Hence, the pro-cyclicality of the
average bank’s return on equity in Regression (6) is indirectly determined and captured
by the pro-cyclical nature of the net profit margin.
We finally examine whether our findings regarding the bank-specific control variables
are driven by endogeneity issues. Therefore, we first adopt a dynamic regression specifica-
tion that includes the lag of the dependent variables among the regressors to account for
endogenous default risk and return persistence. The regression coefficients of the lagged
risk and return variables indicate the speed of adjustment to equilibrium. A coefficient
close to one implies that banks’ levels of Z-score and return on equity persist over time.
Values around zero mean that there is no persistency. Values in between indicate that
default risk and return are somewhat persistent but will eventually return to their average
levels. In a second regression setup, we lag all bank-specific regressors by one period in
order to account for potential reverse causalities. Endogeneity can be a concern and might
bias our results in case banks’ risk and return characteristics cause banks to adjust their
balance sheet size, growth rates or equity ratios. L. denotes the one period lag of the
corresponding variable. The results for the bank-specific control variables are presented
in Table 3.6 and confirm our previous findings. Bank size coincides with higher levels of
Z-score (lower probability of default), whereas higher asset growth rates reduce a bank’s
solvency. The net profit margin remains the major driver of the return on equity; however,
the economic significance of the former decreases. Lastly, we find further evidence that
higher equity ratios lower banks’ profitability.
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Z-score ROE
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assets 2.914 *** 2.911 *** 0.904 0.889
(1.034) (1.021) (2.572) (2.821)
Asset growth -0.052 *** -0.050 *** 0.010 0.020
(0.012) (0.012) (0.027) (0.028)
Equity ratio 1.411 *** 1.410 *** -0.691 * -0.695 *
(0.309) (0.310) (0.396) (0.410)
Net profit margin 0.056 *** 0.061 *** 0.971 *** 1.004 ***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.113) (0.113)
GDP growth -0.263 -0.066 3.133 *** 0.313
(0.314) (0.275) (0.554) (0.469)
Inflation 0.018 0.331 1.213 * 1.182 **
(0.379) (0.293) (0.700) (0.580)
Slope-yield-curve 0.809 -0.843 -3.445 -0.411
(0.776) (0.750) (2.804) (1.036)
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
adjusted R2 0.399 0.039 0.423 0.629 0.198 0.639
p-value (F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
# obs 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030
Table 3.4 – Determinants of default risk and return
All figures are estimated from quarterly sample bank characteristics and quarterly macroeconomic data
from the European Union covering the period from July 2005 to June 2013. The table is organized as
follows. Regressions (1), (2), and (3) feature Z-score as the dependent variable, whereas Regressions (4),
(5), and (6) feature return on equity (roe) as the dependent variable. A bank’s Z-score is a measure
of bank solvency and is defined as (roat + cart)/σroa, where roa is the return on assets, car the capital
asset ratio, and σ denotes the standard deviation; t refers to the respective quarter. Return on equity
is defined as the annualized ratio of net income over book equity expressed in percentage terms. Assets
is the natural logarithm of an institution’s total assets (in EUR k) and asset growth is the quarterly
growth rate of total assets. Equity ratio is the ratio of book equity over total assets. The net profit
margin is defined as net income divided by gross sales and other operating revenue. GDP growth is the
inflation-adjusted annualized growth rate of the EU’s gross domestic product. Inflation is the inflation
rate based on the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices and slope-yield-curve is the differential between
the 10- and 1-year German government bond yields. Asset growth, equity ratio, net profit margin, and
all macroeconomic variables are expressed in percentage terms. All data are obtained from Datastream.
We estimate all regressions employing time and bank fixed effects and applying clustered standard errors
at the bank level. For the ease of exposition, we suppress regression intercepts. Standard errors are given
in parentheses. The regression coefficients are assigned asterisks if they are statistically significant (***,
**, and * denotes significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-confidence levels).
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Net profit margin
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Assets 6.110 *** 6.511 ***
(2.162) (1.985)
Asset growth 0.089 ** 0.118 **
(0.043) (0.046)
Equity ratio 2.128 *** 2.271 ***
(0.543) (0.558)
GDP growth 2.890 *** 4.052 ***
(0.826) (0.769)
Inflation 0.034 1.453
(1.063) (0.890)
Slope-yield-curve -2.534 -3.219 *
(2.199) (1.866)
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank
adjusted R2 0.089 0.173 0.244
p-value (F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000
# obs 2,030 2,030 2,030
Table 3.5 – Drivers of the net profit margin
All figures are estimated from quarterly sample bank characteristics and quarterly macroeconomic data
from the European Union covering the period from July 2005 to June 2013. The regressions feature
the net profit margin as the dependent variable. The net profit margin is defined as net income divided
by gross sales and other operating revenue and is expressed in percentage terms. Assets is the natural
logarithm of an institution’s total assets (in EUR k) and asset growth is the quarterly growth rate of total
assets. Equity ratio is the ratio of book equity over total assets. GDP growth is the inflation-adjusted
annualized growth rate of the EU’s gross domestic product. Inflation is the inflation rate based on the
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices and slope-yield-curve is the differential between the 10- and 1-year
German government bond yields. Net profit margin, asset growth, equity ratio, and all macroeconomic
variables are expressed in percentage terms. All data are obtained from Datastream. We estimate all
regressions employing time and bank fixed effects and applying clustered standard errors at the bank level.
For the ease of exposition, we suppress regression intercepts. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
The regression coefficients are assigned asterisks if they are statistically significant (***, **, and * denotes
significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-confidence levels).
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Z-score ROE
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag dependent 0.654 *** 0.426 ***
(0.044) (0.099)
Assets 1.349 *** -0.677
(0.366) (1.660)
Asset growth -0.088 *** -0.004
(0.012) (0.027)
Equity ratio 0.609 *** -0.634 **
(0.147) (0.298)
Net profit margin 0.039 *** 0.697 ***
(0.006) (0.141)
L.Assets 2.095 ** -0.416
(0.924) (1.535)
L.Asset growth -0.041 *** 0.080 **
(0.013) (0.037)
L.Equity ratio 1.104 *** -0.566 *
(0.238) (0.343)
L.Net profit margin 0.070 *** 0.808 ***
(0.016) (0.098)
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank
adjusted R2 0.739 0.326 0.724 0.466
p-value (F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
# obs 1,946 1,946 1,946 1,946
Table 3.6 – Endogeneity and banks’ default risk and return
All figures are estimated from quarterly sample bank characteristics covering the period from July 2005
to June 2013. The table is organized as follows. Regressions (1) and (2) feature Z-score as the dependent
variable, whereas Regressions (3) and (4) feature return on equity (roe) as the dependent variable. A
bank’s Z-score is a measure of bank solvency and is defined as (roat + cart)/σroa, where roa is the return
on assets, car the capital asset ratio, and σ denotes the standard deviation; t refers to the respective
quarter. Return on equity is defined as the annualized ratio of net income over book equity expressed in
percentage terms. Lag dependent is the one period lag of the dependent variable Z-score or return on
equity. Assets is the natural logarithm of an institution’s total assets (in EUR k) and asset growth is the
quarterly growth rate of total assets. Equity ratio is the ratio of book equity over total assets. The net
profit margin is defined as net income divided by gross sales and other operating revenue. Asset growth,
equity ratio, and net profit margin are expressed in percentage terms. L. indicates the one period lag of the
corresponding variable. All data are obtained from Datastream. We estimate all regressions employing
time fixed and/or bank fixed effects and applying clustered standard errors at the bank level. For the
ease of exposition, we suppress the regressions’ intercepts. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The
regression coefficients are assigned asterisks if they are statistically significant (***, **, and * denotes
significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-confidence levels).
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3.4.2 Impact of systemic importance on default risk and return
We now turn towards the influence of systemic importance on banks’ default risk and
return characteristics. However, evaluating the effects of systemic importance by means
of theoretical considerations is a complex task because opposing marginal effects between
the drivers of systemic importance need to be taken into account. As demonstrated by
SRISK, in particular, these are an institution’s size, MES, and leverage.
Especially the effect of size is ambiguous. On the one hand, large institutions can be
expected to be less risky and more profitable as a result of superior portfolio diversification,
enhanced risk management techniques, and returns of scale and scope (cf. Section 3.3.2).
On the other hand, institutions exceeding a too-big-to-fail size threshold may take ex-
cessive risk on their balance sheets due to the perception of implicit government bailout
guarantees. The effects of MES and leverage are more uniform. Reflecting investors’
expectations about which institutions suffer most in times of financial crises, banks with
higher levels of MES should be more affected by distressed financial markets, resulting in
less favorable risk and return characteristics. High levels of leverage boost institutions’
return on equity which in turn is bought at the price of an increased risk of default.
The previous discussion highlights the difficulty to derive the total of these effects from
theory, stressing the necessity to analyze dependencies between systemic importance,
default risk, and return characteristics empirically. This is especially true because the
individual drivers of systemic importance do not need to be of any concern, but it is the
(non-linear) combination of the latter breeding institutions’ systemic importance.
Figure 3.4 presents scatterplots revealing the relationship between institutions’ sys-
temic importance and their default risk and return characteristics. The left panel displays
the relation between SRISK and Z-score and the right panel exhibits the relation between
SRISK and return on equity.
Institutions’ SRISK and Z-score exhibit a weakly negative linear relationship. In
contrast, the negative relationship between institutions’ SRISK and return on equity is
more pronounced in that high levels of SRISK are reflected in an inferior performance.
For a more detailed analysis, we split our sample of banks into five subsamples. We rank
sample banks according to their systemic importance in decreasing order in each quarter
and allocate them to quintiles. Quintile 1 contains institutions with the highest systemic
importance whereas Quintile 5 contains institutions with the lowest. Hence, we refer to
Quintile 1 banks as systemically important banks (SIBs).
To develop a better understanding about the dependencies between banks’ systemic
importance and their default risk and return characteristics, we calculate mean descriptive
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Figure 3.4 – Systemic importance, default risk, and return
The figure presents the relationship between the sample banks’ quarterly systemic importance, default
risk, and return characteristics covering the period from July 2005 to June 2013. The blue dashed
lines indicate the linear relation of the aforementioned. SRISK is a bank’s expected undercapitalization
conditional on a future financial crisis expressed in EUR m. A bank’s Z-score is a measure of bank
solvency and is defined as (roat + cart)/σroa, where roa is the return on assets, car the capital asset
ratio, and σ denotes the standard deviation; t refers to the respective quarter. Return on equity is
defined as the annualized ratio of net income over book equity expressed in percentage terms. For the
ease of exposition, we suppress the variables’ upper and lower 2.5% quantiles. All data are obtained from
Datastream.
statistics for both Z-score and return on equity for each quintile. We additionally explore
the relevance of institutions’ systemic importance over time by calculating quarterly leads
of Z-score and return on equity for up to four quarters.
Table 3.7 presents the results. Lead = k, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} indicates the k-quarter lead
of the corresponding quintiles’ mean default risk and return characteristics. For instance,
Lead = 0 presents contemporaneous default risk and return characteristics; Lead = 2
gives the mean characteristics of Z-score and return on equity in the second quarter
after the institutions were assigned to the respective quintiles. The main findings are as
follows. We observe that systemic importance coincides with consistently higher levels
of default risk and lower profitability. Both, institutions’ Z-score and return on equity
substantially increase with decreasing systemic importance. Contemporaneous return on
equity only amounts to 2.91% in Quintile 1, but steadily increases across quintiles up
to 13.90% in Quintile 5. For contemporaneous Z-score, differences are not as evident in
a comparison between Quintiles 2, 3, and 4, but are more pronounced in a comparison
between Quintiles 1 and 5, with Z-score amounting to 15.79 and 26.66, respectively. The
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Quintiles
Sample 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Lead = 0 Z-score 20.533 15.789 (0.004) 19.071 (0.179) 20.780 (0.964) 20.719 (0.000) 26.662
ROE 8.354 2.911 (0.004) 6.192 (0.302) 7.424 (0.000) 11.721 (0.001) 13.900
Lead = 1 Z-score 20.454 15.907 (0.002) 19.531 (0.485) 20.436 (0.924) 20.308 (0.000) 26.356
ROE 8.157 2.706 (0.002) 6.359 (0.760) 6.739 (0.000) 11.615 (0.005) 13.633
Lead = 2 Z-score 20.346 16.057 (0.003) 19.603 (0.588) 20.317 (0.740) 19.871 (0.000) 26.055
ROE 7.905 2.221 (0.000) 6.700 (0.862) 6.483 (0.000) 11.347 (0.039) 12.932
Lead = 3 Z-score 20.228 16.178 (0.002) 20.002 (0.948) 20.090 (0.612) 19.410 (0.000) 25.579
ROE 7.612 1.852 (0.000) 7.237 (0.398) 6.177 (0.000) 10.841 (0.159) 12.046
Lead = 4 Z-score 20.097 16.232 (0.001) 20.590 (0.489) 19.639 (0.595) 18.934 (0.000) 25.224
ROE 7.226 2.041 (0.000) 6.896 (0.610) 6.252 (0.004) 9.800 (0.154) 11.194
Table 3.7 – Summary statistics of institutions’ default risk and return characteristics cate-
gorized by systemic importance
The table presents mean values of the sample banks’ (lead) quarterly default risk and return character-
istics for various subsamples covering the period from July 2005 to June 2013. The table is organized
as follows. Column three (Sample) presents the mean values obtained for the uncategorized sample.
Columns 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 present mean values of subsamples representing the institutions falling in the
respective header quintile within each quarter. Numbers in parentheses represent p-values of a two-sample
t-test between the adjacent quintile mean values. We apply SRISK as a categorization criterion. SRISK
is a bank’s expected undercapitalization conditional on a future financial crisis expressed in EUR m. A
bank’s Z-score is a measure of bank solvency and is defined as (roat + cart)/σroa, where roa is the return
on assets, car the capital asset ratio, and σ denotes the standard deviation; t refers to the respective
quarter. Return on equity is defined as the annualized ratio of net income over book equity expressed
in percentage terms. All data are obtained from Datastream. Lead = k, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} indicates the
k-quarter lead of the corresponding subsamples’ mean default risk and return characteristics.
observed patterns are predominantly persistent for all four quarter leads (see p-values of
two-sample t-tests in parentheses).
In the following, we want to confirm if the previously observed patterns remain valid
after controlling for the explanatory variables employed in Section 3.4.1. Additionally, we
want to explore whether or not a bank’s systemic nature affects its sensitivity to macroe-
conomic conditions. We therefore modify our regression analysis in order to explicitly
account for the influence of institutional systemic importance:
roe i,t = α + β
′ BankControls i,t + γ
′ MacroControls t
+ κ SysRisk i,t + δ SysRisk i,t ∗GDP growtht + φ′ BFi + θ′ TFt + ǫi,t
Z-score i,t = α + β
′ BankControls i,t + γ
′ MacroControls t
+ κ SysRisk i,t + δ SysRisk i,t ∗GDP growtht + φ′ BFi + θ′ TFt + ǫi,t
(3.5)
The distinctive new features of the above regressions are the two additional terms Sys-
Risk and SysRisk * GDP growth, where SysRisk is a dummy variable that within a
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given quarter equals one in case a bank’s SRISK corresponds to a respective quintile and
zero otherwise. SysRisk reveals the marginal effect of systemic importance on banks’
Z-score and return on equity in the cross-section of quintiles. The interaction term Sys-
Risk * GDP growth captures the subsamples’ cyclicality. In other words, the interaction
term measures the quintile-specific default risk and return sensitivity to economic ex-
pansions and contractions. Vectors BankControls and MacroControls are defined as in
Equation (3.4) and contain the control variables assets, asset growth, equity ratio, net
profit margin, GDP growth, inflation, and slope-yield-curve. We again perform the regres-
sions employing bank fixed and time fixed effects and estimate all regressions allowing for
clustered standard errors at the bank level. Table 3.8 presents the regression results and
is organized as follows. The table header states the quintile to which the dummy variable
SysRisk refers and the regressions’ dependent variables are indicated by the subheader.
As highlighted by the SysRisk dummy variable, we observe a significantly negative
relationship between institutions’ systemic importance and their return on equity in the
cross-section of quintiles. Banks in the group of the 20% systemically most important
institutions exhibit annual returns that are 4.7% lower than those of non-SIBs. In contrast,
the 20% least systemically important institutions feature annual returns that are 2.3%
higher compared to systemically more important banks. For Quintiles 2, 3, and 4 the
marginal effect of systemic importance on return on equity does not significantly differ
from zero. The observed pattern suggests that implicit government bailout guarantees
for SIBs are costly to shareholders, too. Put differently, our finding contradicts the
view that such guarantees can be regarded as a free of charge long-term put option on
shareholders’ future income streams. The net profit margin, though, remains the major
driver of institutions’ return characteristics for all quintile subsamples.
Higher levels of systemic importance, on the other hand, cannot be associated with
higher levels of contemporaneous default risk. Thus, we do not find evidence that insti-
tutions’ systemic nature significantly affects their risk-taking behavior. This challenges
the assumption that SIBs take on excessive risks due to their too-important-to-fail status.
The variations of institutions’ Z-score are primarily determined by the control variables
assets, asset growth, net profit margin, and most importantly by the equity ratio. Across
quintiles, a 1% increase of the equity ratio is reflected in an increase of the Z-score by
approximately 1.4. According to Table 3.1, the median equity ratio amounts to 5.13%. In
contrast, our calculations reveal that Quintile 1 and Quintile 5 banks’ mean equity ratios
amount to 4.02% and 6.73%, respectively. Regulators therefore would be able to signifi-
cantly decrease SIBs’ default probability by introducing balance sheet leverage ratios of
up to 5% without affecting the median bank.
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Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Assets 2.951 *** 1.396 2.908 *** 0.888 2.913 *** 0.865 2.923 *** 1.019 2.892 *** 0.786
(1.016) (2.895) (1.014) (2.809) (1.021) (2.810) (1.025) (2.811) (1.012) (2.842)
Asset growth -0.047 *** -0.003 -0.050 *** 0.020 -0.050 *** 0.021 -0.048 *** 0.021 -0.051 *** 0.015
(0.012) (0.032) (0.012) (0.027) (0.012) (0.028) (0.012) (0.028) (0.012) (0.028)
Equity ratio 1.415 *** -0.609 1.407 *** -0.690 * 1.408 *** -0.699 * 1.409 *** -0.686 * 1.406 *** -0.717 *
(0.311) (0.405) (0.309) (0.408) (0.309) (0.411) (0.308) (0.407) (0.313) (0.416)
Net profit margin 0.065 *** 0.977 *** 0.061 *** 1.006 *** 0.062 *** 1.004 *** 0.063 *** 1.001 *** 0.060 *** 0.996 ***
(0.017) (0.114) (0.017) (0.114) (0.017) (0.113) (0.016) (0.113) (0.017) (0.113)
GDP growth -0.094 0.191 -0.099 0.372 -0.045 0.298 -0.048 0.460 -0.058 0.347
(0.273) (0.429) (0.269) (0.501) (0.270) (0.483) (0.274) (0.466) (0.296) (0.499)
Inflation 0.351 1.183 ** 0.317 1.214 ** 0.323 1.197 ** 0.335 1.226 ** 0.321 1.129 *
(0.295) (0.570) (0.292) (0.598) (0.296) (0.578) (0.291) (0.592) (0.279) (0.631)
Slope-yield-curve -0.800 -0.911 -0.858 -0.364 -0.859 -0.361 -0.820 -0.389 -0.844 -0.418
(0.764) (1.030) (0.746) (1.048) (0.751) (1.040) (0.764) (1.058) (0.778) (1.089)
SysRisk ∗ GDP growth 0.142 ** 1.192 * 0.142 -0.257 -0.124 0.084 -0.105 -0.541 ** -0.076 -0.364
(0.071) (0.624) (0.087) (0.319) (0.096) (0.342) (0.067) (0.210) (0.131) (0.307)
SysRisk 0.746 -4.678 ** -0.257 0.655 -0.015 -0.301 -0.309 0.595 0.426 2.293 *
(0.481) (2.219) (0.278) (0.978) (0.269) (0.743) (0.348) (0.559) (0.379) (1.203)
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
adjusted R2 0.428 0.648 0.424 0.639 0.424 0.638 0.425 0.640 0.424 0.640
p-value (F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
# of obs. 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030
Table 3.8 – Systemic importance, bank default risk, and return
All figures are estimated from quarterly sample bank characteristics and quarterly macroeconomic data from the European Union covering the period
from July 2005 to June 2013. The table is organized as follows. Regressions that are assigned odd numbers feature Z-score as the dependent variable,
whereas regressions with assigned even numbers feature return on equity (roe) as the dependent variable. A bank’s Z-score is a measure of bank
solvency and is defined as (roat + cart)/σroa, where roa is the return on assets, car the capital asset ratio, and σ denotes the standard deviation;
t refers to the respective quarter. Return on equity is defined as the annualized ratio of net income over book equity expressed in percentage terms.
Assets is the natural logarithm of an institution’s total assets (in EUR k) and asset growth is the quarterly growth rate of total assets. Equity ratio
is the ratio of book equity over total assets. The net profit margin is defined as net income divided by gross sales and other operating revenue. GDP
growth is the inflation-adjusted annualized growth rate of the EU’s gross domestic product. Inflation is the inflation rate based on the Harmonised
Index of Consumer Prices and slope-yield-curve is the differential between the 10- and 1-year German government bond yields. Asset growth, equity
ratio, net profit margin, and all macroeconomic variables are expressed in percentage terms. SysRisk ∗ GDP growth denotes an interaction term
between SysRisk and GDP growth. SysRisk is a dummy variable that within a given quarter equals one in case a bank’s SRISK falls within the
sample banks’ respective quintile as given in the table header and zero otherwise. SRISK is a bank’s expected undercapitalization conditional on a
future financial crisis expressed in EUR m. All data are obtained from Datastream. For all above regressions we employ time and bank fixed effects
and apply clustered standard errors at the bank level. For the ease of exposition we suppress the regressions’ intercepts. Standard errors are given
in parentheses. The regression coefficients are assigned asterisks if they are statistically significant (***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%-,
5%-, and 10%-confidence levels).
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Figure 3.5 presents the marginal effects of systemic importance on banks’ default risk
and return on equity by SRISK quintile. The marginal contributions represent estimates κˆ
of Equation (3.5). Employing two standard deviation confidence bands, the graph reveals
a logarithmic-shaped relationship between systemic importance and return on equity. As
mentioned previously, we do not observe a significant impact of the marginal effects of
systemic importance on banks’ default risk characteristics.
1 2 3 4 5
−
2
−
1
0
1
2
3
SRISK quintile
Z
−
s
c
o
re
1 2 3 4 5
−
8
−
6
−
4
−
2
0
2
4
SRISK quintile
R
e
tu
rn
 o
n
 e
q
u
it
y
Figure 3.5 – Marginal contribution of systemic importance by quintile
The graph presents marginal contributions of banks’ systemic importance to their Z-score and return
on equity as a function of their systemic relevance. The marginal contributions represent regression
coefficients of dummy variable SysRisk and are estimated according to Equation (3.5) from our sample
of banks covering the period from July 2005 to June 2013. Banks are grouped in quintiles according to
their systemic importance. We apply SRISK as a categorization criterion. The blue shaded area indicates
the two standard deviation confidence bands. Standard deviations are estimated allowing for clustered
standard errors. SRISK is a bank’s expected undercapitalization conditional on a future financial crisis
expressed in EURm. A bank’s Z-score is a measure of bank solvency and is defined as (roat + cart)/σroa,
where roa is the return on assets, car the capital asset ratio, and σ denotes the standard deviation; t
refers to the respective quarter. Return on equity is defined as the annualized ratio of net income over
book equity expressed in percentage terms. All stock price and balance sheet data are obtained from
Datastream.
In addition, the results demonstrate that SIBs’ and non-SIBs’ Z-scores substantially
differ in their economic cyclicality, which can be deduced from the quintile-specific inter-
action term. I.e., the significance of variable SysRisk ∗ GDP growth in Regression (1)
reveals that an increase of the GDP growth rate results in an above average improve-
ment of SIBs’ default risk characteristics when compared to those of non-SIBs. Economic
booms thus disproportionately lower Quintile 1 institutions’ probability of default and
vice versa. Yet, non-SIBs’ probability of default is insignificantly related to the macroe-
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conomic interaction term suggesting that the latter do not exhibit default risk cyclicality
patterns that are distinctively different from those of the average bank.
Table 3.8 also indicates an elevated pro-cyclicality of SIBs’ profitability patterns.
While, in general, GDP growth has no additional explanatory power for banks’ return
on equity when accounting for the pro-cyclical net profit margin (cf. Tables 3.4 and 3.5),
the macroeconomic variable provides further insights into the cross-section of quintiles.
In particular, we observe that the profitability of Quintile 1 banks is more sensitive to
economic fluctuations than the return characteristics of non-SIBs, though the interaction
term coefficient is statistically only significant at the 5.6% level. We cannot find a similar
effect for Quintiles 2 to 5. If anything, non-SIBs’ return characteristics seem to feature
below average pro-cyclicality with respect to economic conditions.4
3.4.3 Systemically important banks’ risk and return dynamics
We now analyze if systemically important banks’ particularities concerning their default
risk and return characteristics are persistent over time. This type of analysis necessitates
the incorporation of a time lag structure into the previous regression:
roe i,t = α + β
′ BankControls i,t + γ
′ MacroControls t + κ SysRisk i,t−k
+ δ SysRisk i,t−k ∗GDP growtht + φ′ BFi + θ′ TFt + ǫi,t
Z-score i,t = α + β
′ BankControls i,t + γ
′ MacroControls t + κ SysRisk i,t−k
+ δ SysRisk i,t−k ∗GDP growtht + φ′ BFi + θ′ TFt + ǫi,t.
(3.6)
Accordingly, Equation (3.6) includes lags of variable SysRisk in order to capture banks’ fu-
ture default risk and return dynamics. SysRisk is either lagged by k = 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 quar-
ters. This regression specification additionally allows to account for endogeneity issues
between banks’ systemic importance and their default risk and return characteristics.
Endogeneity might be a concern and bias our results, if banks’ risk and return character-
istics are causing banks to adjust their systemic importance. However, given the latent
character of systemic importance, we think that this problem is limited. We present the
results obtained for Quintile 1 institutions in Table 3.9. The table header indicates the
quarter lag to which the dummy variable SysRisk refers.
4 It is important to note that by definition, given the validity of our results concerning the above
average cyclicality of SIBs’ default risk and return characteristics, the group of non-SIBs cannot
feature patterns similar to those of SIBs on average.
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Lag = 0 Lag = 1 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 4
Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Assets 2.951 *** 1.396 3.249 *** 0.939 3.483 *** 0.434 3.690 *** 0.001 3.876 *** -0.626
(1.016) (2.895) (1.177) (2.960) (1.238) (2.996) (1.363) (3.001) (1.459) (2.970)
Asset growth -0.047 *** -0.003 -0.045 *** -0.002 -0.048 *** 0.011 -0.055 *** 0.011 -0.055 *** 0.028
(0.012) (0.032) (0.012) (0.030) (0.012) (0.031) (0.014) (0.031) (0.014) (0.035)
Equity ratio 1.415 *** -0.609 1.469 *** -0.651 1.482 *** -0.660 1.496 *** -0.671 1.513 *** -0.751 *
(0.311) (0.405) (0.328) (0.418) (0.329) (0.429) (0.336) (0.444) (0.346) (0.449)
Net profit margin 0.065 *** 0.977 *** 0.063 *** 0.993 *** 0.063 *** 0.992 *** 0.063 *** 0.992 *** 0.061 *** 1.001 ***
(0.017) (0.114) (0.016) (0.114) (0.016) (0.112) (0.016) (0.112) (0.016) (0.114)
GDP growth -0.094 0.191 -0.038 0.294 -0.062 0.419 -0.065 0.442 -0.103 0.005
(0.273) (0.429) (0.258) (0.419) (0.232) (0.354) (0.232) (0.334) (0.269) (0.457)
Inflation 0.351 1.183 ** 0.429 1.102 * 0.414 1.258 ** 0.317 1.606 *** 0.305 1.264 **
(0.295) (0.570) (0.275) (0.595) (0.285) (0.551) (0.288) (0.579) (0.283) (0.605)
Slope-yield-curve -0.800 -0.911 -0.813 -1.492 -0.934 -0.840 -1.062 -0.864 -0.803 -0.523
(0.764) (1.030) (0.699) (1.032) (0.745) (1.024) (0.773) (1.027) (0.677) (0.999)
SysRisk ∗ GDP growth 0.142 ** 1.192 * 0.151 * 1.358 ** 0.176 ** 1.484 ** 0.202 ** 1.584 ** 0.220 ** 1.369 *
(0.071) (0.624) (0.079) (0.625) (0.086) (0.658) (0.095) (0.706) (0.099) (0.718)
SysRisk 0.746 -4.678 ** 1.035 ** -4.440 ** 1.310 *** -5.095 *** 1.585 *** -4.851 ** 1.739 *** -3.765 *
(0.481) (2.219) (0.447) (1.857) (0.460) (1.866) (0.456) (2.075) (0.479) (1.953)
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
adjusted R2 0.428 0.648 0.443 0.653 0.451 0.655 0.454 0.652 0.456 0.644
p-value (F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
# of obs. 2,030 2,030 1,946 1,946 1,862 1,862 1,778 1,778 1,694 1,694
Table 3.9 – Systemically important banks’ risk and return dynamics
All figures are estimated from quarterly sample bank characteristics and quarterly macroeconomic data from the European Union covering the period
from July 2005 to June 2013. The table is organized as follows. Regressions that are assigned odd numbers feature Z-score as the dependent variable,
whereas regressions with assigned even numbers feature return on equity (roe) as the dependent variable. A bank’s Z-score is a measure of bank
solvency and is defined as (roat + cart)/σroa, where roa is the return on assets, car the capital asset ratio, and σ denotes the standard deviation;
t refers to the respective quarter. Return on equity is defined as the annualized ratio of net income over book equity expressed in percentage terms.
Assets is the natural logarithm of an institution’s total assets (in EUR k) and asset growth is the quarterly growth rate of total assets. Equity ratio
is the ratio of book equity over total assets. The net profit margin is defined as net income divided by gross sales and other operating revenue. GDP
growth is the inflation-adjusted annualized growth rate of the EU’s gross domestic product. Inflation is the inflation rate based on the Harmonised
Index of Consumer Prices and slope-yield-curve is the differential between the 10- and 1-year German government bond yields. Asset growth, equity
ratio, net profit margin, and all macroeconomic variables are expressed in percentage terms. SysRisk ∗ GDP growth denotes an interaction term
between SysRisk and GDP growth. SysRisk is a dummy variable that within a given quarter equals one in case a bank’s SRISK ranks among the
20% highest values (Quintile 1) within all sample banks and zero otherwise. SRISK is a bank’s expected undercapitalization conditional on a future
financial crisis expressed in EUR m. All data are obtained from Datastream. For all above regressions we employ time and bank fixed effects and
apply clustered standard errors at the bank level. Lag k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} indicates that the corresponding regression employs the k-th quarter lag of
dummy variable SysRisk. For the ease of exposition we suppress the regressions’ intercepts. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The regression
coefficients are assigned asterisks if they are statistically significant (***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-confidence levels).
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First of all, Table 3.9 demonstrates that Quintile 1 institutions persistently underperform
in comparison to the non-systemic sample bank for the following three consecutive quar-
ters, which is indicated by a highly significant SysRisk dummy. Moreover, the above aver-
age pro-cyclicality of SIBs’ profitability patterns becomes evident over time because their
future return characteristics are persistently and significantly affected by GDP growth.
A 1% increase of the GDP growth rate results in an improvement of SIBs’ return on
equity that is around 1.4% higher than that of non-SIBs.5 During economic downturns
or crises, however, SIBs’ return generating activities are affected worst. Likewise, SIBs’
future default risk characteristics are disproportionately affected by the state of the real
economy.
From a theoretical point of view, without specifying a bank’s business model, the eco-
nomic cyclicality can, at least in part, be attributed to the size and leverage effect. By
definition leverage increases the cyclical behavior of banks. In contrast, the size effect
should reduce cyclicality due to larger banks’ portfolio diversification benefits, economies
of scope, and enhanced risk management capabilities that smooth their net incomes over
time. SIBs rank among both the largest and the most leveraged. Obviously, the leverage
effect dominates the size effect for Quintile 1 banks. SIBs’ interconnectedness and eco-
nomic integration may, however, additionally reinforce the pro-cyclicality of their default
risk and return dynamics.
The resulting implications for regulation and supervision are twofold. First of all, for
the development and execution of macroprudential stress-testing procedures the former
distinctions are particularly important because SIBs’ and non-SIBs’ sensitivities with re-
spect to macroeconomic shocks need to be accounted for in an adequate manner. Second,
the increased pro-cyclicality of SIBs’ default risk and return characteristics again high-
lights the usefulness of a regulation on leverage ratio constraints for the latter due to the
fact that the leverage ratio is much more counter-cyclical than the current regulation on
risk-weighted assets (Brei and Gambacorta, 2015). It is worth mentioning, however, that
when the leverage ratio becomes a binding regulatory measure, it might lose its economic
expediency and thus becomes an unreliable indicator in the spirit of Charles Goodhart
(Goodhart’s law), as banks reallocate their assets to optimize regulatory constraints and
may find ways for regulatory arbitrage.
The results further reveal that in consecutive quarters, SIBs exhibit patterns of ame-
liorating levels of default risk. That is, banks that are classified as systemically important
5 We calculate the SIB-specific time invariant return sensitivity by averaging across the estimated
interaction term coefficients for lag length k = 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4.
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steadily increase their Z-score within the subsequent four quarters, which may be ex-
plained as follows. On the one hand, SIBs disproportionately eliminated excess risk on
their balance sheets as a response to the recent crises. On the other hand, Quintile 1
banks increased their capital ratios in anticipation of higher capital requirements. E.g.,
EU banks that are identified as systemically important have to fulfill enhanced capital
requirements by 2016. For more details we refer to Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV).
The persistence of the marginal effects of systemic importance on SIBs’ default risk
and return dynamics also becomes very visible in Figure 3.6 which represents the estimates
of coefficient κˆ from Equation (3.6). The blue shaded area indicates the two standard
deviation confidence bands.
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Figure 3.6 – Systemically important banks’ default risk and return dynamics
The graph presents the marginal contributions of systemic importance on banks’ Z-score and return
on equity over time. The marginal contributions represent regression coefficients of (lagged) dummy
variable SysRisk and are estimated according to Equation (3.6) from our sample of banks covering
the period from July 2005 to June 2013. SysRisk refers to Quintile 1 banks. We apply SRISK as a
categorization criterion. Lag length k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} indicates that the corresponding dummy variable
is lagged by k quarters. The blue shaded area indicates the two standard deviation confidence bands.
Standard deviations are estimated allowing for clustered standard errors. SRISK is a bank’s expected
undercapitalization conditional on a future financial crisis expressed in EUR m. A bank’s Z-score is a
measure of bank solvency and is defined as (roat + cart)/σroa, where roa is the return on assets, car the
capital asset ratio, and σ denotes the standard deviation; t refers to the respective quarter. Return on
equity is defined as the annualized ratio of net income over book equity expressed in percentage terms.
All stock price and balance sheet data are obtained from Datastream.
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3.4.4 Robustness checks
In order to evaluate the stability of our results, we perform various robustness checks. In a
first step, we change the subsample categorization from quintiles to quartiles and rerun the
estimation of Equations (3.5) and (3.6). That is to say, SIBs are now defined as the 25%
systemically most important banks within a given quarter. Most importantly, we are able
to confirm our main results. Appendix-Tables 3.10 and 3.11 present the estimates. We
additionally redefine the dummy variable SysRisk in order to capture the ten systemically
most important banks within a given quarter. Again, the results under the Top10 speci-
fication are similar to those reported in Section 3.4.3, though SIBs’ default risk dynamics
are now less significantly affected by macroeconomic growth (Appendix-Table 3.12).
Regarding the drivers of SRISK, we conduct a more rigorous robustness check including
MES as an independent variable in Equation (3.6). We compute quarterly time series of
MES by averaging across the weekly MES values referring to the respective quarter and
express quarterly MES in percentage terms. In theory, banks featuring a lower MES are
less affected by distressed financial markets, which in turn should be reflected in more
favorable default risk and return dynamics. Appendix-Table 3.13 contains the estimates
and supports our key findings. Institutions featuring higher levels of MES exhibit lower
returns on equity. The effect of MES on banks’ default risk characteristics is positive,
though only slightly significant. The results confirm that SIBs’ default risk and return
dynamics cannot simply be explained by the sum of the SRISK drivers’ marginal effects.
Furthermore, our results may be biased due to the simultaneous analysis of the
marginal and cyclical effects of systemic importance on banks’ default risk and return
characteristics. In order to eliminate these concerns, we re-estimate Equations (3.5) and
(3.6) including either the dummy variable SysRisk or the interaction term SysRisk * GDP
growth. Panel A of Appendix-Table 3.14 contains the coefficients of interest for Quintile 1
institutions’ Z-score and Panel B for Quintile 1 institutions’ return on equity.
The observed particularities in SIBs’ default risk and return patterns remain valid.
All dummy variables and interaction terms within the Z-score regressions are at least
significant at the 5% level. Consequentially, the results allow to reject the hypothesis
that SIBs take excessive risks as a result of perceived government bailout guarantees.
In addition, the economic significance of the cyclical effect of systemic importance on
banks’ probability of default strongly increases. The economic significance of the effect
of systemic importance on banks’ return characteristics decrease, however. Under the
current regression specification, SIBs exhibit contemporaneous returns on equity that are
3.2% lower than those of non-SIBs while a 1% increase of the GDP growth rate results
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in an improvement of Quintile 1 banks’ return characteristics that is around 0.6% higher
than that of the average non-systemic bank. The default risk and return patterns of
non-SIBs stay unchanged.
In order to account for the possibility that our main results are partly driven by
endogenous default risk and return persistence, we again adopt a dynamic regression
model specification by including the lag of the dependent variable among the regressors
of Equation (3.6). Panel A of Appendix-Table 3.15 contains the key estimates. Variable
lag dependent denotes the one period lag of the variable Z-score or return on equity.
The results show that banks’ default risk and return characteristics indeed feature time
persistency. However, given the regression coefficients of the lagged dependent variables
– approximately 0.65 for lagged Z-score and 0.40 for lagged return on equity – both
measures will quickly return to their average levels. More important, though, we find
that SIBs exhibit weaker contemporaneous return patterns than non-SIBs and that SIBs’
systemic nature does not adversely affect their probability of default. Moreover, SIBs
future default risk dynamics are significantly more pro-cyclical with respect to economic
growth than those of non-SIBs. SIBs’ future return patterns still feature some above
average pro-cyclicality at the 10% confidence level.
We additionally use the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation technique
adopted by Arellano and Bond (1991) to re-estimate the dynamic regression model spec-
ification of Panel A. The GMM approach allows us to treat all explanatory variables as
endogenous and uses their lagged values as their instruments. We thus deal with poten-
tial reverse causality effects between banks’ default risk and return characteristics and the
employed bank-specific regressors by treating all bank-specific control variables as endoge-
nous. The macroeconomic control variables’ time series are expected to be exogenous.
We use the entire lag structure of the endogenous variables as their instruments and ap-
ply a finite sample correction as in Windmeijer (2005). Panel B of Appendix-Table 3.15
shows the coefficients of interest. Our results regarding the cyclical effects of systemic
importance on Quintile 1 banks’ default risk and return characteristics remain fairly un-
altered. The magnitude of SIBs’ underperformance, when compared to non-SIBs, slightly
increases; however, the significance of the marginal effect decreases. As in Panel A, we are
unable to find significant support for the perspective that a bank’s systemic relevance ad-
versely affects its probability of default. In total, the former robustness checks underline
that endogeneity concerns are not significantly affecting our main results.
As an alternative to SRISK, we further use a measure of systemic importance in the
spirit of the Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES) proposed by Acharya et al. (2010), where
the time-varying version of the (unobservable) SES can be approximated by the MES.
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Using the latter as the categorization criterion for systemic importance, we are able to
confirm our results for SIBs’ cyclical and marginal performance particularities at the 5%
and 10% confidence level, respectively. Furthermore, systemic importance still cannot
be associated with higher levels of banks’ contemporaneous default risk. Institutions’
MES, however, does not clearly differentiate between the economic cyclicality of SIBs’
and non-SIBs’ default risk characteristics. Appendix-Table 3.16 presents the results.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes how banks’ systemic importance affects their financial stability on the
basis of a broad representative sample of European banks covering the period from July
2005 to June 2013 which includes both the International Financial Crisis and the European
Sovereign Debt Crisis. We evaluate banks’ financial stability by focusing on their default
risk and return characteristics and measure systemic importance by employing the SRISK
concept. The latter quantifies the amount of government transfers needed in case of a
bank failure and can be considered a measure for the externalities of bank distress.
Our findings are as follows. On the one hand, higher levels of systemic importance
are not reflected in higher levels of contemporaneous default risk, challenging the popular
notion that SIBs take excessive risks as a result of their too-important-to-fail status. Yet,
existing differences in SIBs’ and non-SIBs’ default risk characteristics can be primarily
attributed to variations in their equity ratios. Interestingly, our analysis further reveals
that SIBs exhibit patterns of ameliorating default risk over time. The latter is likely to
reflect recapitalization efforts in anticipation of higher capital requirements and reduced
risk-taking as a response to the recent crises.
On the other hand, we find that institutions’ systemic importance coincides with
substantially weaker return patterns. In particular, SIBs exhibit annual returns on equity
that are 4.7% lower than those of non-SIBs. This contradicts the shareholders’ view
that implicit government tail-risk guarantees for SIBs can be regarded as a free of charge
long-term put option on their future income streams.
Furthermore, SIBs’ contemporaneous and future default risk and return characteris-
tics feature above average pro-cyclicality with respect to economic conditions. We do
not find evidence that non-SIBs exhibit cyclicality patterns that are distinctively differ-
ent from those of the average institution. Economic recessions thus disproportionately
impede SIBs’ financial stability. The distinctions between SIBs’ and non-SIBs’ are par-
ticularly important for the development and execution of macroprudential stress-testing
3 Systemic importance, default risk, and profitability 76
procedures, because their different sensitivities with respect to economic shocks need to
be accounted for in an adequate manner. The increased cyclicality of SIBs’ financial
stability additionally demonstrates that a close monitoring of economic integration and
interconnectedness is of vital importance for the stability of the banking system.
In contrast to the popular notion that large institutions are most hazardous, we find
that size is significantly negatively related to an institution’s default risk, suggesting
that the divesture of large institutions as a measure to increase banking stability would
be inappropriate. In general, such measures can reduce economies of scale and scope,
deteriorate risk management capacities, and adversely affect market liquidity (IMF, 2014).
Our results emphasize, however, the usefulness of imposing binding leverage ratio
constraints on SIBs in order to effectively reduce their above average pro-cyclical behavior.
The measure further limits banks’ SRISK and thereby public transfers from taxpayers in
case of bank failures or restructurings. It is worth mentioning, however, that when the
leverage ratio becomes a binding regulatory measure, it might lose its economic expediency
and thus becomes an unreliable indicator in the spirit of Charles Goodhart (Goodhart’s
law), as banks reallocate their assets to optimize regulatory constraints and may find ways
for regulatory arbitrage.
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3.A Supplementary tables
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Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Assets 2.971 *** 1.393 2.899 *** 0.941 2.931 *** 1.032 2.901 *** 0.803
(1.017) (2.877) (1.021) (2.811) (1.031) (2.799) (1.016) (2.809)
Asset growth -0.049 *** -0.006 -0.050 *** 0.018 -0.049 *** 0.019 -0.051 *** 0.014
(0.012) (0.030) (0.012) (0.027) (0.012) (0.028) (0.012) (0.028)
Equity ratio 1.419 *** -0.619 1.408 *** -0.683 * 1.406 *** -0.685 * 1.409 *** -0.712 *
(0.312) (0.406) (0.310) (0.407) (0.307) (0.409) (0.313) (0.413)
Net profit margin 0.062 *** 0.978 *** 0.061 *** 1.005 *** 0.062 *** 1.001 *** 0.060 *** 0.993 ***
(0.017) (0.114) (0.017) (0.114) (0.017) (0.113) (0.016) (0.114)
GDP growth -0.095 0.114 -0.082 0.379 -0.032 0.464 -0.054 0.356
(0.273) (0.432) (0.267) (0.513) (0.266) (0.474) (0.293) (0.487)
Inflation 0.339 1.170 * 0.328 1.195 ** 0.336 1.164 ** 0.329 1.161 **
(0.295) (0.636) (0.292) (0.593) (0.297) (0.582) (0.291) (0.580)
Slope-yield-curve -0.848 -0.931 -0.837 -0.438 -0.830 -0.478 -0.854 -0.533
(0.754) (1.056) (0.743) (1.049) (0.751) (1.031) (0.750) (1.033)
SysRisk ∗ GDP growth 0.141 ** 1.216 ** 0.058 -0.249 -0.132 ** -0.447 * -0.071 -0.404
(0.068) (0.542) (0.105) (0.323) (0.062) (0.257) (0.116) (0.300)
SysRisk 0.203 -4.011 ** -0.068 0.233 -0.178 0.653 0.217 2.151 **
(0.389) (1.601) (0.316) (0.846) (0.295) (0.763) (0.370) (1.057)
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
p-value (F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
# of obs. 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030
Table 3.10 – Robustness tests: Systemic importance, bank default risk, and return
All figures are estimated from quarterly sample bank characteristics and quarterly macroeconomic data from the European Union covering the period
from July 2005 to June 2013. The table is organized as follows. Regressions that are assigned odd numbers feature Z-score as the dependent variable,
whereas regressions with assigned even numbers feature return on equity (roe) as the dependent variable. A bank’s Z-score is a measure of bank
solvency and is defined as (roat + cart)/σroa, where roa is the return on assets, car the capital asset ratio, and σ denotes the standard deviation; t
refers to the respective quarter. Return on equity is defined as the annualized ratio of net income over book equity expressed in percentage terms.
Assets is the natural logarithm of an institution’s total assets (in EUR k) and asset growth is the quarterly growth rate of total assets. Equity ratio
is the ratio of book equity over total assets. The net profit margin is defined as net income divided by gross sales and other operating revenue. GDP
growth is the inflation-adjusted annualized growth rate of the EU’s gross domestic product. Inflation is the inflation rate based on the Harmonised
Index of Consumer Prices and slope-yield-curve is the differential between the 10- and 1-year German government bond yields. Asset growth, equity
ratio, net profit margin, and all macroeconomic variables are expressed in percentage terms. SysRisk ∗ GDP growth denotes an interaction term
between SysRisk and GDP Growth. SysRisk is a dummy variable that within a given quarter equals one in case a bank’s SRISK falls within the
sample banks’ respective quartile as given in the table header and zero otherwise. SRISK is a bank’s expected undercapitalization conditional on a
future financial crisis expressed in EUR m. All data are obtained from Datastream. For all above regressions we employ time and bank fixed effects
and apply clustered standard errors at the bank level. For the ease of exposition we suppress the regressions’ intercepts. Standard errors are given
in parentheses. The regression coefficients are assigned asterisks if they are statistically significant (***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%-,
5%-, and 10%-confidence levels).
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Lag = 0 Lag = 1 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 4
Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Assets 2.971 *** 1.393 3.257 *** 0.865 3.480 *** 0.339 3.701 *** -0.088 3.848 ** -0.489
(1.017) (2.877) (1.181) (2.947) (1.246) (2.973) (1.375) (2.992) (1.482) (2.966)
Asset growth -0.049 *** -0.006 -0.046 *** -0.002 -0.048 *** 0.018 -0.055 *** 0.021 -0.054 *** 0.035
(0.012) (0.030) (0.012) (0.032) (0.012) (0.033) (0.013) (0.033) (0.014) (0.034)
Equity ratio 1.419 *** -0.619 1.473 *** -0.670 1.485 *** -0.697 1.502 *** -0.721 1.514 *** -0.768 *
(0.312) (0.406) (0.328) (0.421) (0.330) (0.433) (0.338) (0.448) (0.346) (0.452)
Net profit margin 0.062 *** 0.978 *** 0.061 *** 0.995 *** 0.061 *** 1.002 *** 0.061 *** 1.006 *** 0.058 *** 1.009 ***
(0.017) (0.114) (0.016) (0.115) (0.016) (0.114) (0.016) (0.113) (0.016) (0.114)
GDP growth -0.095 0.114 -0.055 0.301 -0.044 0.247 -0.068 0.376 -0.148 0.116
(0.273) (0.432) (0.257) (0.425) (0.231) (0.406) (0.232) (0.348) (0.264) (0.428)
Inflation 0.339 1.170 * 0.379 1.303 ** 0.408 1.204 ** 0.379 1.335 ** 0.269 1.299 **
(0.295) (0.636) (0.277) (0.597) (0.287) (0.564) (0.282) (0.539) (0.267) (0.547)
Slope-yield-curve -0.848 -0.931 -0.876 -1.210 -0.880 -1.117 -1.054 -0.882 -0.902 -0.179
(0.754) (1.056) (0.694) (1.018) (0.741) (1.135) (0.765) (1.046) (0.667) (0.832)
SysRisk ∗ GDP growth 0.141 ** 1.216 ** 0.155 ** 1.201 ** 0.164 ** 1.233 ** 0.183 ** 1.255 ** 0.211 ** 1.037 *
(0.068) (0.542) (0.074) (0.550) (0.076) (0.563) (0.080) (0.601) (0.085) (0.612)
SysRisk 0.203 -4.011 ** 0.692 * -3.231 ** 0.864 ** -2.847 * 1.154 *** -2.373 1.203 *** -1.370
(0.389) (1.601) (0.385) (1.474) (0.386) (1.573) (0.422) (1.815) (0.409) (1.830)
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
p-value (F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
# of obs. 2,030 2,030 1,946 1,946 1,862 1,862 1,778 1,778 1,694 1,694
Table 3.11 – Robustness tests: Systemically important banks’ risk and return dynamics (Quartile 1 regressions)
All figures are estimated from quarterly sample bank characteristics and quarterly macroeconomic data from the European Union covering the period
from July 2005 to June 2013. The table is organized as follows. Regressions that are assigned odd numbers feature Z-score as the dependent variable,
whereas regressions with assigned even numbers feature return on equity (roe) as the dependent variable. A bank’s Z-score is a measure of bank
solvency and is defined as (roat + cart)/σroa, where roa is the return on assets, car the capital asset ratio, and σ denotes the standard deviation;
t refers to the respective quarter. Return on equity is defined as the annualized ratio of net income over book equity expressed in percentage terms.
Assets is the natural logarithm of an institution’s total assets (in EUR k) and asset growth is the quarterly growth rate of total assets. Equity ratio
is the ratio of book equity over total assets. The net profit margin is defined as net income divided by gross sales and other operating revenue. GDP
growth is the inflation-adjusted annualized growth rate of the EU’s gross domestic product. Inflation is the inflation rate based on the Harmonised
Index of Consumer Prices and slope-yield-curve is the differential between the 10- and 1-year German government bond yields. Asset growth, equity
ratio, net profit margin, and all macroeconomic variables are expressed in percentage terms. SysRisk ∗ GDP growth denotes an interaction term
between SysRisk and GDP growth. SysRisk is a dummy variable that within a given quarter equals one in case a bank’s SRISK ranks among the
25% highest values (Quartile 1) within all sample banks and zero otherwise. SRISK is a bank’s expected undercapitalization conditional on a future
financial crisis expressed in EUR m. All data are obtained from Datastream. For all above regressions we employ time and bank fixed effects and
apply clustered standard errors at the bank level. Lag k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} indicates that the corresponding regression employs the k-th quarter lag of
dummy variable SysRisk. For the ease of exposition we suppress the regressions’ intercepts. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The regression
coefficients are assigned asterisks if they are statistically significant (***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-confidence levels).
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Lag = 0 Lag = 1 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 4
Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Assets 2.954 *** 1.160 3.242 *** 0.536 3.427 *** 0.077 3.593 ** -0.191 3.718 ** -0.755
(1.026) (2.845) (1.186) (2.882) (1.245) (2.928) (1.387) (3.029) (1.511) (3.143)
Asset growth -0.049 *** 0.004 -0.046 *** -0.001 -0.050 *** 0.020 -0.054 *** 0.027 -0.058 *** 0.034
(0.012) (0.032) (0.012) (0.031) (0.012) (0.030) (0.014) (0.030) (0.013) (0.031)
Equity ratio 1.418 *** -0.654 1.473 *** -0.708 * 1.480 *** -0.715 * 1.496 *** -0.720 1.507 *** -0.793 *
(0.313) (0.405) (0.330) (0.415) (0.330) (0.427) (0.340) (0.442) (0.351) (0.457)
Net profit margin 0.062 *** 0.993 *** 0.060 *** 1.002 *** 0.061 *** 1.005 *** 0.060 *** 1.011 *** 0.059 *** 1.013 ***
(0.017) (0.112) (0.016) (0.112) (0.016) (0.112) (0.016) (0.113) (0.016) (0.116)
GDP growth -0.068 0.107 0.001 0.173 -0.053 0.460 -0.023 0.482 -0.117 0.211
(0.274) (0.461) (0.261) (0.461) (0.231) (0.369) (0.233) (0.357) (0.263) (0.417)
Inflation 0.356 1.163 * 0.475 * 0.835 0.438 1.206 ** 0.390 1.424 *** 0.323 1.204 **
(0.298) (0.652) (0.278) (0.631) (0.282) (0.567) (0.280) (0.544) (0.259) (0.538)
Slope-yield-curve -0.865 -0.665 -0.829 -1.617 -1.060 -0.480 -1.007 -0.899 -0.911 -0.226
(0.755) (1.082) (0.694) (1.162) (0.736) (1.038) (0.762) (1.046) (0.654) (0.836)
SysRisk ∗ GDP growth 0.133 0.959 ** 0.150 1.107 ** 0.169 1.199 ** 0.202 * 0.920 ** 0.229 ** 0.496
(0.083) (0.425) (0.097) (0.448) (0.106) (0.513) (0.108) (0.426) (0.110) (0.372)
SysRisk 0.588 -4.023 * 1.017 * -4.784 ** 1.334 ** -4.369 *** 1.433 *** -3.116 ** 1.419 *** -3.553 **
(0.512) (2.357) (0.533) (1.851) (0.519) (1.522) (0.488) (1.500) (0.460) (1.796)
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
p-value (F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
# of obs. 2,030 2,030 1,946 1,946 1,862 1,862 1,778 1,778 1,694 1,694
Table 3.12 – Robustness tests: Systemically important banks’ risk and return dynamics (Top10 regressions)
All figures are estimated from quarterly sample bank characteristics and quarterly macroeconomic data from the European Union covering the
period from July 2005 to June 2013. The table is organized as follows. Regressions that are assigned odd numbers feature Z-score as the dependent
variable, whereas regressions with assigned even numbers feature return on equity (roe) as the dependent variable. A bank’s Z-score is a measure
of bank solvency and is defined as (roat + cart)/σroa, where roa is the return on assets, car the capital asset ratio, and σ denotes the standard
deviation; t refers to the respective quarter. Return on equity is defined as the annualized ratio of net income over book equity expressed in
percentage terms. Assets is the natural logarithm of an institution’s total assets (in EUR k) and asset growth is the quarterly growth rate of total
assets. Equity ratio is the ratio of book equity over total assets. The net profit margin is defined as net income divided by gross sales and other
operating revenue. GDP growth is the inflation-adjusted annualized growth rate of the EU’s gross domestic product. Inflation is the inflation rate
based on the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices and slope-yield-curve is the differential between the 10- and 1-year German government bond
yields. Asset growth, equity ratio, net profit margin, and all macroeconomic variables are expressed in percentage terms. SysRisk ∗ GDP growth
denotes an interaction term between SysRisk and GDP growth. SysRisk is a dummy variable that within a given quarter equals one in case a bank’s
SRISK ranks among the ten highest values (Top10) within all sample banks and zero otherwise. SRISK is a bank’s expected undercapitalization
conditional on a future financial crisis expressed in EUR m. All data are obtained from Datastream. For all above regressions we employ time and
bank fixed effects and apply clustered standard errors at the bank level. Lag k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} indicates that the corresponding regression employs
the k-th quarter lag of dummy variable SysRisk. For the ease of exposition we suppress the regressions’ intercepts. Standard errors are given in
parentheses. The regression coefficients are assigned asterisks if they are statistically significant (***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%-, 5%-,
and 10%-confidence levels).
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Lag = 0 Lag = 1 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 4
Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Assets 2.947 *** 1.376 3.250 *** 0.945 3.486 *** 0.444 3.700 *** 0.038 3.894 *** -0.551
(1.034) (2.661) (1.204) (2.724) (1.265) (2.780) (1.388) (2.791) (1.481) (2.764)
Asset growth -0.048 *** -0.009 -0.047 *** -0.008 -0.050 *** 0.003 -0.058 *** -0.001 -0.059 *** 0.014
(0.012) (0.030) (0.012) (0.029) (0.012) (0.030) (0.014) (0.030) (0.014) (0.032)
Equity ratio 1.414 *** -0.612 1.469 *** -0.654 1.480 *** -0.669 1.493 *** -0.682 1.511 *** -0.761 *
(0.310) (0.392) (0.326) (0.405) (0.327) (0.415) (0.334) (0.429) (0.343) (0.433)
Net profit margin 0.059 *** 0.953 *** 0.057 *** 0.968 *** 0.056 *** 0.968 *** 0.057 *** 0.966 *** 0.054 *** 0.972 ***
(0.018) (0.113) (0.018) (0.114) (0.017) (0.112) (0.017) (0.112) (0.017) (0.114)
MES -0.043 * -0.189 ** -0.047 * -0.182 ** -0.049 * -0.182 ** -0.049 * -0.192 ** -0.050 * -0.210 **
(0.026) (0.095) (0.025) (0.091) (0.025) (0.090) (0.026) (0.090) (0.027) (0.094)
GDP growth -0.106 0.137 -0.056 0.223 -0.080 0.353 -0.076 0.398 -0.115 -0.045
(0.272) (0.392) (0.253) (0.381) (0.228) (0.320) (0.227) (0.298) (0.262) (0.412)
Inflation 0.304 0.975 * 0.378 0.905 0.359 1.053 ** 0.257 1.370 ** 0.243 1.006 *
(0.280) (0.549) (0.261) (0.579) (0.267) (0.529) (0.271) (0.533) (0.271) (0.573)
Slope-yield-curve -0.758 -0.726 -0.753 -1.260 -0.899 -0.712 -1.050 -0.815 -0.778 -0.416
(0.727) (0.877) (0.659) (0.887) (0.703) (0.846) (0.734) (0.856) (0.638) (0.854)
SysRisk ∗ GDP growth 0.127 * 1.128 * 0.136 * 1.298 ** 0.161 * 1.428 ** 0.187 * 1.524 ** 0.206 ** 1.312 *
(0.072) (0.603) (0.080) (0.599) (0.087) (0.628) (0.095) (0.675) (0.099) (0.688)
SysRisk 0.878 * -4.096 * 1.169 ** -3.919 ** 1.424 *** -4.669 *** 1.692 *** -4.434 ** 1.834 *** -3.368 *
(0.504) (2.281) (0.465) (1.816) (0.474) (1.793) (0.468) (1.969) (0.490) (1.860)
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
p-value (F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
# of obs. 2,030 2,030 1,946 1,946 1,862 1,862 1,778 1,778 1,694 1,694
Table 3.13 – Robustness tests: Systemically important banks’ risk and return dynamics (including MES as independent variable)
All figures are estimated from quarterly sample bank characteristics and quarterly macroeconomic data from the European Union covering the
period from July 2005 to June 2013. The table is organized as follows. Regressions that are assigned odd numbers feature Z-score as the dependent
variable, whereas regressions with assigned even numbers feature return on equity (roe) as the dependent variable. A bank’s Z-score is a measure
of bank solvency and is defined as (roat + cart)/σroa, where roa is the return on assets, car the capital asset ratio, and σ denotes the standard
deviation; t refers to the respective quarter. Return on equity is defined as the annualized ratio of net income over book equity expressed in
percentage terms. Assets is the natural logarithm of an institution’s total assets (in EUR k) and asset growth is the quarterly growth rate of
total assets. Equity ratio is the ratio of book equity over total assets. The net profit margin is defined as net income divided by gross sales and
other operating revenue. MES measures a bank’s expected stock market return conditional on the banking system’s tail return. GDP growth is
the inflation-adjusted annualized growth rate of the EU’s gross domestic product. Inflation is the inflation rate based on the Harmonised Index of
Consumer Prices and slope-yield-curve is the differential between the 10- and 1-year German government bond yields. Asset growth, equity ratio,
net profit margin, MES, and all macroeconomic variables are expressed in percentage terms. SysRisk ∗ GDP growth denotes an interaction term
between SysRisk and GDP growth. SysRisk is a dummy variable that within a given quarter equals one in case a bank’s SRISK ranks among the
20% highest values (Quintile 1) within all sample banks and zero otherwise. SRISK is a bank’s expected undercapitalization conditional on a future
financial crisis expressed in EUR m. All data are obtained from Datastream. For all above regressions we employ time and bank fixed effects and
apply clustered standard errors at the bank level. Lag k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} indicates that the corresponding regression employs the k-th quarter lag of
dummy variable SysRisk. For the ease of exposition we suppress the regressions’ intercepts. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The regression
coefficients are assigned asterisks if they are statistically significant (***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-confidence levels).
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Panel A – Z-score
Lag = 0 Lag = 1 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 4
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
SysRisk ∗ GDP growth 0.204 ** 0.231 ** 0.267 *** 0.298 *** 0.311 **
(0.081) (0.091) (0.103) (0.114) (0.122)
SysRisk 0.963 ** 1.251 *** 1.536 *** 1.811 *** 1.945 ***
(0.485) (0.466) (0.495) (0.501) (0.533)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
p-value (F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
# of obs. 2,030 2,030 1,946 1,946 1,862 1,862 1,778 1,778 1,694 1,694
Panel B – return on equity
Lag = 0 Lag = 1 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 4
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
SysRisk ∗ GDP growth 0.613 ** 0.642 ** 0.691 ** 0.770 ** 0.693 **
(0.295) (0.297) (0.303) (0.306) (0.330)
SysRisk -3.190 *** -2.941 *** -2.870 *** -2.499 *** -2.068 **
(1.075) (0.959) (0.923) (0.950) (0.803)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
p-value (F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
# of obs. 2,030 2,030 1,946 1,946 1,862 1,862 1,778 1,778 1,694 1,694
Table 3.14 – Robustness tests: Systemically important banks’ risk and return dynamics (separate regression analysis)
All figures are estimated from quarterly sample bank characteristics and quarterly macroeconomic data from the European Union covering the
period from July 2005 to June 2013. The table is organized as follows. Panel A features Z-score as the dependent variable, whereas Panel B features
return on equity as the dependent variable. A bank’s Z-score is a measure of bank solvency and is defined as (roat + cart)/σroa, where roa is the
return on assets, car the capital asset ratio, and σ denotes the standard deviation; t refers to the respective quarter. Return on equity is defined
as the annualized ratio of net income over book equity expressed in percentage terms. SysRisk ∗ GDP growth denotes an interaction term between
SysRisk and GDP growth. SysRisk is a dummy variable that within a given quarter equals one in case a bank’s SRISK ranks among the 20%
highest values (Quintile 1) within all sample banks and zero otherwise. SRISK is a bank’s expected undercapitalization conditional on a future
financial crisis expressed in EUR m. GDP growth is the inflation-adjusted annualized growth rate of the EU’s gross domestic product expressed
in percentage terms. All data are obtained from Datastream. For all above regressions we employ time and bank fixed effects and apply clustered
standard errors at the bank level. Lag k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} indicates that the corresponding regression employs the k-th quarter lag of dummy variable
SysRisk. For the ease of exposition we suppress the regressions’ intercepts and the coefficients of all control variables employed in Equation (3.6).
Standard errors are given in parentheses. Regression coefficients are assigned asterisks if they are statistically significant (***, **, and * denotes
significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-confidence levels).
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Panel A – endogenous risk and return persistence
Lag = 0 Lag = 1 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 4
Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Lag dependent 0.651 *** 0.414 *** 0.671 *** 0.406 *** 0.672 *** 0.390 *** 0.665 *** 0.375 *** 0.659 *** 0.365 ***
(0.045) (0.097) (0.039) (0.100) (0.039) (0.102) (0.039) (0.104) (0.040) (0.107)
SysRisk * GDP growth 0.037 0.515 0.048 * 0.625 0.062 ** 0.740 * 0.075 ** 0.768 * 0.085 ** 0.572
(0.028) (0.345) (0.029) (0.380) (0.032) (0.428) (0.034) (0.462) (0.037) (0.413)
SysRisk 0.433 ** -2.750 ** 0.519 *** -1.913 0.639 *** -2.737 * 0.773 *** -2.328 0.794 *** -0.754
(0.204) (1.253) (0.163) (1.223) (0.194) (1.561) (0.203) (1.692) (0.238) (1.510)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects No No No No No No No No No No
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
p-value (F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
# of obs. 1,946 1,946 1,862 1,862 1,778 1,778 1,694 1,694 1,610 1,610
Panel B – reverse causalities
Lag = 0 Lag = 1 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 4
Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Lag dependent 0.659 *** 0.397 *** 0.655 *** 0.393 *** 0.656 *** 0.384 *** 0.654 *** 0.376 *** 0.650 *** 0.377 ***
(0.038) (0.100) (0.038) (0.101) (0.037) (0.104) (0.038) (0.104) (0.039) (0.106)
SysRisk ∗ GDP growth 0.032 0.528 0.051 0.619 * 0.074 ** 0.755 * 0.082 ** 0.773 * 0.081 * 0.542
(0.030) (0.340) (0.034) (0.368) (0.037) (0.406) (0.042) (0.443) (0.043) (0.388)
SysRisk 0.523 *** -3.424 ** 0.770 *** -2.528 * 0.837 *** -2.879 1.001 *** -2.492 0.935 *** -0.942
(0.197) (1.496) (0.198) (1.300) (0.240) (1.765) (0.252) (1.819) (0.282) (1.612)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.032
Test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.095 0.351 0.093 0.421 0.091 0.390 0.123 0.490 0.120 0.388
Hansen test (p-value) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
# of obs. 1,862 1,862 1,862 1,862 1,778 1,778 1,694 1,694 1,610 1,610
Table 3.15 – Robustness tests: Systemically important banks’ risk and return dynamics (endogeneity issues)
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Table 3.15 – continued:
All figures are estimated from quarterly sample bank characteristics and quarterly macroeconomic data
from the European Union covering the period from July 2005 to June 2013. The table is organized as
follows. Panel A exhibits the results of Equation (3.6) including the one period lag of the regressions’
dependent variable among the bank-specific regressors and Panel B exhibits the results of the same
regression employing the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation technique with finite sample
correction. Regressions that are assigned odd numbers feature Z-score as the dependent variable, whereas
regressions with assigned even numbers feature return on equity (roe) as the dependent variable. A bank’s
Z-score is a measure of bank solvency and is defined as (roat + cart)/σroa, where roa is the return on
assets, car the capital asset ratio, and σ denotes the standard deviation; t refers to the respective
quarter. Return on equity is defined as the annualized ratio of net income over book equity expressed in
percentage terms. Lag dependent is the one period lag of the dependent variable Z-score or return on
equity. SysRisk ∗ GDP growth denotes an interaction term between SysRisk and GDP growth. SysRisk
is a dummy variable that within a given quarter equals one in case a bank’s SRISK ranks among the
20% highest values (Quintile 1) within all sample banks and zero otherwise. SRISK is a bank’s expected
undercapitalization conditional on a future financial crisis expressed in EUR m. GDP growth is the
inflation-adjusted annualized growth rate of the EU’s gross domestic product expressed in percentage
terms. All data are obtained from Datastream. For all above regressions we employ time fixed and/or
bank fixed effects and apply clustered standard errors at the bank level. Lag k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} indicates
that the corresponding regression employs the k-th quarter lag of dummy variable SysRisk. For the ease
of exposition we suppress the regressions’ intercepts and the coefficients of all control variables. Standard
errors are given in parentheses. The Hansen test refers to the difference-in-Hansen tests statistic of
exogeneity of the instruments in GMM dynamic model estimation (H0: instruments are exogenous).
AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the Arellano-Bond test that the average auto-covariance in residuals of order
one and two, respectively, is zero. The regression coefficients are assigned asterisks if they are statistically
significant (***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-confidence levels).
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Lag = 0 Lag = 1 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 4
Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE Z-score ROE
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Assets 2.930 *** 0.398 3.197 *** -0.189 3.360 *** -0.327 3.526 ** -0.555 3.660 ** -0.813
(1.026) (2.522) (1.188) (2.606) (1.256) (2.841) (1.403) (2.962) (1.527) (3.067)
Asset growth -0.050 *** 0.019 -0.048 *** 0.015 -0.050 *** 0.033 -0.053 *** 0.031 -0.057 *** 0.038
(0.012) (0.027) (0.012) (0.028) (0.012) (0.029) (0.014) (0.031) (0.014) (0.031)
Equity ratio 1.409 *** -0.678 * 1.461 *** -0.743 * 1.470 *** -0.757 * 1.484 *** -0.764 * 1.491 *** -0.794 *
(0.309) (0.394) (0.325) (0.409) (0.326) (0.428) (0.334) (0.446) (0.343) (0.460)
Net profit margin 0.063 *** 0.971 *** 0.061 *** 0.987 *** 0.059 *** 1.010 *** 0.058 *** 1.019 *** 0.057 *** 1.020 ***
(0.017) (0.113) (0.016) (0.115) (0.016) (0.115) (0.016) (0.115) (0.016) (0.116)
GDP growth -0.047 -0.090 0.022 -0.035 -0.006 0.437 0.017 0.471 -0.072 0.193
(0.278) (0.463) (0.265) (0.463) (0.234) (0.402) (0.236) (0.378) (0.272) (0.458)
Inflation 0.329 1.181 * 0.422 0.592 0.390 1.226 * 0.373 1.403 ** 0.307 1.230 **
(0.297) (0.637) (0.280) (0.680) (0.283) (0.687) (0.277) (0.581) (0.263) (0.540)
Slope-yield-curve -0.836 -0.403 -0.822 -1.654 -0.957 -0.246 -0.965 -0.748 -0.880 -0.186
(0.755) (1.087) (0.686) (1.187) (0.732) (1.216) (0.768) (1.093) (0.658) (0.840)
SysRisk ∗ GDP growth -0.100 1.778 ** -0.120 1.665 ** -0.107 1.222 * -0.108 0.719 -0.093 0.692
(0.071) (0.721) (0.079) (0.739) (0.075) (0.631) (0.093) (0.460) (0.116) (0.521)
SysRisk 0.161 -4.552 * 0.323 -4.745 * 0.333 -2.759 0.461 -2.041 * 0.654 -1.072
(0.412) (2.412) (0.457) (2.517) (0.420) (1.726) (0.492) (1.126) (0.484) (1.116)
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
p-value (F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
# of obs. 2,030 2,030 1,946 1,946 1,862 1,862 1,778 1,778 1,694 1,694
Table 3.16 – Robustness tests: Systemically important banks’ risk and return dynamics (MES as categorization criterion)
All figures are estimated from quarterly sample bank characteristics and quarterly macroeconomic data from the European Union covering the
period from July 2005 to June 2013. The table is organized as follows. Regressions that are assigned odd numbers feature Z-score as the dependent
variable, whereas regressions with assigned even numbers feature return on equity (roe) as the dependent variable. A bank’s Z-score is a measure
of bank solvency and is defined as (roat + cart)/σroa, where roa is the return on assets, car the capital asset ratio, and σ denotes the standard
deviation; t refers to the respective quarter. Return on equity is defined as the annualized ratio of net income over book equity expressed in
percentage terms. Assets is the natural logarithm of an institution’s total assets (in EUR k) and asset growth is the quarterly growth rate of total
assets. Equity ratio is the ratio of book equity over total assets. The net profit margin is defined as net income divided by gross sales and other
operating revenue. GDP growth is the inflation-adjusted annualized growth rate of the EU’s gross domestic product. Inflation is the inflation rate
based on the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices and slope-yield-curve is the differential between the 10- and 1-year German government bond
yields. Asset growth, equity ratio, net profit margin, and all macroeconomic variables are expressed in percentage terms. SysRisk ∗ GDP growth
denotes an interaction term between SysRisk and GDP growth. SysRisk is a dummy variable that within a given quarter equals one in case a bank’s
MES ranks among the ten highest values (Top10) within all sample banks and zero otherwise. MES is a bank’s expected h-day stock return given
that the banking system’s h-day return falls below a predefined threshold C, indicating a severe crisis in the banking system expressed in percentage
terms. All data are obtained from Datastream. For all above regressions we employ time and bank fixed effects and apply clustered standard errors
at the bank level. Lag k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} indicates that the corresponding regression employs the k-th quarter lag of dummy variable SysRisk. For
the ease of exposition we suppress the regressions’ intercepts. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The regression coefficients are assigned
asterisks if they are statistically significant (***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-confidence levels).

4 Risk-adjusted bank performance
and income diversification
4.1 Introduction
Euro area banks are still suffering from the consequences of the International Financial
Crisis of 2007 to 2009 and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. Especially the significantly
higher regulatory capital requirements introduced in response to the systemic event that
followed the Lehman bankruptcy with the aim to increase the resilience of the European
banking system squeeze bank profitability.1 Moreover, the current approach of the Eu-
ropean Central Bank to revive the euro area economy with rock bottom interest rates
becomes a growing drag on banks’ profitability as returns from maturity transformation
erode and negative interest rates cannot easily be passed on to depositors. Enhanced
competition from Fintechs, i.e., financial technology companies, and the trend towards a
higher digitization of banking services and products is not particularly helpful for tradi-
tional credit institutions either.
As profitability in general and margins from interest income activities in particular, de-
crease, supervisors and regulators increasingly urge banks to rethink their current business
models (see, e.g., Deutsche Bundesbank, 2014, Financial Stability Review). In contrast to
the public opinion, the former do care about future bank profitability because sustainably
profitable institutions are less likely to default in times of crises and thus increase bank-
ing system stability. The newly introduced Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process
(SREP) follows this line of argument and directly assesses the sustainability of European
banks’ business models for regulatory purposes.
One possibility to increase banks’ business model profitability is, given the current
economic environment, and besides cost cutting efforts, the increased diversification into
non-interest income activities. Such a diversification could be especially advantageous for
commercial banks, co-operative banks, and savings banks that rely heavily on interest
income (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010).
From a theoretical point of view, based on the insights of Markowitz (1952) and his
approach to portfolio theory, the diversification into non-interest income activities should
smooth a bank’s revenue and income streams and thus increase its risk-return profile
as long as interest income and non-interest income activities do not exhibit a perfect
1 The Basel III capital requirements were endorsed by European law in 2013 by the adoption of the
Capital Requirements Regulation (Regulation 2013/575/EU).
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positive correlation. Furthermore, diversifying into activities such as fees, commissions,
and trading could soften the squeeze of banks’ net interest margins. In contrast to the
former, however, an increase in the non-interest income share could also lead to higher
earnings volatility over the business cycle (Stiroh and Rumble, 2006), increased organiza-
tional complexity, decreased benefits from specialization, and cross-subsidization effects
between interest income and non-interest income generating activities (Lepetit et al.,
2008), reducing the benefits of diversification.
To enrich the debate about income diversification, this paper provides empirical ev-
idence on whether an increase in banks’ non-interest income share increases their risk-
adjusted performance patterns. We consider this issue for a large sample of euro area
banks covering the period from 2007 to 2014, which is especially useful as current litera-
ture focuses mainly on the U.S. banking system but lacks studies covering the European
banking system (Busch and Kick, 2015). However, given the differences between the U.S.
and the European banking systems, insights from the former are unlikely to be appropriate
for the latter (DeYoung and Rice, 2004).
Our paper contributes to the literature in three important ways. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to measure the effect of income diversification on banks’
profitability patterns employing the variable return on risk-weighted assets (RoRWA).
We make use of this particular profitability ratio for the following reasons. First, the
RoRWA directly proxies for the underlying risk of banks’ credit, market, and operational
exposures and thus makes the performance of banks’ business models more comparable
than measures like the return on assets or the return on equity, which do not account
for different levels of risk taking. Second, maximizing measures in the spirit of a bank’s
return on risk-adjusted capital should, at least in theory, maximize the value of market
equity and hence overall bank performance. We proxy for income diversification and
its subcomponents by calculating the shares of non-interest income, fee income, trading
income, and other non-interest income in total operating income.
Moreover, we conduct a careful analysis of the underlying factors that determine the
relationship between income diversification and profitability. For this reason, we explic-
itly control for the effects of different type of banks and bank sizes. Finally, instead of
estimating the income diversification effects employing OLS regressions and later on con-
ducting robustness tests using IV regressions in order to control for endogeneity issues,
we rigorously make use of the two-step system GMM (generalized method of moments)
approach developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The
system GMM estimation technique has two major advantages. First, the approach di-
rectly allows us to treat all explanatory variables as endogenous, which is essential given
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the fact that we can easily expect reverse causalities between bank performance, income
diversification, and bank-specific control variables. Second, the system GMM estimator
simultaneously controls for unobserved heterogeneity across sample banks by first differ-
encing all regression variables.
Our empirical analysis reveals that a diversification into non-interest related activities
significantly increases euro area banks’ return on risk-weighted assets, supporting the ex-
istence of economies of scope. That is to say, an increase in both the fee income share and
the trading income share increases the average bank’s risk-adjusted performance pattern.
Yet, the economic significances of both diversification measures differ substantially. On
average, banks can boost their performance twice as much by relatively expanding their
trading activities instead of trying to expand their relative income from fees and com-
missions. We additionally find evidence that diversifying into other non-interest income
activities is disadvantageous for a bank’s profitability. The latter is in line with the point of
view that income diversification is only beneficial if it is based on core banking activities.
We conduct a number of robustness tests, which indicate that the economic signifi-
cances that we find in our baseline regression analysis are fairly robust. However, we also
find that the relation between non-interest income diversification and aggregate bank prof-
itability is substantially driven by bank type and bank size. Especially investment banks
and banks with a stock exchange listing excel at utilizing economies of scope resulting
from fee generating activities, whereas the evidence that other type of banks can actually
increase their return on risk-weighted assets by relatively increasing their business related
to fees and commissions is less clear-cut. This less significant relation for other type of
banks, namely commercial banks, co-operative banks, and savings banks, thus gives rise
to the conjecture that for the latter the dark side of diversification outweighs, i.e., the
additional revenues from increases in the fee income share do not significantly exceed the
additional expenses and potential costs from cross-subsidization.
The effect of the trading income share on banks’ return patterns is not distorted by the
type of a bank, but depends on bank size. Small banks are able to significantly increase
their return on risk-weighted assets by diversifying their revenue streams into trading
activities. Nevertheless, the diversification of small banks’ revenue streams into trading
income generating activities cannot be easily realized in practice. The implementation
of new trading desks, especially for banks that have not been engaged in trading in
the past, comes at very high costs and needs supervisory permission. Small banks could,
however, without the need to establish own trading desks, participate from the advantages
of an increased trading income share by setting up co-operation models with specialized
financial institutions.
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In contrast, for medium-sized and large banks, the trading income share is insignif-
icantly related to risk-adjusted bank profitability. As a consequence, increasing these
banks’ trading activities, on average, should not substantially enhance their performance
patterns, suggesting that medium-sized and large banks already exhibit optimal trading
income ratios.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview
of the literature related to bank profitability and income diversification, Section 4.3 elab-
orates on the sample selection, the variables employed in our analysis, the estimation
methodology, and gives summary statistics, Sections 4.4 and 4.5 present and discuss our
empirical results and robustness tests, and Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Related literature
The literature on the determinants of bank profitability can be broadly separated into
studies analyzing the effects of internal determinants, external determinants or both.
The internal determinants include bank-specific variables and the external determinants
represent macroeconomic and industry-specific variables such as GDP growth, bank reg-
ulation or industry concentration. In the following, we present a selection of important
contributions to the literature.
Early work done by Short (1979) showed that a greater industry concentration is
beneficial for bank profitability and Bourke (1989) found that higher capital ratios and
higher interest rates lead to higher profits. More recent studies such as Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt
and Huizinga (1999), Micco et al. (2007), and Pathan and Faff (2013) find that bank
taxation, deposit insurance regulation, legal and political indicators, bank ownership,
and board structure significantly affect bank profitability.
Focusing on bank-specific variables, Garc´ıa-Herrero et al. (2009), among others, pro-
vide further evidence that a bank’s capital ratio is significantly positively related to its
return on assets, Berger and Bouwman (2013) show that banks with higher capital ra-
tios tend to perform better in times of crises, and Goddard et al. (2013) and Dietrich
and Wanzenried (2011) provide empirical evidence that operational efficiency, total loan
growth, and lower funding costs positively affect bank profitability. Recent studies ana-
lyzing the link between the business cycle and macroeconomic conditions and bank prof-
itability in more detail are Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) and Bolt et al. (2012).
Both studies find a significant and positive relation between the growth rates of a coun-
try’s gross domestic product and the performance of financial institutions. The former
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relation is especially intense in times of crises.
Empirical research on the effects of income diversification on banks’ return patterns
can be divided into studies highlighting aggregate benefits as well as drawbacks, the lat-
ter mainly for the U.S. banking system. Stiroh (2004) assesses the effects of income
diversification on bank risk, measured by a bank’s Z-score, and risk-adjusted bank prof-
itability, calculated using the Sharpe-ratio, for the U.S. banking industry for the 1984 to
2001 period. He finds that an above average reliance on non-interest income, particularly
on trading income, is reflected in higher risks and lower risk-adjusted profits. Likewise,
DeYoung and Rice (2004) observe that, on average, a higher non-interest income share is
associated with an inferior risk-return trade-off and that well-managed U.S. commercial
banks increase their non-interest income activities less quickly.
Stiroh and Rumble (2006) further analyze the benefits of income diversification for
financial holding companies in the U.S. for the period of 1997 to 2002. They find evidence
that diversification benefits exist between financial holding companies, however, those
benefits are offset by the costs of an increased exposure to the more volatile activities
that hide behind aggregate non-interest income. Studying the effect of diversification
on the financial performance of U.S. credit unions in detail, Goddard et al. (2008) show
that income diversification exhibits a negative relationship with banks’ risk-adjusted and
unadjusted return patterns for all but the largest financial institutions. These results
are in line with previous work done by Rogers and Sinkey Jr. (1999), who find evidence
that U.S. banks with well above average non-interest income shares tend to be larger but
exhibit less risk. Mercieca et al. (2007) investigate the increase of small European credit
institutions’ non-interest income shares over the 1997 to 2003 period but are unable to
find direct diversification benefits.
Contrary to the former studies, Smith et al. (2003), Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga
(2010), Sanya and Wolfe (2011), and Busch and Kick (2015) find that income diver-
sification significantly increases the average bank’s profitability. That is to say, Smith
et al. (2003) show that the increased importance of non-interest income for European
banks stabilized profits in the European banking industry in the 1994 to 1998 period and
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) find that, using an international sample of listed
banks, banks can increase their return on assets by expanding into fee generating activ-
ities. Furthermore, they show that income diversification provides some risk reduction
benefits at low levels.
Examining a sample of emerging market banks, Sanya and Wolfe (2011) empirically
show that diversification into non-interest income generating activities decreases banks’
insolvency risk and increases their profitability. Busch and Kick (2015) analyze the rela-
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tionship between fee income and banks’ risk-adjusted performance patterns for German
banks between 1995 and 2011. A bank’s risk-adjusted performance is calculated by divid-
ing the profitability measure by its standard deviation. They find evidence that universal
banks’ return on equity and return on total assets, both on a risk-adjusted basis, are
significantly positively related to the banks’ level of income diversification. However, they
also find that banks with higher non-interest income shares charge lower interest margins,
indicating cross-subsidization or cross-selling effects.
4.3 Data and empirical method
This section explains the sample bank selection, discusses the different bank characteristics
and macroeconomic variables employed in the regression analysis, provides descriptive
summary statistics, and highlights the econometric regression methodology.
4.3.1 Sample selection
Our empirical analysis focuses on banks headquartered in euro area countries and covers
the period from 2007 to 2014. By restricting the sample to the 2007 to 2014 period, we
ensure that most institutions report their risk-weighted assets using at least the Basel II
regulatory requirements.2 The availability of such a regulatory framework is especially
crucial for us for the calculation of comparable and sufficiently risk-sensitive performance
measures (see Section 4.3.2 for more details).
All bank-level data in this study are taken from Bankscope. That is, we select all banks
from the Bankscope database that fit our geographical restrictions and report total risk-
weighted assets in their annual statements. The resulting sample contains 2,374 different
sample banks with a total of 10,092 annual bank observations. The sample banks are from
13 euro area countries including Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
4.3.2 Measures of bank performance and income diversification
Wemeasure a bank’s performance employing the profitability ratio return on risk-weighted
assets (RoRWA). We make use of this particular profitability ratio for two reasons. First,
the metric proxies for the riskiness of banks’ credit, market, and operational exposures
2 Banks headquartered in the euro area generally implemented the Basel II Directives 2006/48/EC and
2006/49/EC in 2007.
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and thus makes the performance of banks’ different business models more comparable
than measures like the return on assets or the return on equity, which do not account
for different levels of risk taking. Second, maximizing measures in the spirit of a bank’s
return on risk-adjusted capital should, at least in theory, maximize the value of market
equity and hence overall bank performance. We define RoRWA as a bank’s operating
profit divided by its total risk-weighted assets expressed in percentage terms:
RoRWAi,t =
operating profiti,t
risk-weighted assetsi,t
× 100, (4.1)
where t indicates the year and i the respective institution. The operating profit is the
pre-tax profit adjusted for non-recurring and non-operating income and expenses and thus
measures a bank’s profits resulting from its general business activities.
In order to calculate the degree of banks’ income diversification, we breakdown an
institution’s operating income into its subcomponents. Operating income is generally de-
fined as the sum of interest income and non-interest income; whereas non-interest income
contains the income statement items fee income, trading income, and other non-interest
income. Other non-interest income summarizes the residual positions net gains and losses
on assets at fair value through the income statement, net insurance income, and other
operating income.
Using these data, we construct a bank’s non-interest income share (NII share) as the
share of non-interest income in total operating income as follows:
NII sharei,t =
non-interest incomei,t
non-interest incomei,t + interest incomei,t
× 100, (4.2)
with:
Non-interest incomei,t =|fee incomei,t|+|trading incomei,t|+|other non-interest incomei,t|.
|...| denotes the absolute value of the income statement item. Taking absolute values
ensures that the NII share is bounded between 0% and 100% and adequately represents
the relative size of banks’ non-interest income related business activities even if parts of
the respective income streams are negative, i.e., result in annual losses. A higher NII
share indicates that an institution’s total revenues are less dependent on the traditional
interest income generated by its loan portfolios. In other words, institutions with a higher
NII share are more orientated towards revenues coming from fee generating and trading
activities.
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Analogously, we define measures to capture a bank’s fee income share (fee share),
trading income share (trading share), and other non-interest income share (other NII
share) as a percentage of total operating income:
Fee sharei,t =
|fee incomei,t|
non-interest incomei,t + interest incomei,t
× 100 (4.3a)
Trading sharei,t =
|trading incomei,t|
non-interest incomei,t + interest incomei,t
× 100 (4.3b)
Other NII sharei,t =
|other NII incomei,t|
non-interest incomei,t + interest incomei,t
× 100. (4.3c)
In line with Equation 4.2, the different diversification measures are, by definition, bounded
between 0% and 100% and individually proxy for the overall relative importance of a
bank’s fee income, trading income, and other non-interest income. For example, a fee
income share (trading income share) of 25 (10) would indicate that 25% (10%) of the
operating income is related to fee generating (trading) activities. The other NII share
measures the relative amount of operating income that is not related to interest income,
fee income, and trading income. We therefore refer to the former as a measure of the
share of banks’ non-core banking activities.3
4.3.3 Control and dummy variables
Our subsequent empirical analysis of the relationship between bank performance and in-
come diversification necessitates the inclusion of a set of bank-specific and macroeconomic
control and dummy variables since we expect these variables to directly affect a bank’s
risk-adjusted performance.
The control variable assets is defined as the natural logarithm of an institution’s
total assets measured in em and captures bank size. The capital ratio is the ratio of book
equity to total assets and proxies for a bank’s loss absorbing capacity and capital strength.
Asset growth measures the annual growth rate of total assets and loan growth measures
the annual growth rate of total gross loans. Both controls are included to account for the
possibility that above or below average asset and loan growth rates have a substantial
effect on bank performance.
Next, we use the variable loan loss reserves, which is defined as the ratio of loan
3 One could note that because the other NII share includes the accounting adjustments of financial
assets at fair value through the income statement, the other NII share and the trading income share
are interrelated. However, this is not the case. Net gains and losses on assets related to trading
activities (e.g., equity and debt securities and derivatives) are correctly considered as trading income.
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loss reserves to total loans, to control for the banks’ underlying loan portfolio quality.
The variables overhead costs, personnel costs, and nonpersonnel costs are constructed to
capture the main drivers of potential cost efficiencies. To be more specific, overhead costs
is the ratio of overhead expenses to total assets and personnel costs and nonpersonnel
costs are defined as personnel expenses to total assets and nonpersonnel expenses to total
assets, respectively.
The bank-specific control variable net interest margin is the quotient of a bank’s net in-
terest income and its average interest earning assets. This measure is especially important
to evaluate how successful a bank can invest its deposits and own funds. Additionally, we
use the two variables liquid assets and nondeposit funding to control for the consequences
of taking liquidity risks. Liquid assets is the share of liquid assets in total assets and
nondeposit funding is the share of nondeposit short-term funding in total deposits and
short-term funding. We additionally make use of the cost income ratio, which is defined
as the ratio of operating expenses relative to total operating income, to measure aggregate
bank efficiency. We express all former ratios and growth rates in percentage terms.
Besides the inclusion of a set of bank-specific control variables, we construct a number
of dummy variables in order to account for the effect of bank type on bank performance. In
particular, we differentiate between co-operative banks, savings banks, investment banks,
and listed banks. Banks that are not classified as co-operative bank, savings bank, or
investment bank are labeled as commercial bank. To classify banks into these groups,
we make use of the bank type identifier available in Bankscope. That is to say, the
variable co-operative bank is a dummy variable that is one for co-operative banks and
zero otherwise; the variable savings bank is a dummy variable that is one for savings
banks and zero otherwise; and the variable investment bank is a dummy variable that is
one for investment banks and zero otherwise. Likewise, the measure listed is a dummy
variable that is one for listed banks and zero otherwise.
Finally, four macroeconomic control variables are used. All of them are obtained from
the World Bank database. We use the variable GDP growth to capture the economic
cyclicality of banks’ performance patterns. We generally expect institutions to better
perform in countries with higher GDP growth rates. GDP growth is measured using the
annual growth rate of real GDP. Real GDP is defined as nominal GDP deflated by the
GDP deflator. The macro control GDP per capita is constructed by dividing a country’s
gross domestic product by its population and is a good indicator for a country’s economic
development and financial market sophistication. We measure GDP per capita in ek.
Inflation measures the steady increase in the general price level over time and acts as a
proxy for a stable economy. Generally, a moderate inflation target is regarded as positive
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(Mundell, 1963; Tobin, 1965). Furthermore, above or below average inflation rates could
affect bank performance and influence banks to expand or reduce their non-interest income
activities (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). Lastly, the control variable interest rate is
calculated as the yield on 10-year government bonds and proxies for the sample countries’
general solvency. The variables GDP growth, inflation, and interest rate are expressed in
percentage terms.
Table 4.1 on the next page provides a summary of all bank characteristics and macroe-
conomic variables used in our main study including their description and data source. All
variables of Table 4.1 are sampled on an annual frequency.
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Label Description Source
Bank performance and income diversification
RoRWA Return on risk-weighted assets: Operating profit as a percentage of total
risk-weighted assets (if not otherwise specified)
Bankscope
NII share Non-interest income share: Share of non-interest income (sum of fee in-
come, trading income, and other non-interest income) in total operating
income expressed in percentage terms
Bankscope
Fee share Share of fee income in total operating income expressed in percentage
terms
Bankscope
Trading share Share of trading income in total operating income expressed in percentage
terms
Bankscope
Other NII share Other non-interest income share: Share of other non-interest income in
total operating income expressed in percentage terms
Bankscope
Bank-specific control variables
Assets Natural logarithm of total assets in millions of euros Bankscope
Capital ratio Book equity as a percentage of total assets Bankscope
Asset growth Annual growth rate of total assets expressed in percentage terms Bankscope
Loan growth Annual growth rate of total gross loans expressed in percentage terms Bankscope
Loan loss reserves Loan loss reserves as a percentage of total gross loans Bankscope
Overhead costs Overhead expenses divided by total assets expressed in percentage terms Bankscope
Personnel costs Personnel expenses divided by total assets expressed in percentage terms Bankscope
Nonpersonnel costs Nonpersonnel expenses divided by total assets expressed in percentage
terms
Bankscope
Net interest margin Net interest income as a percentage of average earning assets Bankscope
Liquid assets Share of liquid assets in total assets expressed in percentage terms Bankscope
Nondeposit funding Share of nondeposit short-term funding in total deposits and short-term
funding expressed in percentage terms
Bankscope
Cost income ratio Ratio of operating expenses relative to total operating income expressed
in percentage terms
Bankscope
Bank-specific dummy variables
Co-operative bank Dummy variable that is one for co-operative banks and zero otherwise Bankscope
Savings bank Dummy variable that is one for savings banks and zero otherwise Bankscope
Investment bank Dummy variable that is one for investment banks and zero otherwise Bankscope
Listed Dummy variable that is one for listed banks and zero otherwise Bankscope
Macroeconomic control variables
GDP growth Real growth rate of gross domestic product expressed in percentage terms World Bank
GDP per capita Gross domestic product per capita in thousands of euros World Bank
Inflation Inflation measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP deflator ex-
pressed in percentage terms
World Bank
Interest rate Interest rate calculated as the yield on 10-year government bonds ex-
pressed in percentage terms
World Bank
Table 4.1 – Definition of variables
The table shows the label, description, and data source of the main variables used in the regression
analysis. All data are sampled on an annual frequency and cover the period from 2007 to 2014.
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4.3.4 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
Table 4.2 provides summary statistics of all bank characteristics and macroeconomic vari-
ables used in the main study. Note that for all calculations and analyses, we winsorize the
bank-specific control variables at the 1% level in order to control for outliers. Table 4.3
additionally reports the correlation coefficients of all bank-specific and macroeconomic
control variables.
The figures of Table 4.2 reveal that the average sample bank has an annual RoRWA
of approximately 1.05% and a NII share of 30.70%. That is, interest income accounts for
69.30% of aggregate operating income. However, banks substantially vary in terms of their
NII shares, which can be inferred from the corresponding standard deviation of 17.08%.
Splitting the NII share into its subcomponents shows that the bulk of non-interest income
results from fee generating activities. Banks’ trading activities account for 5.48% of total
operating income and are only slightly higher than the income share of 3.84% realized by
the residual income variable other NII share.
The median sample bank is furthermore characterized by total assets of approxi-
mately e837m4 and a capital ratio of 8.75%. Institutions’ annual asset growth rates have
a median value of 3.66%. The loan portfolio exhibits a slightly higher median growth
rate of approximately 3.97%. The average bank’s cost income ratio is 67.11%. Moreover,
co-operative banks and savings banks, respectively, account for 58% and 17% of all sam-
ple bank observations. Only a minority of 5% of observations correspond to investment
banks. The residual value of 20% of bank observations are from commercial banks.
The macroeconomic statistics show that the GDP growth rates of the sample countries
averaged at around 0.16% during the 2007 to 2014 period. Furthermore, GDP per capita
ranges between e39k and e97k and the median inflation rate of the 13 euro area countries
was approximately 1.49%.
Figure 4.1 plots the frequency distribution of the NII share, fee income share, trading
income share, and other NII share for our sample of euro area banks. The vertical bars
represent 5% intervals. Both the distribution of the NII share and of the fee income share
peak around values of 20%. More than 5% of banks, however, rely only on interest income.
Relatively few banks rely almost exclusively on non-interest income. The majority of
banks do not generate income from trading activities. As a result, the distribution of
the trading income share is highly skewed to the right with most probability mass being
around the first two frequency intervals. The distribution of banks’ other NII share is
very similar. Almost no bank has a NII share of more than 25% of total operating income.
4 This corresponds to the natural logarithm of total assets, exp(6.73) ≈ e837m.
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Statistics
# obs mean median std dev min max
Bank performance and income diversification
RoRWA 10,092 1.05 1.10 1.86 -7.53 7.61
NII share 10,076 30.70 27.78 17.08 0.00 100.00
Fee share 10,076 21.39 20.25 12.54 0.00 100.00
Trading share 10,076 5.48 0.00 10.65 0.00 94.44
Other NII share 10,076 3.84 0.00 8.57 0.00 100.00
Bank-specific control variables
Assets 10,092 7.34 6.73 2.38 3.47 13.37
Capital ratio 10,092 9.55 8.75 4.85 1.57 36.90
Asset growth 9,973 5.46 3.66 11.94 -20.07 68.22
Loan growth 9,925 6.09 3.97 14.28 -28.46 84.38
Loan loss reserves 10,092 2.82 1.97 2.94 0.00 13.92
Overhead costs 10,082 2.19 2.12 1.01 0.15 8.50
Personnel costs 10,051 1.25 1.23 0.58 0.01 4.35
Nonpersonnel costs 10,082 0.95 0.86 0.55 0.00 4.10
Net interest margin 10,079 2.39 2.43 0.85 0.21 4.69
Liquid assets 10,092 14.11 9.86 13.26 1.61 77.78
Nondeposit funding 10,065 22.24 16.42 21.83 0.00 100.00
Cost income ratio 10,028 67.11 66.67 15.65 26.32 128.00
Bank-specific dummy variables
Co-operative bank 10,092 0.58 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
Savings bank 10,092 0.17 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00
Investment bank 10,092 0.05 0.00 0.21 0.00 1.00
Listed 10,092 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.00 1.00
Macroeconomic control variables
GDP growth 104 0.16 0.40 3.14 -9.13 8.40
GDP per capita 104 41.79 39.22 15.67 24.06 96.71
Inflation 104 1.33 1.49 1.48 -4.26 4.53
Interest rate 104 4.04 3.82 2.95 0.00 22.50
Table 4.2 – Descriptive statistics
The table presents summary statistics for the main sample bank characteristics and macroeconomic
indicators. All data are sampled on an annual frequency and cover the period from 2007 to 2014. For a
detailed description of the variables we refer to Table 4.1.
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Bank-specific and macroeconomic control variables
A
s
s
e
t
s
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
r
a
t
i
o
A
s
s
e
t
g
r
o
w
t
h
L
o
a
n
g
r
o
w
t
h
L
o
a
n
l
o
s
s
r
e
s
e
r
v
e
s
O
v
e
r
h
e
a
d
c
o
s
t
s
P
e
r
s
o
n
n
e
l
c
o
s
t
s
N
o
n
p
e
r
s
o
n
n
e
l
c
o
s
t
s
N
e
t
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
m
a
r
g
i
n
L
i
q
u
i
d
a
s
s
e
t
s
N
o
n
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
f
u
n
d
i
n
g
C
o
s
t
i
n
c
o
m
e
r
a
t
i
o
G
D
P
g
r
o
w
t
h
G
D
P
p
e
r
c
a
p
i
t
a
I
n
fl
a
t
i
o
n
I
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
r
a
t
e
Assets 1.00
Capital ratio -0.36 *** 1.00
Asset growth -0.05 *** 0.04 *** 1.00
Loan growth -0.01 0.05 *** 0.62 *** 1.00
Loan loss reserves 0.04 *** -0.01 -0.07 *** -0.14 *** 1.00
Overhead costs -0.33 *** 0.42 *** 0.03 ** 0.10 *** 0.02 1.00
Personnel costs -0.37 *** 0.41 *** 0.02 * 0.08 *** 0.03 ** 0.83 *** 1.00
Nonpersonnel costs -0.24 *** 0.33 *** 0.06 *** 0.13 *** 0.01 0.83 *** 0.63 *** 1.00
Net interest margin -0.43 *** 0.28 *** 0.12 *** 0.11 *** 0.11 *** 0.39 *** 0.40 *** 0.32 *** 1.00
Liquid assets 0.15 *** 0.03 *** 0.07 *** 0.10 *** -0.06 *** 0.04 *** -0.02 * 0.10 *** -0.29 *** 1.00
Nondeposit funding 0.28 *** -0.13 *** 0.01 -0.05 *** 0.13 *** -0.28 *** -0.30 *** -0.22 *** -0.44 *** 0.19 *** 1.00
Cost income ratio -0.11 *** -0.02 * -0.05 *** 0.01 -0.07 *** 0.42 *** 0.36 *** 0.41 *** -0.08 *** 0.06 *** -0.21 *** 1.00
GDP growth 0.04 *** -0.06 *** -0.06 *** 0.04 *** -0.24 *** -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 * -0.06 *** 0.03 *** -0.02 0.04 *** 1.00
GDP per capita 0.04 *** -0.13 *** -0.14 *** -0.02 * -0.38 *** -0.07 *** -0.06 *** -0.07 *** -0.14 *** 0.11 *** 0.02 * 0.01 0.39 *** 1.00
Inflation -0.13 *** 0.05 *** 0.10 *** 0.12 *** -0.28 *** 0.10 *** 0.09 *** 0.09 *** 0.23 *** 0.04 *** -0.16 *** -0.01 0.05 *** 0.32 *** 1.00
Interest rate 0.08 *** 0.08 *** 0.11 *** 0.04 *** 0.35 *** 0.00 -0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.06 *** 0.04 *** 0.15 *** -0.02 -0.42 *** -0.55 *** -0.22 *** 1.00
Table 4.3 – Sample correlations
The table exhibits correlations between all bank-specific and macroeconomic control variables. All data are sampled on an annual frequency and
cover the period from 2007 to 2014. For a detailed description of the bank-specific and macroeconomic control variables we refer to Table 4.1.
Correlation coefficients are assigned asterisks if they are statistically significant (*** = 0.1% confidence level; ** = 1% confidence level; * = 10%
confidence level).
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Figure 4.1 – Distribution of the non-interest income share and its subcomponents
The figure presents the distribution of the non-interest income share and its subcomponents fee income
share, trading income share, and other non-interest income share for the aggregate of all sample banks
covering the period from 2007 to 2014. The non-interest income share represents the share of non-interest
income in total operating income. Non-interest income is the sum of fee income, trading income, and
other non-interest income. The fee income share, trading income share, and other non-interest income
share are the shares of fee income, trading income, and other non-interest income in total operating
income. The vertical bars represent 5% intervals. All ratios are sampled on an annual frequency and
expressed in percentage terms. The data are obtained from Bankscope.
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Table 4.4 on the next page shows descriptive statistics for the bank performance and
income diversification variables for different sample bank subsets. The subsets differen-
tiate between bank type, bank size, and stock exchange listing. Bank type comprises
the groups commercial banks, co-operative banks, savings banks, and investment banks.
As mentioned previously, the classification of banks into these four groups is based on
the bank type identifier available in Bankscope. The category bank size differentiates
between small banks, medium-sized banks, and large banks. The classification of bank
size is based on total assets. Small banks (large banks) are defined as the 25% smallest
(25% largest) banks in the entire sample of banks with respect to total assets at time t.
Medium-sized banks are banks with total assets in the second and third quartile. Finally,
we differentiate between banks that have a stock exchange listing (listed banks) and those
that do not have a listing (unlisted banks).
The data show that co-operative banks (1.12%) and savings banks (1.31%) are, on
a risk-adjusted basis, much more profitable than commercial banks (0.67%). Investment
banks (0.93%) realize returns on risk-weighted assets that are comparable to those of the
average bank. The NII share is highest for investment banks (54.08%) and lowest for co-
operative banks and savings banks (25.63% and 28.36%, respectively). The differences are
most obvious for the trading income share. Whereas commercial banks and investment
banks have a trading income share of approximately 9.03% and 16.55%, respectively,
savings banks’ average trading income shares only amount to 2.00%, followed by co-
operative banks with a share of 4.34%.
The same patterns hold for small and large banks. On the one hand, small banks,
which are to a great extend co-operative banks and savings banks, have an average RoRWA
of 1.22% and generate around 22.65% of their operating income from non-interest related
activities. On the other hand, large banks exhibit returns on risk-weighted assets of 0.70%
and have a NII share of 38.86%. Banks with a stock exchange listing have an average
NII share of 44.30% and are, surprisingly, the least profitable. Banks of this group only
realize average risk-adjusted returns of approximately 0.36%.
The circumstance that larger banks underperform their smaller peers over the 2007
to 2014 period has probably many reasons. One particular important issue, however, is
likely to be the fact that the former disproportionately suffered during the International
Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis due to their elevated international
exposures and interconnectedness.
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Bank performance and income diversification
RoRWA NII share Fee share Trading share Other NII share
Category # obs mean std dev mean std dev mean std dev mean std dev mean std dev
Bank type
Commercial banks 2,041 0.67 2.74 41.80 20.11 26.43 17.09 9.03 13.33 6.34 12.35
Co-operative banks 5,898 1.12 1.40 25.63 13.07 18.76 8.94 4.34 8.83 2.53 6.93
Savings banks 1,676 1.31 1.47 28.36 9.51 22.28 7.68 2.00 6.04 4.08 5.10
Investment banks 477 0.93 2.93 54.08 24.54 29.12 24.95 16.55 17.69 8.41 12.19
Bank size
Small banks 2,523 1.22 1.73 22.65 18.87 17.94 15.53 3.15 9.29 1.56 6.15
Medium-sized banks 5,045 1.14 1.66 30.63 14.25 22.22 10.28 5.24 10.22 3.17 6.34
Large banks 2,524 0.70 2.29 38.86 16.58 23.16 12.66 8.26 12.05 7.44 12.52
Stock exchange listing
Listed banks 767 0.36 2.62 44.30 16.75 26.77 13.64 10.61 12.18 6.92 11.37
Unlisted banks 9,325 1.11 1.77 29.58 16.62 20.95 12.34 5.05 10.40 3.58 8.25
Table 4.4 – Bank performance and income diversification by bank category
The table shows descriptive statistics for the bank performance and income diversification variables for different sample bank subsets. Sample banks
are either categorized by bank type, bank size or stock exchange listing. Bank type differentiates between commercial banks, co-operative banks,
savings banks, and investment banks. The classification of bank size is based on total assets. Small banks (large banks) are defined as the 25%
smallest (25% largest) banks in the entire sample of banks with respect to total assets at time t. Medium-sized banks are banks with total assets
in the second and third quartile. Listed banks are banks that are listed on the stock exchange. All data are sampled on an annual frequency and
cover the period from 2007 to 2014. For a detailed description of the bank performance and income diversification variables we refer to Table 4.1.
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Return on risk−weighted assets by bank size
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Figure 4.2 – Return on risk-weighted assets
The figure presents the trend of the return on risk-weighted assets by bank type and bank size. The
return on risk-weighted assets is defined as the ratio of operating profit over total risk-weighted assets
expressed in percentage terms. Bank type differentiates between commercial banks, co-operative banks,
savings banks, and investment banks. The classification of bank size is based on total assets. Small banks
(large banks) are defined as the 25% smallest (25% largest) banks in the entire sample of banks with
respect to total assets at time t. Medium-sized banks are banks with total assets in the second and third
quartile. The time series of observations cover the period from 2007 to 2014. All data are obtained from
Bankscope.
4 Risk-adjusted bank performance and income diversification 105
Non−interest income share by bank type
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Figure 4.3 – Bank type and income diversification
The figure presents the time trend of the non-interest income share and its subcomponents fee income
share, trading income share, and other non-interest income share for different types of banks covering the
period from 2007 to 2014. Sample banks are either classified as commercial banks, co-operative banks,
savings banks, or investment banks. The non-interest income share represents the share of non-interest
income in total operating income. Non-interest income is the sum of fee income, trading income, and
other non-interest income. The fee income share, trading income share, and other non-interest income
share are the shares of fee income, trading income, and other non-interest income in total operating
income. All time series are expressed in percentage terms. The data are obtained from Bankscope.
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Non−interest income share by bank size
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Fee income share by bank size
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Trading income share by bank size
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Other non−interest income share by bank size
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Figure 4.4 – Bank size and income diversification
The figure presents the time trend of the non-interest income share and its subcomponents fee income
share, trading income share, and other non-interest income share for small, medium-sized, and large
banks covering the period from 2007 to 2014. The classification of bank size is based on total assets.
Small banks (large banks) are defined as the 25% smallest (25% largest) banks in the entire sample of
banks with respect to total assets at time t. Medium-sized banks are banks with total assets in the second
and third quartile. The non-interest income share represents the share of non-interest income in total
operating income. Non-interest income is the sum of fee income, trading income, and other non-interest
income. The fee income share, trading income share, and other non-interest income share are the shares
of fee income, trading income, and other non-interest income in total operating income. All time series
are expressed in percentage terms. The data are obtained from Bankscope.
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Figure 4.2 shows the time trend of the return on risk-weighted assets assorted by bank
type and bank size. Not surprisingly, the RoRWA variable decreases for each subsample
after the onset of the International Financial Crisis in 2007. Returns are lowest at the
height of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis in 2011. Over time, however, the risk-
adjusted returns of commercial banks and investment banks seem to be more cyclical
than those of co-operative banks and savings banks.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 additionally present the time trends of the four income diversifi-
cation measures NII share, fee income share, trading income share, and other NII share
for the different subsets of the categories bank type and bank size, respectively.
The NII share of commercial banks and investment banks is higher throughout the
sample period than for co-operative banks and savings banks. The same holds true for
the other income diversification variables. Most important though, the diversification
measures’ trajectories of each bank type seem to move in tandem. Figure 4.4 underlines
these results except for the trend of the trading income share. Interestingly, small and
medium-sized banks have significantly increased their trading income share since 2011 if
compared to large banks.
4.3.5 Estimation method
We estimate and explore the impact of income diversification on bank performance using
the following linear regression specification:
Y i,t = α + βY i,t−1 + γDIV i,t +
B∑
b=1
δbX
b
i,t +
M∑
m=1
ζmX
m
i,t +
T∑
t=1
λtTF t + u i + ǫi,t, (4.4)
where subscript i denotes the institution (i = 1, 2, ..., 2, 374) and t indicates the time pe-
riod (t = 2007, 2008, ..., 2014). Yi,t is bank i’s risk-adjusted performance measure RoRWA
at time t and DIV i,t represents any of the four income diversification measures NII share,
fee income share, trading income share or other NII share. Furthermore, the X bi,t’s repre-
sent a set of bank-specific control and dummy variables, the Xmi,t’s a set of macroeconomic
controls, and the TF t’s capture the time fixed effects. U i is the unobserved bank-specific
fixed effect and ǫi,t the remaining idiosyncratic error term. The coefficient α denotes the
intercept of the regression.
We additionally include the one period lag of the dependent variable Yi,t among the
regressors in order to account for the possibility of endogenous performance persistence.
We estimate Equation 4.4 using the two-step system GMM (generalized method of mo-
ments) approach developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).
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The system GMM estimation technique has two major advantages. First, the system
GMM allows us to treat all explanatory variables as endogenous and uses their lagged
values as their instruments, which is especially helpful given the fact that we can easily
expect reverse causalities between bank performance and income diversification.
For example, although the non-interest income share determines a bank’s performance
pattern, a bank could also change its business model and hence its non-interest income
share due to prior underperformance. We therefore treat all bank characteristics as en-
dogenous. The macroeconomic control variables are expected to be exogenous, however.
Second, the system GMM approach deals with the problem of unobservable heterogeneity
across banks by creating a matching equation of the first differences of all variables (i.e.,
by using the technique of first differencing).
Since the two-step system GMM estimation technique produces downward biased stan-
dard errors (Blundell and Bond, 1998), we use a finite sample correction in line with Wind-
meijer (2005). We test the validity of the system GMM instruments using the Hansen’s J
test statistic of overidentifying restrictions, with the H0 hypothesis that the instruments
are exogenous. Furthermore, we report the Arellano and Bond (1991) test statistic for
first- and second-order autocorrelation in the error terms.
4.4 Empirical evidence
In the following, we empirically explore the dependence structure between banks’ non-
interest income shares and their risk-adjusted performance patterns. As a starting point,
Table 4.5 reports the results of regressions with the return on risk-weighted assets as
the dependent variable and the non-interest income share as the explanatory variable of
special interest. All regressions are estimated applying standard error clustering at the
bank level. The coefficients’ standard errors are given in parentheses and the abbreviation
L. indicates the one period lag of the corresponding variable.
Regression (1) reveals that a diversification into non-interest related activities signif-
icantly increases the average bank’s risk-adjusted return measure RoRWA, supporting
the existence of economies of scope. We find no evidence that bank size is significantly
positively related to bank performance, which is in line with the descriptive statistics
of Table 4.4. That is to say, we are unable to find evidence for potential economies of
scale. Banks with higher capital ratios, nevertheless, tend to have higher risk-adjusted
returns. This finding supports Berger (1995), who shows that better capitalized banks
disproportionately benefit from lower funding costs.
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Return on risk-weighted assets
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
L.RoRWA 0.240 *** 0.237 *** 0.236 *** 0.267 *** 0.141 *** 0.252 *** 0.238 ***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.034) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035)
NII share 0.032 *** 0.032 *** 0.029 *** 0.029 *** 0.030 *** 0.031 *** 0.031 ***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Assets 0.013 -0.056 0.027 0.040 0.002 -0.026 -0.011
(0.046) (0.060) (0.046) (0.048) (0.040) (0.064) (0.053)
Capital ratio 0.074 ** 0.084 *** 0.089 *** 0.072 *** 0.030 0.067 ** 0.074 **
(0.029) (0.031) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.030)
Asset growth -0.000 0.002 0.004 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Loan growth 0.003
(0.005)
Loan loss reserves -0.153 *** -0.148 *** 0.148 *** -0.152 *** -0.218 *** -0.157 *** -0.150 ***
(0.022) (0.026) (0.024) (0.020) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022)
Overhead costs -0.860 *** -0.812 *** -0.871 *** -0.012 -0.782 *** -0.889 ***
(0.177) (0.190) (0.181) (0.145) (0.177) (0.178)
Personnel costs -0.384
(0.298)
Nonpersonnel costs -1.019 ***
(0.278)
Net interest margin 1.417 *** 1.430 *** 1.364 *** 1.235 *** 0.714 *** 1.393 *** 1.422 ***
(0.148) (0.150) (0.157) (0.135) (0.143) (0.149) (0.147)
Liquid assets 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.007 0.008
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Nondeposit funding -0.012 ***
(0.003)
Cost income ratio -0.054 ***
(0.005)
Investment bank 0.191
(0.233)
Savings bank -0.266 **
(0.124)
Co-operative bank -0.459 **
(0.224)
Listed 0.203
(0.188)
GDP growth 0.124 *** 0.120 *** 0.113 *** 0.125 *** 0.152 *** 0.108 *** 0.125 ***
(0.032) (0.035) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
GDP per capita 0.005 -0.097 ** 0.003 0.006 -0.003 -0.000 0.006
(0.007) (0.048) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Inflation 0.086 * 0.150 *** 0.078 * 0.073 * 0.157 *** 0.089 ** 0.084 *
(0.044) (0.046) (0.046) (0.042) (0.040) (0.045) (0.044)
Interest rate -0.129 *** -0.091 *** -0.144 *** -0.101 *** -0.066 ** -0.145 *** -0.132 ***
(0.030) (0.033) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.032) (0.030)
Country fixed effects No Yes No No No No No
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.603 0.735 0.618 0.586 0.750 0.593 0.598
Hansen test (p-value) 0.335 0.299 0.020 0.133 0.018 0.293 0.269
Table 4.5 – Non-interest income share and the return on risk-weighted assets
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Table 4.5 – continued:
The figures are estimated from annual sample bank characteristics and annual macroeconomic data
from euro area countries covering the period from 2007 to 2014. All regressions feature the return on
risk-weighted assets (RoRWA) as the dependent variable. RoRWA is defined as the ratio of operating
profit over total risk-weighted assets expressed in percentage terms. L. indicates the one period lag of
the corresponding variable. For a description of the explanatory variables we refer to Table 4.1. The
regressions are estimated using the two-step system GMM methodology with the Windmeijer (2005)
finite sample correction. The estimation method is described in more detail in Section 4.3.5. All bank
performance and income diversification variables as well as all bank-specific control variables are treated
as endogenous. For all above regressions we apply clustered standard errors at the bank level. Standard
errors are given in parentheses. The regression coefficients are assigned asterisks if they are statistically
significant. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-confidence levels. The Hansen
test refers to the difference-in-Hansen tests statistic of exogeneity of the instruments in GMM dynamic
model estimation (H0: instruments are exogenous). AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the Arellano-Bond test
that the average auto-covariance in residuals of order one and two, respectively, is zero. For the ease of
exposition we suppress the regressions’ intercepts.
Furthermore, an increase in the level of banks’ loan loss reserves is significantly neg-
atively associated with bank performance. A poor loan portfolio quality thus decreases
profitability. In contrast, not surprisingly, higher net interest margins and GDP growth
rates increase a bank’s RoRWA. We cannot find evidence that the growth rate of total
assets acts as a driver of the bank performance measure.
Regression (2) contains the same explanatory variables as Regression (1) but includes
country fixed effects to control for differences between the sample bank countries that
are not captured by our macroeconomic control variables and Regression (3) substitutes
the asset growth rate with the loan growth rate in order to control for the effect of
bank growth. In Regression (4) we split the variable overhead costs into its components
personnel costs and nonpersonnel costs to get a better impression about the underlying
drivers of the former costs efficiency variable. Our regression results on the effect of
the non-interest income share remain unaltered. The loan growth rate cannot explain
differences in the level of banks’ RoRWA either. It is worth mentioning, however, that
the overhead costs efficiency variable is mostly driven by nonpersonnel costs. In contrast,
the variable personnel costs is insignificantly related to aggregate bank performance.
In Regression (5) we additionally include the bank-specific control variables nondeposit
funding and cost income ratio. The estimates show that banks with a higher share of
wholesale funding are less profitable than banks funded mainly by customer deposits.
The same relation holds true for the cost income ratio. The inclusion of the variables has
no effect on the economic significance of the income diversification measure. However, the
controls capture the explanatory power of the capital ratio, which becomes insignificant.
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Finally, Regressions (6) and (7) add the bank-specific dummy variables investment
bank, savings bank, co-operative bank, and listed to the regression equation. These
variables enable us to analyze whether a bank’s legal framework has an influence on its
performance. Furthermore, the bank type might influence the degree to which banks can
profit from the diversification into non-interest income activities. For example, one could
expect investment banks to better utilize the benefits of economies of scope.
The data show that we cannot find evidence that investment banks and banks with
a stock exchange listing exhibit, all else being equal, risk-adjusted performance patterns
that are significantly different from those of the average bank. We do find, however, that
both savings banks and co-operative banks do not lift their full performance potential
when compared to the average sample bank. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the former
dummy variables does not change the circumstance that banks can significantly boost
their return on risk-weighted assets by increasing their non-interest income share.
In a next step, we examine the separate impact of the subcomponents of the non-
interest income share on banks’ risk-adjusted performance measure RoRWA. Table 4.6
contains the estimates and is structured as follows. Regression (1) again depicts the non-
interest income share as the dependent variable of interest and Regressions (2), (3), and
(4) feature the fee income share, trading income share, and other non-interest income
share as the dependent variable of interest. All regressions include the bank type dummy
variables investment bank, savings bank, and co-operative bank.
The results demonstrate that an increase in the fee income share coincides with an
increase of the dependent variable RoRWA. The relation is significant at the 5% confidence
level. Likewise, increasing a bank’s share of trading income enhances its return on risk-
weighted assets. Yet, the economic significances of both diversification measures differ
substantially. Whereas a one unit increase in the trading income share increases a bank’s
RoRWA by 0.028 percentage points, a one unit increase in the fee income share only
increases a bank’s RoRWA by 0.015 percentage points. In other words, banks, on average,
can boost their performance twice as much by relatively expanding their trading activities
instead of trying to expand their relative income from fees and commissions.
Regression (4) of Table 4.6 further reveals that a bank’s other non-interest income
share is negatively related to its risk-adjusted performance pattern. The coefficient of the
other NII share variable is significant at the 10% level. A relative increase in non-core
banking activities thus reduces the average bank’s profitability. This finding indicates that
financial institutions should primarily focus on fee generating and trading activities when
expanding into non-interest revenue streams since the benefits of the other non-interest
income share are rather disadvantageous.
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Return on risk-weighted assets
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
L.RoRWA 0.252 *** 0.296 *** 0.269 *** 0.275 ***
(0.035) (0.037) (0.039) (0.038)
NII share 0.031 ***
(0.007)
Fee share 0.015 **
(0.006)
Trading share 0.028 ***
(0.008)
Other NII share -0.029 *
(0.016)
Assets -0.026 -0.015 -0.013 -0.015
(0.064) (0.066) (0.077) (0.068)
Capital ratio 0.067 ** 0.058 *** 0.054 * 0.068 ***
(0.028) (0.023) (0.029) (0.025)
Asset growth 0.000 0.005 -0.003 0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Loan loss reserves -0.157 *** -0.106 *** -0.164 *** -0.121 ***
(0.022) (0.020) (0.025) (0.021)
Overhead costs -0.782 *** -0.600 *** -0.534 *** -0.685 ***
(0.177) (0.175) (0.187) (0.173)
Net interest margin 1.393 *** 0.900 *** 1.179 *** 0.936 ***
(0.149) (0.123) (0.148) (0.128)
Liquid assets 0.007 0.017 ** 0.009 0.014
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Bank type controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.593 0.451 0.529 0.402
Hansen test (p-value) 0.293 0.284 0.365 0.060
Table 4.6 – Baseline results: The non-interest income share and its subcomponents
The figures are estimated from annual sample bank characteristics and annual macroeconomic data
from euro area countries covering the period from 2007 to 2014. All regressions feature the return on
risk-weighted assets (RoRWA) as the dependent variable. RoRWA is defined as the ratio of operating
profit over total risk-weighted assets expressed in percentage terms. L. indicates the one period lag
of the corresponding variable. The label bank type controls includes the dummy variables investment
bank, savings bank, and co-operative bank and the label macro controls refers to the macroeconomic
control variables GDP growth, GDP per capita, inflation, and interest rate. For a description of the
explanatory variables we refer to Table 4.1. The regressions are estimated using the two-step system
GMM methodology with the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction. The estimation method is
described in more detail in Section 4.3.5. All bank performance and income diversification variables as
well as all bank-specific control variables are treated as endogenous. For all above regressions we apply
clustered standard errors at the bank level. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The regression
coefficients are assigned asterisks if they are statistically significant. ***, **, and * denotes significance at
the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-confidence levels. The Hansen test refers to the difference-in-Hansen tests statistic
of exogeneity of the instruments in GMM dynamic model estimation (H0: instruments are exogenous).
AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the Arellano-Bond test that the average auto-covariance in residuals of order
one and two, respectively, is zero. For the ease of exposition we suppress the regressions’ intercepts and
the coefficients of the bank type and macro control variables.
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4.5 Extended analysis and robustness tests
In this section, we present an extended regression framework to further analyze the effects
of the different income diversification measures and discuss the results of a number of
robustness tests, which indicate that the economic significances that we find in our baseline
regression analysis are robust.
We extend our regression analysis to identify the differences between a diversification
into fee income, trading income, and other non-interest income in more detail. For this
reason, we first expand Equation 4.1 by total assets:
RoRWAi,t =
operating profiti,t
risk-weighted assetsi,t
× 100 =
operating profiti,t
total assetsi,t
risk-weighted assetsi,t
total assetsi,t
× 100, (4.5)
where the numerator of the second fraction is the return on assets and the corresponding
denominator the relative riskiness of a bank’s total assets. With these definitions in mind,
we are able to evaluate the effects of the main components of the non-interest income share
on banks’ profit and risk figures in isolation. Table 4.7 reports the results and is organized
as follows. Regressions (1) to (3) feature the ratio of operating profit over total assets
as the dependent variable and regressions (4) to (6) feature the ratio of risk-weighted
assets over total assets as the dependent variable. Both ratios are expressed in percentage
terms. To adequately analyze the relationship between the fee income share, trading
income share, and other non-interest income share and the riskiness of total assets, we
additionally make use of three different control variables that proxy for a bank’s balance
sheet structure. These variables are gross loans, defined as the ratio of total gross loans
over total assets, derivatives, the ratio of on-balance-sheet derivatives over total assets,
and non-earning assets, which is the share of non-earning assets to total assets. Gross
loans, derivatives, and non-earning assets are all expressed in percentage terms.
The fee share in Regression (1) is seen to obtain a coefficient that is positive and
statistically significant. In contrast, Regression (4) shows that fee generating activities
do not provide explanatory power for the ratio of risk-weighted assets over total assets.
An increase in the fee income share thus increases a bank’s profitability but does not
substantially change its riskiness per unit of total assets. These results are in line with
expectations, as the income of fees and commissions should not affect the measures risk-
weighted assets and total assets. Quite the contrary, an increase of the fee income share
should increase a bank’s RoRWA as long as the additional revenues from fees and com-
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missions exceed the additional expenses and costs from a possible cross-subsidization.
The trading income share exhibits significant explanatory power for both the return
on assets and the riskiness of a bank’s total assets. That is to say, increasing the trading
income share results in an increase in banks’ profitability patterns and a decrease in
their risk profiles (see Regressions (2) and (5)). The regression results of Table 4.7 thus
support our finding that diversifying into trading income disproportionately increases
the average bank’s RoRWA when compared to a relative increase of its fee generating
activities. Our findings, though, depend on the adequateness of banks’ risk-weighted
assets as a measure of their underlying credit risk, market risk, and operational risk. In
particular, one possibility why trading activities disproportionately increase institutions’
RoRWA could be due to the fact that the determination of regulatory capital for trading
activities was incorrectly specified over the sample period. In fact, the International
Financial Crisis revealed that major banks’ trading books were insufficiently backed by
regulatory capital, prompting supervisors in the European Union to increase the capital
requirements for market risk in 2010.
We cannot find evidence that the isolated effect of the other non-interest income share
variable on the return on assets is significantly different from zero. The relation between
the former diversification measure and a bank’s riskiness of total assets is positive but
also insignificant.
Next, our summary statistics revealed that bank size has a substantial effect on banks’
income diversification pattern. I.e., the non-interest income share significantly differs
for small, medium-sized, and large banks, with small banks being less and large banks
being most diversified. This fact may indicate that the relationship between a bank’s
non-interest income activities and its profitability depends on bank size. Therefore, we
split our sample of banks into three subsets based on bank size and rerun our baseline
regressions for each subset. The classification of bank size is based on total assets. In line
with the category definitions of Table 4.4, small banks are defined as the 25% smallest
banks in the entire sample of banks with respect to total assets at time t and large banks
are defined as the 25% largest banks with respect to total assets at time t. Medium-sized
banks are banks with total assets in the second and third quartile.
We further control for the possibility of nonlinearities between the income diversifica-
tion measures and banks’ return on risk-weighted assets by including squared terms of the
diversification measures non-interest income share, fee income share and trading income
share. Table 4.8 reports the results. To be more specific, Panel A of Table 4.8 features
the regression results for small sample banks, Panel B for medium-sized sample banks,
and Panel C for large sample banks.
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Operating profit/total assets RWA/total assets
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.Dependent 0.169 *** 0.162 *** 0.163 *** 0.746 *** 0.755 *** 0.733 ***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.033) (0.031) (0.033)
Fee share 0.009 ** -0.007
(0.004) (0.027)
Trading share 0.010 *** -0.082 ***
(0.003) (0.031)
Other NII share 0.003 0.051
(0.005) (0.048)
Assets 0.033 * 0.027 0.030 -0.238 -0.380 -0.262
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.281) (0.323) (0.293)
Capital ratio 0.041 *** 0.047 *** 0.049 *** 0.442 *** 0.340 *** 0.481 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.120) (0.118) (0.121)
Asset growth 0.006 0.004 0.006 * -0.114 *** -0.118 *** -0.109 ***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Loan loss reserves -0.070 *** -0.094 *** -0.069 *** -0.115 -0.050 -0.136
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.108) (0.116) (0.104)
Overhead costs -0.324 *** -0.275 *** -0.275 ***
(0.066) (0.060) (0.060)
Net interest margin 0.507 *** 0.553 *** 0.472 ***
(0.059) (0.050) (0.053)
Liquid assets 0.005 * 0.004 0.004 -0.032 -0.024 -0.047
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.086) (0.077) (0.077)
Gross loans 0.085 0.081 0.093
(0.080) (0.071) (0.070)
Derivatives -0.031 0.025 -0.037
(0.076) (0.072) (0.070)
Non-earning assets 0.051 0.034 0.015
(0.098) (0.089) (0.092)
Bank type and macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.552 0.671 0.561 0.209 0.192 0.250
Hansen test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.745 0.829 0.883
Table 4.7 – Fee, trading, and other NII share and the RoRWA: An extended analysis
The figures are estimated from annual sample bank characteristics and annual macroeconomic data from
euro area countries covering the period from 2007 to 2014. The table is organized as follows. Regressions
(1) to (3) feature the ratio of operating profit over total assets as the dependent variable and regressions
(4) to (6) feature the ratio of risk-weighted assets (RWA) over total assets as the dependent variable,
both expressed in percentage terms. L.Dependent indicates the one period lag of the dependent variable.
Gross loans is the ratio of total gross loans over total assets and derivatives is defined as on-balance-
sheet derivatives divided by total assets. Non-earning assets is the ratio of non-earning assets over
total assets. Gross loans, derivatives, and non-earning assets are expressed in percentage terms. For a
description of the other explanatory variables we refer to Table 4.1. The label bank type controls includes
the dummy variables investment bank, savings bank, and co-operative bank and the label macro controls
refers to the macroeconomic control variables GDP growth, GDP per capita, inflation, and interest
rate. The regressions are estimated using the two-step system GMM methodology with the Windmeijer
(2005) finite sample correction. The estimation method is described in more detail in Section 4.3.5. All
bank performance and income diversification variables as well as all bank-specific control variables are
treated as endogenous. For all above regressions we apply clustered standard errors at the bank level.
Standard errors are given in parentheses. The regression coefficients are assigned asterisks if they are
statistically significant. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-confidence levels.
The Hansen test refers to the difference-in-Hansen tests statistic of exogeneity of the instruments in GMM
dynamic model estimation (H0: instruments are exogenous). AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the Arellano-
Bond test that the average auto-covariance in residuals of order one and two, respectively, is zero. For
the ease of exposition we suppress the regressions’ intercepts and the coefficients of the bank type and
macro control variables.
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Independent of bank size, the non-interest income share is significantly positively re-
lated to the risk-adjusted performance measure RoRWA. That is, small, medium-sized,
and large banks can all enhance their performance figures by increasing their non-interest
income activities. However, differences between the bank size categories become evident
when focusing on the subcomponents of the income diversification measure. Small banks
are able to significantly increase their return on risk-weighted assets by diversifying their
revenue streams into fee generating and trading activities. Both coefficients are significant
at the 5% confidence level and of similar magnitude. Nevertheless, the diversification of
small banks’ revenue streams into trading income generating activities cannot be easily
realized in practice. The implementation of new trading desks, especially for banks that
have not been engaged in trading in the past, comes at very high costs and needs supervi-
sory permission. Small banks could, however, without the need to establish own trading
desks, participate from the advantages of an increased trading income share by setting up
co-operation models with specialized financial institutions. The other non-interest income
share variable is negatively related to risk-adjusted bank performance.
In contrast, for medium-sized and large banks, only the fee income share adds signif-
icant explanatory power to the dependent variable RoRWA. The trading income share
is insignificantly related to the latter. As a consequence, increasing these banks’ trading
activities, on average, should not substantially enhance their performance patterns. One
reason for this finding might be the fact that, in contrast to small banks, medium-sized
and large banks already exhibit optimal trading income ratios. An increase of the former
would then not increase aggregate profitability. Furthermore, Table 4.4 indicates that
small banks have, relatively to the other bank size categories, much lower trading income
shares than fee income shares, suggesting that they are not operating at their optimal
trading income mixture. Finally, we are unable to find evidence that diversifying into
other non-interest income activities is disadvantageous for medium-sized and large banks.
We also examine whether our baseline results are driven by the possibility that only
particular types of banks profit from (or disproportionately profit from) a diversification
into non-interest income generating activities. For example, the positive and significant
relationship between the average bank’s fee income share and trading income share may be
predominantly driven by investment banks or listed banks that already exhibit the highest
non-interest revenue streams and thus are likely to be better and more sophisticated at
utilizing the benefits of economies of scope. In order to control for this particular issue,
Panel A of Table 4.9 features the baseline regression results including the interaction of
the regressions’ corresponding income diversification variable with the dummy variable
investment bank (e.g. NII share ∗ investment bank) and Panel B of Table 4.9 features
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the baseline regression results including the interaction of the regressions’ corresponding
income diversification variable with the dummy variable listed (e.g. NII share ∗ listed).
The results of Regression (1) show that the interaction terms do not significantly
affect the relationship between banks’ aggregate non-interest income share and their risk-
adjusted performance patterns. However, differences between investment banks and listed
banks and the other sample banks become evident when shifting the focus to the fee in-
come share. The positive relation between fee generating activities and a bank’s return
on risk-weighted assets is predominantly driven by the bank type interactions of Regres-
sion (2). The coefficient of the fee income share in Panel A turns out to be only slightly
significant at the 10% confidence level and the coefficient of the fee income share in Panel B
becomes insignificant altogether. That is to say, after controlling for the different type of
banks, the evidence that non-investment banks and non-listed banks can increase their
RoRWA by relatively increasing their business related to fees and commissions seems to
be less clear-cut, whereas investment banks and listed banks excel at utilizing economies
of scope resulting from fee generating activities.
In contrast, Regression (3) reveals that an increase in the trading income share is still
beneficial for all types of banks. We do not find evidence that only investment banks or
listed banks can increase their return on risk-weighted assets by relatively increasing their
trading income streams. The results for the other non-interest income share are similar.
We do not find divergent results for the different types of banks. On average, increases in
the share of other non-interest income reduce a bank’s return on risk-weighted assets.
As primary robustness checks, we consider whether our findings are robust to using
alternative measures of the non-interest income share variable. In order to do so, we
follow De Jonghe et al. (2015) and construct one income diversification measure based
on the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and one diversification measure based on Laeven and
Levine (2007). The first one, denoted Div(HHI), is defined as:
Div(HHI) = 1−
(
NIIi,t
NII + IIi,t
)2
−
(
IIi,t
NII + IIi,t
)2
, (4.6)
where NII denotes the non-interest income and II the interest income. Both variables are
defined as described in Section 4.3.2. The measure can attain a maximum value of 0.5 if
non-interest income and interest income each account for exactly 50% of total operating
income (perfect diversification) and a minimum value of 0 if there is no diversification at
all, i.e., total operating income is exclusively generated by non-interest income or interest
income.
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Panel A – small banks
Return on risk-weighted assets
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
L.RoRWA 0.169 *** 0.152 *** 0.199 *** 0.216 *** 0.226 *** 0.238 *** 0.216 ***
(0.052) (0.050) (0.056) (0.057) (0.054) (0.059) (0.056)
NII share 0.030 *** -0.017
(0.007) (0.016)
NII share ∗ NII share 0.001 ***
(0.000)
Fee share 0.024 ** -0.003
(0.011) (0.015)
Fee share ∗ Fee share 0.000
(0.000)
Trading share 0.020 ** 0.007
(0.009) (0.015)
Trading share ∗ Trading share 0.000
(0.000)
Other NII share -0.033 *
(0.019)
Bank type controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank and macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.259 0.182 0.339 0.318 0.273 0.252 0.255
Hansen test (p-value) 0.489 0.272 0.136 0.593 0.650 0.682 0.618
Panel B – medium-sized banks
Return on risk-weighted assets
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
L.RoRWA 0.236 *** 0.230 *** 0.234 *** 0.245 *** 0.215 *** 0.209 *** 0.268 ***
(0.057) (0.054) (0.064) (0.060) (0.062) (0.065) (0.060)
NII share 0.030 *** -0.027
(0.011) (0.024)
NII share ∗ NII share 0.001 **
(0.000)
Fee share 0.018 -0.045
(0.013) (0.029)
Fee share ∗ Fee share 0.001 ***
(0.000)
Trading share 0.010 0.030
(0.010) (0.021)
Trading share ∗ Trading share -0.000
(0.001)
Other NII share 0.004
(0.022)
Bank type controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank and macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.250 0.246 0.234 0.277 0.258 0.273 0.182
Hansen test (p-value) 0.611 0.679 0.694 0.338 0.780 0.744 0.761
Table 4.8 – Income diversification and bank size (continued on the next page)
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Panel C – large banks
Return on risk-weighted assets
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
L.RoRWA 0.265 *** 0.221 *** 0.226 *** 0.222 *** 0.259 *** 0.243 *** 0.271 ***
(0.047) (0.050) (0.049) (0.051) (0.046) (0.050) (0.049)
NII share 0.033 *** 0.124 ***
(0.012) (0.031)
NII share ∗ NII share -0.001 ***
(0.000)
Fee share 0.034 ** 0.050
(0.013) (0.033)
Fee share ∗ Fee share -0.000
(0.001)
Trading share 0.017 0.037
(0.013) (0.023)
Trading share ∗ Trading share -0.000
(0.000)
Other NII share -0.010
(0.013)
Bank type controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank and macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.380 0.484 0.396 0.427 0.310 0.313 0.289
Hansen test (p-value) 0.728 0.971 0.196 0.057 0.132 0.504 0.267
Table 4.8 – Income diversification and bank size
The figures are estimated from annual sample bank characteristics and annual macroeconomic data from
euro area countries covering the period from 2007 to 2014. The table is organized as follows. Panel A
features the baseline regression results for small sample banks, Panel B for medium-sized sample banks,
and Panel C for large sample banks. The classification of bank size is based on total assets. Small banks
(large banks) are defined as the 25% smallest (25% largest) banks in the entire sample of banks with
respect to total assets at time t. Medium-sized banks are banks with total assets in the second and third
quartile. All regressions feature the return on risk-weighted assets (RoRWA) as the dependent variable.
RoRWA is defined as the ratio of operating profit over total risk-weighted assets expressed in percentage
terms. L. indicates the one period lag of the corresponding variable and variable ∗ variable illustrates
the use of an interaction term. The label bank type controls includes the dummy variables investment
bank, savings bank, and co-operative bank and the label macro controls refers to the macroeconomic
control variables GDP growth, GDP per capita, inflation, and interest rate. Bank controls indicates
that the bank-specific control variables assets, capital ratio, asset growth, loan loss reserves, overhead
costs, net profit margin, and liquid assets are used in the regression analysis. For a description of the
explanatory variables we refer to Table 4.1. The regressions are estimated using the two-step system
GMM methodology with the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction. The estimation method is
described in more detail in Section 4.3.5. All bank performance and income diversification variables as
well as all bank-specific control variables are treated as endogenous. For all above regressions we apply
clustered standard errors at the bank level. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The regression
coefficients are assigned asterisks if they are statistically significant. ***, **, and * denotes significance at
the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-confidence levels. The Hansen test refers to the difference-in-Hansen tests statistic
of exogeneity of the instruments in GMM dynamic model estimation (H0: instruments are exogenous).
AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the Arellano-Bond test that the average auto-covariance in residuals of order
one and two, respectively, is zero. For the ease of exposition we suppress the regressions’ intercepts and
the coefficients of all control variables.
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Panel A – income diversification benefits and investment banks
Return on risk-weighted assets
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
L.RoRWA 0.244 *** 0.286 *** 0.272 *** 0.284 ***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.039)
NII share 0.031 ***
(0.007)
NII share ∗ investment bank -0.002
(0.010)
Fee share 0.011 *
(0.007)
Fee share ∗ investment bank 0.024 **
(0.011)
Trading share 0.033 ***
(0.007)
Trading share ∗ investment bank -0.020
(0.021)
Other NII share -0.032
(0.021)
Other NII share ∗ investment bank 0.002
(0.031)
Bank type controls excl. investment bank Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank and macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.617 0.502 0.573 0.362
Hansen test (p-value) 0.128 0.287 0.177 0.164
Panel B – income diversification benefits and stock exchange listing
Return on risk-weighted assets
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
L.RoRWA 0.248 *** 0.285 *** 0.271 *** 0.269 ***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.039) (0.037)
NII share 0.032 ***
(0.007)
NII share ∗ listed 0.003
(0.007)
Fee share 0.010
(0.007)
Fee share ∗ listed 0.023 ***
(0.007)
Trading share 0.027 ***
(0.007)
Trading share ∗ listed 0.007
(0.018)
Other NII share -0.036 **
(0.018)
Other NII share ∗ listed 0.027
(0.031)
Bank type controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank and macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.556 0.472 0.503 0.376
Hansen test (p-value) 0.065 0.375 0.475 0.047
Table 4.9 – Income diversification and the impact of investment banks and listed banks
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Table 4.9 – continued:
The figures are estimated from annual sample bank characteristics and annual macroeconomic data from
euro area countries covering the period from 2007 to 2014. The table is organized as follows. Panel A
features the baseline regression results including the interaction of the regressions’ corresponding income
diversification variable with the dummy variable investment bank and Panel B features the baseline
regression results including the interaction of the regressions’ corresponding income diversification variable
with the dummy variable listed. All regressions feature the return on risk-weighted assets (RoRWA) as
the dependent variable. RoRWA is defined as the ratio of operating profit over total risk-weighted assets
expressed in percentage terms. L. indicates the one period lag of the corresponding variable and variable
∗ variable illustrates the use of an interaction term. The label bank type controls includes the dummy
variables investment bank, savings bank, and co-operative bank and the label macro controls refers to the
macroeconomic control variables GDP growth, GDP per capita, inflation, and interest rate. Bank controls
indicates that the bank-specific control variables assets, capital ratio, asset growth, loan loss reserves,
overhead costs, net profit margin, and liquid assets are used in the regression analysis. For a description
of the explanatory variables we refer to Table 4.1. The regressions are estimated using the two-step
system GMM methodology with the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction. The estimation method
is described in more detail in Section 4.3.5. All bank performance and income diversification variables as
well as all bank-specific control variables are treated as endogenous. For all above regressions we apply
clustered standard errors at the bank level. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The regression
coefficients are assigned asterisks if they are statistically significant. ***, **, and * denotes significance at
the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-confidence levels. The Hansen test refers to the difference-in-Hansen tests statistic
of exogeneity of the instruments in GMM dynamic model estimation (H0: instruments are exogenous).
AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the Arellano-Bond test that the average auto-covariance in residuals of order
one and two, respectively, is zero. For the ease of exposition we suppress the regressions’ intercepts and
the coefficients of all control variables.
The second measure, denoted Div(LL), is defined as:
Div(LL) = 1−
∣∣∣∣non-interest incomei,t − interest incomei,tnon-interest incomei,t + interest incomei,t
∣∣∣∣ . (4.7)
Regressions (1) and (2) of Table 4.10 report the estimates. Both regressions feature
the ratio of operating profit over total risk-weighted assets as the dependent variable.
The results using the former diversification measures rather than the non-interest income
share variable are very similar to our previous findings. An increase in a bank’s income
diversification significantly increases its return on risk-weighted assets and thus improves
aggregate bank performance. The income diversification variables Div(HHI) and Div(LL)
are significant at the 5% and 1% confidence level, respectively.
We also test if a change in the risk-adjusted performance measure’s definition may alter
our regression results. For this reason we redefine a bank’s return on risk-weighted assets
as the ratio of net income over total risk-weighted assets. That is to say, the risk-adjusted
performance measure now additionally captures the effect of the income statement items
non-recurring and non-operating income and expenses.
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Operating profit/RWA Net income/RWA
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.Dependent 0.254 *** 0.251 *** 0.255 *** 0.291 *** 0.283 *** 0.295 ***
(0.037) (0.040) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.040)
Div(HHI) 0.637 **
(0.297)
Div(LL) 1.129 ***
(0.387)
NII share 0.032 ***
(0.006)
Fee share 0.024 ***
(0.006)
Trading share 0.025 ***
(0.006)
Other NII share -0.034 ***
(0.013)
Assets -0.097 -0.072 0.034 0.069 0.035 0.046
(0.078) (0.081) (0.054) (0.061) (0.063) (0.064)
Capital ratio 0.111 *** 0.102 *** 0.095 *** 0.085 *** 0.084 *** 0.087 ***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.026) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025)
Asset growth 0.011 * 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Loan loss reserves -0.133 *** -0.144 *** -0.102 *** -0.050 *** -0.103 *** -0.053 ***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016)
Overhead costs -0.867 *** -0.818 *** -0.641 *** -0.578 *** -0.446 *** -0.584 ***
(0.186) (0.184) (0.144) (0.140) (0.140) (0.147)
Net interest margin 0.841 *** 1.100 *** 0.877 *** 0.520 *** 0.649 *** 0.455 ***
(0.132) (0.139) (0.126) (0.098) (0.110) (0.103)
Liquid assets 0.009 0.013 0.007 0.014 ** 0.007 0.012 *
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Bank type and macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.217 0.419 0.985 0.969 0.924 0.852
Hansen test (p-value) 0.600 0.354 0.222 0.004 0.197 0.002
Table 4.10 – Different measures of income diversification and RoRWA
The figures are estimated from annual sample bank characteristics and annual macroeconomic data from
euro area countries covering the period from 2007 to 2014. The table is organized as follows. Regressions
(1) and (2) feature the ratio of operating profit over total risk-weighted assets (RWA) as the depen-
dent variable and replace the NII share variable with the variables Div(HHI) and Div(LL). Regressions
(3) to (6) feature the ratio of net income over total RWA as the dependent variable. The dependent
variables are expressed in percentage terms. L.Dependent indicates the one period lag of the dependent
variable. Div(HHI) is a measure of income diversification based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and
Div(LL) is a income diversification measure based on Laeven and Levine (2007). For a description of
the other explanatory variables we refer to Table 4.1. The label bank type controls includes the dummy
variables investment bank, savings bank, and co-operative bank and the label macro controls refers to
the macroeconomic control variables GDP growth, GDP per capita, inflation, and interest rate. The
regressions are estimated using the two-step system GMM methodology with the Windmeijer (2005)
finite sample correction. The estimation method is described in more detail in Section 4.3.5. All bank
performance and income diversification variables as well as all bank-specific control variables are treated
as endogenous. For all above regressions we apply clustered standard errors at the bank level. Standard
errors are given in parentheses. The regression coefficients are assigned asterisks if they are statisti-
cally significant. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-confidence levels. The
Hansen test refers to the difference-in-Hansen tests statistic of exogeneity of the instruments in GMM
dynamic model estimation (H0: instruments are exogenous). AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the Arellano-
Bond test that the average auto-covariance in residuals of order one and two, respectively, is zero. For
the ease of exposition we suppress the regressions’ intercepts and the coefficients of the bank type and
macro control variables.
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Regressions (3) to (6) of Table 4.10 show the estimates. Our results do not change sub-
stantially. Regression (3) reveals that a diversification into non-interest related activities
significantly increases the average bank’s risk-adjusted return measure, supporting the ex-
istence of economies of scope. Furthermore, we again find that both the fee income share
and the trading income share are significantly positively related to bank performance.
Both variables are significant at the 1% confidence level. However, the magnitudes of the
effects of the fee income share and the trading income share on the dependent variable net
income over risk-weighted assets do not differ anymore. The former has a regression co-
efficient of 0.024 percentage points and the latter a coefficient of 0.025 percentage points.
Regression (6) provides further evidence that an increase in banks’ other non-interest
income share is disadvantageous for their aggregate performance patterns. This time the
relationship is significant at the 1% level, supporting the view that income diversification
is only beneficial if it is based on core banking activities.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze how banks’ income diversification affects their risk-adjusted
performance patterns on the basis of a broad representative sample of euro area banks
covering the period from 2007 to 2014. We measure a bank’s profitability employing the
variable return on risk-weighted assets and proxy for income diversification by calculating
the shares of non-interest income, fee income, trading income, and other non-interest
income in total operating income.
Our empirical analysis reveals that a diversification into non-interest related activities
significantly increases banks’ return on risk-weighted assets, supporting the existence of
economies of scope. That is, an increase in both the fee income share and the trading
income share increases the average bank’s risk-adjusted performance pattern. Yet, the
economic significances of both diversification measures differ substantially. On average,
banks can boost their performance twice as much by relatively expanding their trading
activities instead of trying to expand their relative income from fees and commissions.
We additionally find evidence that diversifying into other non-interest income activities
is disadvantageous for a bank’s profitability. The latter is in line with the point of view
that income diversification is only beneficial if it is based on core banking activities.
We conduct a number of robustness tests, which indicate that the economic signifi-
cances that we find in our baseline regression analysis are fairly robust. However, we also
find that the relation between non-interest income diversification and aggregate bank prof-
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itability is substantially driven by bank type and bank size. Especially investment banks
and banks with a stock exchange listing excel at utilizing economies of scope resulting
from fee generating activities, whereas the evidence that other type of banks can actually
increase their return on risk-weighted assets by relatively increasing their business related
to fees and commissions is less clear-cut.
The effect of the trading income share on banks’ return patterns is not distorted by
the bank type identifiers, but depends on bank size. Small banks are able to significantly
increase their return on risk-weighted assets by diversifying their revenue streams into
trading activities. Nevertheless, the diversification of small banks’ revenue streams into
trading income generating activities cannot be easily realized in practice. The implemen-
tation of new trading desks, especially for banks that have not been engaged in trading in
the past, comes at very high costs and needs supervisory permission. Small banks could,
however, without the need to establish own trading desks, participate from the advantages
of an increased trading income share by setting up co-operation models with specialized
financial institutions.
In contrast, for medium-sized and large banks, the trading income share is insignif-
icantly related to risk-adjusted bank profitability. As a consequence, increasing these
banks’ trading activities, on average, should not substantially enhance their performance
patterns, suggesting that medium-sized and large banks already exhibit optimal trading
income ratios.
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